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JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION
Elizabeth Chamblee Burch*

& MargaretS. Williams**

Peeking under the tent of our nation's largest and often most

impactful cases reveals thatjudges often act like ringmasters: They delegate their authority to a wide array of magistratejudges, specialmasters,
and settlement administrators.Some, like the American Bar Association,
see this as a plus that promotes efficiency and cost savings. Critics, how-

ever, contend that delegatingjudicialpower especially to private citizens,
removes adjudicationfrom public scrutiny, injects thorny ethical questions about ex parte communications, and risks cronyism and high costs.
By constructingan originaldataset of ninety-two multidistrictproducts liabilityproceedingscentralizedoverfourteen years, we introduce the
first taxonomy of the diverse adjuncts working within them. Testing
adjuncts'effects with a multivariateanalysis, we found that proceedings
with special masters lasted 66% longer than those without, and appointing any kind of adjunct meant that the proceedingwas 43% less likely to
end. Not only did justice take longer it cost more: 74% of the adjuncts
were not magistratejudges, meaning that the parties paid them.
Digging deeper we interviewed some of the lawyers, judges, and
adjuncts who participated in these proceedings. Attorneys' experiences
moved scholars' concernsfrom law review pages to real life: Rather than
improving justice, some adjuncts cajole parties through off-the-record
discussions; repeat players tap one anotherfor business; and plaintiffs'
outcomes may depend more on whether they picked an attorney with the
inside track than their suits' merits. Collectively, our findings support
existing reservations about allocatingjudicialpower to those in the pri-

vate sector

* Fuller E. Callaway Chair of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. We are deeply
grateful to the many special masters, magistrate judges, district courtjudges, claims administrators, and plaintiffs' and defense attorneys who allowed us to interview them about all
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drafts, we thank participants in the 5th Annual Civil Procedure Workshop, as well as Lynn
Baker, Zach Clopton, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Maria Glover, Abbe Gluck, Teddy Rave,
Judith Resnik, and Adam Zimmerman. Special thanks to Brooke Carrington, Mollie Fiero,
Leah Hibbler, Sarah Quattrocchi, and Lauren Wallace for their research assistance and to
Tarek Roshdy and the editors at Columbia Law Review for their editorial assistance.
** Adjunct Faculty, Johns Hopkins University.
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INTRODUCTION

Shortly after he received the massive Opiate multidistrict litigation
(MDL), the transferee judge appointed three special masters to do everything from meeting with the parties and mediating disputes to analyzing
legal submissions, coordinating with other courts, and interpreting parties' agreements.' Indeed, it was his special master who proposed a novel
"negotiation class" as a means to unite cities and counties pre-settlement.2
The court compensated these special masters "at their current MDL rates"
but did not disclose them, allowing each to file itemized fee statements
under seal instead.3 Appointments included Cathy Yanni, an arbitrator
who works for the for-profit arbitration company JAMS; the late Francis
McGovern, who was a professor at Duke Law School; and David Cohen, a
professional special master and former president of the Academy of CourtAppointed Masters.4
For more than two decades,judges presiding over mass-tort proceedings like these have parceled their authority out to a range of "judicial
adjuncts"-non-Article III judges who are judicially appointed to perform
judicial or administrative tasks within a specific proceeding and range
from public magistrate judges to privately paid special masters, claims
administrators, escrow agents, and settlement masters. Often appointed
and rarely studied, these adjuncts work behind the scenes, out of the spotlight, yet wield enormous power over the nation's largest and often most
significant cases.
Outsourcing judicial power to private adjuncts raises no shortage of
questions about cost, transparency, horizontal equity, oversight, and
accountability. On the defense side, companies pay private adjunct fees on

1. Appointment Order at 1-3, In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 1:17-MD-2804
(N.D. OhioJan. 11, 2018).
2. Francis E. McGovern & William B. Rubenstein, The Negotiation Class: A Cooperative
Approach to Class Actions Involving Large Stakeholders, Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 22-23), https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3403834 (on file with the Columbia
Law Review).
3. Appointment Order, supra note 1, at 5-6.
4. E.g., David R. Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges: No Contest, Fed.
Law., Sept. 2014, at 73, 73 [hereinafter Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges].
We were deeply saddened to learn of Francis McGovern's recent death.
5. "Judicial adjunct" is a short-hand umbrella term that encompasses a wide array of
positions that range from special masters appointed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
53 to magistrate judges appointed under Article I of the U.S. Constitution. See infra note 29
and accompanying text. For readability, we sometimes use the shorthand term "magistrate"
rather than the full title "magistrate judge," which is the proper title. We mean no offense

by this.
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top of their white-shoe lawyers' hourly rates.6 And on the plaintiffs' side,
contingent-fee attorneys eventually deduct adjunct fees as a litigation cost,
which means that it is not typically lawyers' bottom line that suffers but
plaintiffs' settlement amounts. 7 Deeper questions abound as well: If private
adjuncts must depend on the attorneys for future appointments and
income, can they be neutral? What effect might their appointment have
on creating precedent and adhering to the rule of law?
Without addressing these questions, the American Bar Association
(ABA) recently called for courts to appoint one type of adjunct, special
masters, regularly in MDLs.' Creating an MDL means that the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation has decided that dispersed federal cases
share enough factual similarities that transferring and centralizing them
before the same judge for pretrial purposes promotes justice and efficiency. 9 MDL has thus become the go-to mechanism for handling complex, high-profile mass torts,10 such as cases against Juul over e-cigarettes"
andJohnson &Johnson over talcum powder.12 The "transferee judge," the
judge who receives these cases, bears enormous responsibility: The vast
majority of cases are resolved by motion or settlement within the MDL.
Historically, fewer than 3% of all transferred cases are ever remanded to
their court of origin.13

6. See Thomas E. Willging, Laural L. Hooper, Marie Leary, Dean Miletich, Robert
Timothy Reagan & John Shapard, Special Masters' Incidence and Activity: Report to the
Judicial Conference's Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and Its Subcommittee on Special

Masters 42 (2000), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/SpecMast.pdf [https://
perma.cc/BXX3-M3TQ].
7. See infra section III.B.3.
8. ABA, Resolutions with Reports to the House of Delegates: 2019 Midyear Meeting
Res. 100, at 51 (2019), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/
houseof delegates/ebook-of-resolutions-with-reports/2019-midyear-ebook-of-resolutions-

with-reports.pdf [https://perma.cc/LGH7-8EDF]

[hereinafter ABA Resolutions]; ABA,

Summary of Action of the House of Delegates: 2019 Midyear Meeting 20-21 (2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/houseofdelegates/
summary-of-action/summary-of-action-midyear-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/TE56-7YYB]
(adopting the guidelines). Multidistrict litigation is a procedure that the federal courts use
to coordinate cases with at least one common factual question before the same judge for
pretrial handling. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018). In practice, however, few cases are ever
remanded to their court of origin, which makes what happens in the MDL all the more
important. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 La. L.

Rev. 399, 400 (2014) [hereinafter Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation] ("As of 2010,
the Panel remanded only 3.425% of cases to their original districts.").

9. 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a).
10. See Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 8, at 417 (recognizing
the expediency of settling complex cases as a key success of multidistrict litigation).
11. See Transfer Order at 1-2, In re Juul Labs, Inc., Mktg., Sales Pracs., & Prods. Liab.

Litig., MDL No. 2913 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 2, 2019).
12. See Transfer Order at 1-2, In re Johnson &Johnson Talcum Powder Prods., MDL

No. 2738 (J.P.M.L. Oct. 4, 2016).
13. Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 8, at 400-01.
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The ABA's report proposed that MDLs in particular could "benefit
from specialized expertise" and that "[e]ffective special masters reduce
costs by dealing with issues before they evolve into disputes and by swiftly
and efficiently disposing of disputes that do arise."" The ABA's resolution
thus urged judges to appoint special masters at "the outset of litigation"
and permit them to do everything from overseeing discovery and pretrial
litigation to conducting trials based on parties' consent, allocating settlements, and administering claims.15 Failing to do so, it cautioned,
"[r] egardless of the reason,... may disserve the goal of securing 'a just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination."' Yet neither this reproach nor
the ABA's claims about special masters' utility included systematic empirical support.17
In contrast to the ABA's position, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53
condones appointing special masters for issues "that cannot be effectively
and timely addressed by an available district court judge or magistrate
judge."18 Put simply, it creates a presumption in favor of appointing magistrates in lieu of special masters.19 And though the Manual for Complex
Litigation suggests that courts enjoy broad authority to designate experts,
technical advisors, and special masters, it too cautions that these judicial
adjuncts can increase the already high costs of complex cases, warns that
"[t]ruly neutral experts are difficult to find," and suggests that it may be
hard to know early on whether appointments are warranted.20 "Reference
to a special master must be the exception and not the rule," the Manual
explains.21 Even the Federal Judicial Center's Pocket Guide for Transferee
Judges warns, "In a products liability MDL, it may be particularly difficult
to appoint a completely disinterested special master with no prior relationship to any of the parties, since special masters are often practicing attor14. ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 56-57. But see Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization

of the Judiciary, 92 Yale L.J. 1442,1466 (1983) [hereinafter Fiss, Bureaucratization] ("There
is an undeniable freshness and richness to the judgments of a non-specialist. There is also
less chance of capture by a special interest group.").
15. ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 59-60.

16. Id. at 59 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
17. The ABA commissioned a study of the use of special masters. Data collection problems
resulted in case studies that highlighted, but could not test, how special masters were used
and what their impact was. The two case studies did not involve multidistrict proceedings.
Barbara Meierhoefer, Special Master Case Studies 31 (2018), https://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/aba/publications/judicial-division/20181c-specialmasterscasestudy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7A5V-N2LL] (noting that the response rate to the attorney survey pool

was only 14%).
18. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1) (C).
19. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note on 2003 Amendment (noting that
"appointment of a master must be the exception and not the rule"); George C. Hanks, Jr.,
Searching from Within: The Role of Magistrate Judges in Federal Multi-District Litigation,

8 Fed. Cts. L. Rev. 35, 44 (2015).
20. Fed.Jud. Ctr., Manual for Complex Litigation §§ 11.51-11.52 (4th ed. 2004), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/mcl4.pdf [https://perma.cc/9P72-5PQV].

21. Id. § 11.52.
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neys and tend to have substantial experience with similar disputes." 22 In
other words, special mastering is a business, and like most businesses, it
requires repeat patrons.
Of course, the latest version of the Manual was written in 2004 and
the Pocket Guide in 2011. The Federal Judicial Center last studied special
masters twenty years ago.23 Considering all civil cases, not just complex
ones, that study found that judges appointed special masters in fewer than
two of every 1,000 cases (0.2%).24 But several years thereafter, one federal
judge predicted "that we will see more and varied appointments of such
adjuncts by the year 2020, to the benefit of the courts." 25
It's now 2020. This Article wades into this controversy to set aside the
crystal ball and offer a fresh empirical look at all court-appointed adjuncts
in products liability MDLs-not just special masters and magistrates. We
built and hand coded an original dataset from all products liability pro-

ceedings centralized from 2004 to 2017 that closed by April 15, 2019ninety-two proceedings that included class and nonclass settlements. 26 It
is, to our knowledge, the first attempt that anyone has made to look under
the tent and document courts' interaction with and oversight of a growing
industry that thrives upon settlements.27 Our deep dive into appointments,
costs, and proceedings' duration ultimately prompts us to raise a caution
flag about outsourcing judicial duties to private adjuncts.

22. BarbaraJ. Rothstein & Catherine R. Borden, Fed.Jud. Ctr., Managing Multidistrict
Litigation in Products Liability Cases: A Pocket Guide for Transferee Judges 38 (2011),

https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MDLGdePL.pdf
YCLH].

[https://perma.cc/B3MD-

23. See Willging et al., supra note 6.
24. Id. at 3. Judges were slightly more likely to consider appointing a special master in
cases involving patents, environmental matters, and airplane personal injuries. Id.
25. Shira Scheindlin, We Need Help: The Increasing Use of Special Masters in Federal

Court, 58 DePaul L. Rev. 479, 486 (2009).
26. For a breakdown of outcomes, see infra section III.A.2. When a proceeding "closes,"
it means that the entire proceeding and all of the actions within it have either concluded or
been remanded to their courts of origin such that the transferee judge has nothing left to
do. See, e.g., U.S.Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., MDL Statistics Report - Docket Summary
Listing 1 (2020), https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/RecentlyTerminated_

MDLs-January%201-September-15-2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/ND52-C3N4] (citing date
closed).
27. As Professor Deborah Hensler observed, there is a particular need for legal scholarship on claims resolution facilities, or what we call settlement programs. See Deborah R.
Hensler, Alternative Courts? Litigation-Induced Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 Stan. L.
Rev. 1429, 1435-36 (2005) [hereinafter Hensler, Alternative Courts] ("[L]egal scholars
have not delved deeply into the rules that govern claims resolution facilities or how those
rules are implemented."); Deborah R. Hensler, Assessing Claims Resolution Facilities: What

We Need to Know, 53 Law & Contemp. Probs. 175, 176-78 (1990) (proposing "an agenda
for research on claims resolution facilities" that could assist in providing better alternatives
for the future). We join Professor Hensler in requesting more transparency as to what happens within these settlement programs such that scholars can empirically assess the many
substantive and procedural questions that remain unanswered.
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In the existing academic literature, outsourcing has been both celebrated and condemned, often as the judicial role itself changes. Part I
situates the debate amid judges' shift from dispassionate arbiters to case
managers to, now, supervisors. It also debunks some persistent myths
about "burgeoning" caseload statistics along the way. Although surveying
the existing literature on magistrates and special masters exposes a turf
war between their various proponents, the primary purpose is to set the
stage for our inquiry into howjudges use these adjuncts in MDLs and highlight the remarkable scarcity of work on less traditional adjuncts like claims
administrators, lien resolution companies, banks, and escrow agents.
Part II dives into the MDL ecosystem, placing our dataset within the
world of multidistrict proceedings and debuting a taxonomy of the cast of
characters who appear within it. Despite a call to arms over "a crisis in the
courts,"2" this Part demonstrates that today's judges appoint what we collectively dub "judicial adjuncts" with no greater frequency than they did
in past years with a lighter workload.29 Adjuncts still appear at every stage:
pretrial, settlement negotiations, and post-settlement. 30 What we did discover, however, was a vast settlement support network comprised of banks,
claims administrators, notice experts, certified public accountants, and
lien resolution administrators.31
Part III moves from tallying and classifying these adjuncts to statistically analyzing their effects. In so doing, we are mindful that data and
analytics can tell us only so much; justice cannot be measured solely by
how long a proceeding lasts nor can one measure intangibles like the
benefits or drawbacks of allowing adjuncts to operate behind the scenes. 32
Nevertheless, these findings should help inform courts' cost-benefit calculus, and two key results are highlighted here.
First, it was surprising to find that proceedings with special masters
lasted 66% longer than those without. 33 Of course, this raised a causal
which-came-first question: Did judges appoint special masters to larger
proceedings anticipating that they would be more difficult (and thus take
28. Mark A. Fellows & Roger S. Haydock, Federal Court Special Masters: A Vital

Resource in the Era of Complex Litigation, 31 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1269, 1287 (2005).
29. This Article builds on Professor Linda Silberman's term. Linda Silberman, Judicial

Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc Procedure, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 2131, 213132 (1989) [hereinafter Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited] (using the term judicial
adjuncts" primarily to refer to masters and magistrates, who customize procedure for specific cases).

30. See id. at 2135-36, 2139-40, 2169-70 (describing some of the roles played by judicial adjuncts in litigation).

31. See infra section II.B.3.
32. See generally Miguel F. P. de Figueiredo, Alexandra D. Lahav & Peter Siegelman,
The Six-Month List and the Unintended Consequences ofJudicial Accountability, 105 Cornell
L. Rev. 363 (2020) (finding evidence suggesting that the six-month list, which evaluates how
long a motion has been pending on a judge's docket, may prompt judges to make more
errors).
33. See infra section III.A.4.
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longer) to resolve? Or did the special masters themselves cause that delay?
Using a duration model made it possible to screen some noise by controlling for a proceeding's outcome (settlements uniformly took longer), personal injury claims (which likewise took longer), and the number of
actions (the more actions, the longer the proceeding lasted).34 We found
that appointing a judicial adjunct of any kind made the proceedings continue longer than they otherwise would, all else being equal.35 Although
adding another plaintiff's action to a proceeding had almost no effect on
how long it lasted, designating an adjunct meant that the proceeding was
43% less likely to end.36 And for every additional adjunct appointed, there
was a 12% decrease in the probability of a proceeding ending. 37
These findings raise questions about whether efficiency claims can
justify appointingjudicial adjuncts. To be sure, there may be other benefits
such as specialized expertise and, perhaps more controversially, the ability
to talk with parties behind closed doors, 38 but if judges rely on adjuncts
primarily to ease their caseload and speed proceedings along, then they
ought to reconsider.
Second, costs rise to the fore because parties are paying for both
lengthier lawsuits and private adjuncts. But in considering adjuncts' costs,
we ran into a significant roadblock: Compensation information was either
undisclosed or affirmatively sealed for 62.8% of private adjunct appointments. 39 Even though we couldn't always identify the amounts charged, we
were able to discern that plaintiffs alone bore the costs for 54% of private
adjuncts, meaning that in over half of the appointments, defendants did
not contribute.40 Some of the payments that we could unearth ran into the
millions. In the Actos proceeding, for instance, Special Master Gary Russo
charged over $4.7 million, and Deputy Special Master Kenneth DeJean
charged over $1.3 million.41 To administer the Zyprexa settlement, Special
Settlement Masters Ken Feinberg, Michael Rozen, Cathy Yanni, and John
Trotter collectively charged over $9.4 million.42
If proceedings with adjuncts cost more and last longer, why do judges
appoint them? To piece together this puzzle, we supplemented our quan-

34. See infra section III.A.4.
35. See infra section III.A.4.
36. See infra section III.A.4.
37. See infra section III.A.4.
38. See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2147 (discussing the
potential for abuse that arises from ex parte communication with adjuncts).

39. See infra Table 15.
40. See infra section III.B.3.
41. Order Appointing Special Masters at 1, 6, In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab.

Litig., No. 6:11-md-02299-RFD-PJH (W.D. La. Apr. 11, 2012); infra Table 16. We tabulated
sixty-five docket entries to calculate the aggregate numbers for DeJean and sixty-four docket
entries for Russo.

42. Order at 1, In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:04-md-01596 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 29,
2007).
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titative analysis with twenty-two semi-structured, confidential interviews.
These interviews include conversations with special masters, magistrate
judges, claims administrators, district judges, and plaintiffs' and defense
attorneys with a wealth of experience not only in our proceedings but also
in MDLs spanning back to the 1960s.4 3 Interviews revealed two competing
narratives, which Part IV highlights. In one version, courts outsourced to
effectively manage complex cases behind the scenes and closely monitored
those appointed. In the other, repeat players in both the bar and the
private-adjunct sector came to mutually beneficial arrangements that
exposed real-life problems over capture, self-dealing, bias, transparency,
and ad hoc procedures.44
Shining light into this segment of the MDL world made it clear that
privatization no longer exists on a parallel track with Article III courtsjudges outsource their own power to private actors. As privatization occurs
under the aura of the federal courts, it raises central questions about court
access, cost, impartiality, and fairness, which intersect with existing literatures debating courts' purpose, ad hoc rulemaking, and the judicial role.
Part V thus steps back to offer some larger institutional lessons and
chart a path forward. As courts delegate authority to private adjuncts who,
more often than not, plaintiffs must compensate, justice may come with a
heavier price tag for those least able to afford it. Judges sometimes cite the
enormous expense of complex proceedings as a whole as a reason to
appoint an adjunct, but moving from the grandiose to the granular shows
that those choices have real impact on individual plaintiffs. In the pelvicmesh proceedings, for instance, one plaintiff's settlement statement
revealed a $6,200 fee for "settlement program expense allocation" plus a
"Cathy Yanni Appeal Cost" of $2,000.45 Costs, attorneys' fees, and mandatory medical-lien holdbacks whittled a settlement offer of $195,000 down

43. For more on methodology, see infra Appendix.
44. See infra Part IV.
45. Confidential Claim Closing Statement (on file with authors). In the Ethicon proceeding, of all the private adjunct appointments, only Cathy Yanni's settlement-master fee
was sporadically disclosed, and it varied. To "appeal" whatever amount she awarded, a plaintiff always had to pay $2,000, but her initial review in one settlement cost $300 per claim
plus $10,000 per calendar quarter. In another she charged $350 per claim, and in yet a third,
claim review cost a flat $300. See Pretrial Order #335 (Order Appointing Cathy Yanni as
Special Master for Private Settlement Agreements Between Ethicon & Certain Plaintiffs'

Counsel) at 3, In re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2327 (S.D.
W. Va. Mar. 15, 2019); Pretrial Order #253 (Order Appointing Cathy Yanni as Special Master
for Private Settlement Agreements Between Ethicon & Certain Plaintiffs' Counsel) at 3, In

re Ethicon, Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2327 (S.D. W. Va. filed Apr.
28, 2017); Pretrial Order #236 (Order Appointing Cathy Yanni as Special Master for Private
Settlement Agreements Between Ethicon & Certain Plaintiffs' Counsel) at 3, In re Ethicon,

Inc. Pelvic Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 2327 (S.D. W. Va. filed Sept. 8, 2016).
Yanni's contrasting charges, with some mesh plaintiffs having to pay more for administrative
costs than others, illustrate some of the controversies these appointments entail. Orders are
available at https://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/MDL/ethicon/orders.html.
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to less than $60,000. As the New York Times reported, this plaintiff's experience was not an anomaly: The average pelvic-mesh plaintiff received "less
than $60,000" despite horrific injuries.47 Medical costs alone can wipe
plaintiffs out financially, and one claims administrator estimated that at
least 15% of mesh plaintiffs were bankrupt. 48 Reducing costs-measured
in both time and actual dollars-is thus crucial.
Appointing magistrate judges, whose salaries come from the general
tax revenue, is often a better alternative. As salaried public employees,
magistrates are further insulated from the capture, bias, and self-interest
concerns that plague party-selected, party-compensated private adjuncts.49
They can (and have) performed the same work as special masters, and
sometimes even claims administrators, for far less expense. 50 They are
already ensconced within the federal courthouse and they possess the
legitimacy of federal office.51 Plus, they are accustomed to the ways in
which judges review their decisions, and clear paths exist for correcting
error.5 Far from complaining about the workload, our interviews suggest,
in harmony with previous findings, that many magistrate judges want and

enjoy MDL work. 53 As products liability MDLs play a policing role that
impacts public health, it makes sense to use the general tax base to compensate the public servants who help resolve these disputes and to ensure
that the work itself is both public and reviewable. 54

46. Confidential Claim Closing Statement, supra note 45.
47. Matthew Goldstein, As Pelvic Mesh Settlements Near $8 Billion, Women Question

Lawyers' Fees, N.Y. Times (Feb. 1, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/01/business/
pelvic-mesh-settlements-lawyers.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
48. Telephone and In-Person Interviews with Products Liability MDL Actors (Dec. 1,
2019 through Mar. 1, 2020) (transcript on file with authors) [hereinafter Interviews].
49. See infra Part V.
50. See infra section III.B.
51. See infra section I.A.
52. See infra section V.B.
53. Interviews, supra note 48; see also Hanks, supra note 19, at 52-53.
54. In this Article, "policing" means investigating wrongdoing and holding companies
civilly responsible for faulty products by seeking compensatory and, when warranted, punitive damages. Ensuring that this work occurs in the open addresses a recent criticism that
MDLs lack transparency. See, e.g., Michelle Conlin, Dan Levine & Lisa Girion, Why Big
Business Can Count on Courts to Keep Its Deadly Secrets, Reuters (Dec. 19, 2019), https://
[https://perma.cc/
www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-lobbyist
R2YU-BT6H]; Jaimi Dowdell & Benjamin Lesser, These Lawyers Battle Corporate America
-and
Keep Its Secrets, Reuters (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/
special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-lawyers [https://perma.cc/SA4V-SBWP]; Benjamin Lesser,

Dan Levine, Lisa Girion & Jaimi Dowdell, How Judges Added to the Grim Toll of Opioids,
Reuters (June 25, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/usa-courtssecrecy-judges [https://perma.cc/768U-KBHL]; Dan Levine, Court Let Merck Hide Secrets
About a Popular Drug's Risks, Reuters (Sept. 11, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/

investigates/special-report/usa-courts-secrecy-propecia

[https://perma.cc/7Z8H-PACV].
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I. OUTSOURCEDJUDGING
For decades now, a rising caseload has prompted concerns within
both the judiciary and the academic community about how to best serve
justice. In 1995, the Judicial Conference (the federal courts' policy-making
body) painted a doomsday scenario: "If the federal courts' civil and criminal jurisdiction continues to grow at the same rate it did over the past 53
years, the picture in 2020 can only be described as nightmarish. Should
that occur, in twenty-five years the number of civil cases commenced
annually could reach 1 million . . .. "55 Thankfully, those estimates did not
pan out: In 1995, there were 239,013 civil filings in federal court; 56 in 2019,
there were 293,520.57 In the state courts, civil filings decreased 11% from

2006 to 2015.58
Nevertheless, workloads were increasing in federal courts. As cases
59
rose faster than Article IIIjudgeships, calls forjudicial adjuncts mounted.
Initially, magistrate judges assisted: Their ranks swelled from 470 magistrates in 1990 to 570 in 2012, and their share of case terminations
increased "227 percent" during this time. 60 Nevertheless, pleas for support
continued. One districtjudge went so far as to proclaim that "[i]f the court
refuses to get the help it needs, it will not be able to effectively deal with
its docket."61
Enter special masters. Once the workhorses for managing institutional reform outside the court context, special masters became the proposed savior of the courts, especially in the context of MDLs. Interestingly,
cries for more special masters were made by the special masters themselves: Several years before his appointment as special master in the Opiate
proceeding, David Cohen published an article titled Special Masters Versus
MagistrateJudges: No Contest.62 "It is clear that federal judges do, in fact,
need more help, which is why I believe they should ask for it more often,"

55. Jud. Conf. of the U.S., Long Range Plan for the Federal Courts 18 (1995), https://
www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/federalcourtfederalcourtslO.pdf

[https://perma.cc/

973R-HW33].
56. Id.
57. Table C-U.S. District Courts-Civil Statistical Tables for the FederalJudiciary, U.S.
Cts. (June 30, 2019), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c/statistical-tables-federal-

judiciary/2019/06/30 (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
58. Nat'l Ctr. for State Cts., Examining the Work of State Courts: An Overview of 2015
State Court Caseloads 4 (2016) ("Though the decrease in incoming Civil cases was 11 percent
for the entire 10-year period, caseloads have declined 21 percent since reaching an apex of

19.5 million cases in 2009.").
59. See Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges, supra note 4, at 73 (noting
that the increase in caseloads has outpaced the increase in number ofjudges).

60. Id. at 74.
61. Scheindlin, supra note 25, at 486; see also Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate
Judges, supra note 4, at 73-74 (describing the federal caseload increase and district judges'
need for assistance).
62. Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges, supra note 4.
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he wrote. 63 He cited several claims in support: Civil and criminal caseloads
have increased 17%, complexity makes that number even more compelling, and clerks' offices have less staff.64 "The calculus is inescapabledistrict judges are being asked to do more with less. They need help.""
Despite noting that the number of magistrates increased, and despite the
fact that high caseload projections had already missed their mark when
Cohen made his push, he nevertheless concluded that "the support provided by our magistrate judges doesn't change the calculus."66 Cohen surmised that "[j]udges should appoint special masters when circumstances
call for it, and increasing caseloads indicate those occasions are arising
more and more frequently." 67
Both the increase in magistrates' use and the demands for more special masters highlight how judicial roles have changed steadily over the
past fifty years. In his canonical work, The Role of the Judge in Public Law
Litigation, Professor Abram Chayes chronicled the shift, noting the judge's
move from passive arbiter to actively "shaping, organizing and facilitating
the litigation.'"68 As Professor Arthur Miller observed, "Other than a few
experiments after the Second World War," judicial management "was virtually non-existent." 69 By the 1980s, however, judges began "playing a
critical role in shaping litigation and influencing results," wrote Professor
Judith Resnik; yet they have been doing so by working "beyond the public

63. Id. at 73.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 74. Cohen's sentiment is widely shared by special masters' proponents. See,
e.g., ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 55-56 (" [C]ourts often lack sufficient resources to
manage certain cases-particularly complex commercial cases."); Kenneth R. Feinberg,
Creative Use of ADR: The Court-Appointed Special Settlement Master, 59 Alb. L. Rev. 881,
885-86 (1996) [hereinafter Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR] (noting the burden placed on
the court system by the modern trial docket and the resulting need for special masters);
Fellows & Haydock, supra note 28, at 1287-97 (noting the need for special masters to help
cover the demands on the federal judiciary due to the increase in case filings, complexity of
cases, and average duration); Scheindlin, supra note 25, at 481-82 (detailing the circumstances when special masters should be used to ease the caseload burden on the federal

judiciary).
66. Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges, supra note 4, at 74. But see Philip
M. Pro & Thomas C. Hnatowski, Measured Progress: The Evolution and Administration of
the Federal Magistrate Judges System, 44Am. U. L. Rev. 1503,1506 (1995) ("From its inception,
the magistrates system has evolved to meet the needs of the federal judiciary .... "); Joe
Palazzolo, Magistrate Judges Play a Larger Role, Wall St.J. (Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/magistrate-judges-play-a-larger-role-1428355226 (on file with the ColumbiaLaw Review)
(noting the importance of magistrate judges in helping parties avoid years long delays in
overburdened federal courts).
67. Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges, supra note 4, at 76.

68. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 Harv. L. Rev.
1281, 1298 (1976).
69. Arthur R. Miller, What Are Courts For? Have We Forsaken the Procedural Gold

Standard?, 78 La. L. Rev. 739, 795 (2018).
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view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned

opinions. "70
Today's judges still play a managerial role, but, as Cohen's work conveys, it is not just cases they manage-it's people.7 1 Surveying the existing
literature on special masters and magistrate judges, this Part sets the stage
for an inquiry into how and why judges delegate in MDLs. It also introduces a core question about who is best suited to perform judicial tasks:
public servants like magistrates, or private actors like special masters?
A.

Magistrates

Magistrate judges are judicial officers who assist district court judges
by handling a wide array of civil and criminal pretrial (and sometimes
trial) matters.72 Selected by the judges of a particular district, they serve
eight-year terms when in a full-time capacity 73 and may be reappointed
indefinitely. 74 When the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil
Procedure amended Rule 53 in 1983, its members noted that creating fulltime magistrates eliminated the need for "standing masters" and would
help alleviate the need for special masters. 75 In amending Rule 53 again in
2003, the Advisory Committee cautioned that "[p] articular attention
should be paid to the prospect that a magistrate judge may be available for
special assignments." 76 And, as the oft-quoted treatise Federal Practice and
Procedurewarns, "[1] itigants ought not be asked to bear the expense of a
reference if the matter is one that the judge easily might hear and determine." 77 In other words, special masters-as private adjuncts paid by the
parties-must take a backseat to district and magistrate judges.
70. Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 374, 377-78 (1982) [hereinafter
Resnik, Managerial Judges].
71. See Kenneth R. Feinberg, Response to Deborah Hensler, A Glass Half Full, a Glass
Half Empty: The Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation,
73 Tex. L. Rev. 1647, 1647 (1995) (noting that managerial judging is a necessity and that
using special masters is critical because "there is no better alternative"); Dionne Searcey,
Judges Outsource Workloads as Cases Get More Complex, Wall St. J. (Sept. 29, 2013),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/judges-outsource-workloads-as-cases-get-more-complex1380490748 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (explaining the role of the special master
in a hip-implant MDL, which includes handling "spats over attorneys' fees," "pretrial issues,"
and "tasks as small as circulating lunch menus in advance of meetings").

72. See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2018) (detailing the various powers of U.S. magistrate judges,
including civil and criminal issues).

73. Id. § 631(e).
74. Federal Magistrates Act, Pub. L. No. 90-578, § 401(b), 82 Stat. 1107, 1118 (1968)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 631). For more about magistrate judges, see Questions
and Answers About Magistrate Judges, U.S. Dist. Ct. of Utah, https://www.utd.uscourts.gov/
questions-and-answers-about-magistrate-judges [https://perma.cc/Y3TA-88EE] (last visited

Sept. 2, 2020).
75. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note on 1983 Amendment.
76. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note on 2003 Amendment.
77. 12 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2603

(3d ed. 2014).
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When magistrate judges first entered the legal landscape, however,
scholars raised separation of powers concerns and questioned their
authority as Article I judges who lack Article III's life tenure. 78 Despite
these early objections, the Supreme Court found the use of magistrates
constitutional, noting that they are subject to the district court's discretion
and control.79 And the Supreme Court later declared that magistrates are
"nothing less than indispensable." 0 Without them, the Court concluded,
"the work of the federal court system would grind nearly to a halt."81
Today, when it comes to pretrial matters in civil cases, magistrates may
do everything except dismiss cases without the parties' consent and decide
judgments on the pleadings and motions for injunctive relief, failure to
state a claim, summary judgment, and class certification. 82 They can conduct evidentiary hearings, preside over discovery, and even serve as special
masters under Rule 53.83 Magistrate judges handle over a million civil and
criminal matters per year, and there are nearly as many magistrates as there
are district judges.84

78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 604, 631-39; see also Note, Article III Constraints and the Expanding
Civil Jurisdiction of Federal Magistrates: A Dissenting View, 88 Yale L.J. 1023, 1051 (1979)
("Even without judicial coercion, however, routinization and expansion of consensual reference must eventually come to violate Article III constraints."). This began to change in
the 1980s and 1990s when magistrates "were renamed 'magistrate judges."' Judith Resnik,
Trial as Error, Jurisdiction as Injury: Transforming the Meaning of Article III, 113 Harv. L.

Rev. 924, 989 (2000) [hereinafter Resnik, Trial as Error] (citing Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 321, 104 Stat. 5089, 5117 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §
631)). As Professor Resnik explains, when the Act was first passed, the idea was that magistrates were "assistants to district judges, appointed by district judges, but were not themselves judges."' Id. (quoting Federal Magistrates Act: Hearings on S. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Improvements in Jud. Mach. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong.
241j-245 (1967) (statement of Warren Olney and accompanying reports from the Judicial
Conference Committee on the Administration of Criminal Law)).

79. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681-84 (1980) (" [T]he magistrate acts
subsidiary to and only in aid of the district court.").
80. Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 928 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(quoting Virgin Islands v. Williams, 892 F.2d 305, 308 (3d Cir. 1989)).
81. Wellness Int'l Network, Ltd. v. Sharif, 135 S. Ct. 1932, 1939 (2015).
82. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979 enlarged magistrates' powers
substantially, even allowing them to preside over trials if the parties consent. Id. § 631(c) (1).
83. Id. § 636(b)(2).
84. Christina L. Boyd & Jacqueline M. Sievert, Unaccountable Justice? The Decision

Making of Magistrate Judges in the Federal District Courts, 34Just. Sys. J. 249, 249 (2013).
There are 549 authorized, full-time magistrates, 29 part-time, and 3 combination clerk/
magistrate judge positions. Status of Magistrate Judge Positions and Appointments-Judicial
Business 2019, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/status-magistrate-judge-positions-and-

appointments-judicial-business-2019 [https://perma.cc/NTQ7-EBFX] (last visited Sept. 2,
2020). There are 677 authorized district courtjudgeships, 115 vacancies, and 412 senior judges.
Status of Article IIIJudgeships-Judicial Business 2018, U.S. Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/
statistics-reports/status-article-iii-judgeships-judicial-business-2018
[https://perma.cc/58PT-

H4HC] (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
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Special Masters

Even as courts relied routinely upon magistrates, the need for longterm monitoring in civil rights settlements and other institutional-reform
litigation prompted judges to seek external help. In suits that require
structural changes, like school desegregation, someone must ensure that
the parties comply with the court-ordered declaratory or injunctive relief.85
But neither districtjudges nor magistrate judges can drop their other cases
to focus fully on something like integrating schools, so courts began outsourcing to special masters (court-appointed adjuncts who perform particular tasks on a given case and tend to come from the private sector), citing
their inherent equity power to do so. 86 As Justice Brandeis once explained,
courts have "inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate
instruments required for the performance of their duties," which includes
"authority to appoint persons unconnected with the court to aid
[them] ."87
Because many of these early structural-change lawsuits concerned
Rule 23(b) (2) class actions, the court's equitable duty to enforce remedial
decrees dovetailed with its class action monitoring role.88 Scholars and
courts then carved a path for judges to supervise class counsel, 89 so it made
sense thatjudges would likewise have the power to appoint a special master
to implement class settlements.
As special masters' use evolved to include settlement administration,
so too did Rule 53, which authorizes courts to appoint special masters. 90 In

85. See, e.g., Curtis

J.

Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The

Odyssey of a Special Master, 78 Colum. L. Rev. 707, 710 (1978) (describing the role of the
special master in the integration of Coney Island schools). "It is fundamental that equity
will not issue a decree it cannot enforce," so the maxim goes. United States v. Ga. Power

Co., 528 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (citation omitted).
86. Samuel Jan Brakel, Special Masters in Institutional Litigation, 4 Am. Bar Found.
Rsch. J. 543, 544-45, 549 (1979); Vincent M. Nathan, The Use of Masters in Institutional

Reform
87.
88.
89.

Litigation, 10 U. Tol. L. Rev. 419, 419-23 (1979).
Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312-13 (1920).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
E.g., Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279 (7th Cir. 2002) (recog-

nizing ajudicial duty to protect the members of a class in class action litigation from "lawyers
for the class who may, in derogation of their professional and fiduciary obligations, place
their pecuniary self-interest ahead of that of the class"); Chris Brummer, Note, Sharpening
the Sword: Class Certification, Appellate Review, and the Role of the FiduciaryJudge in Class

Action Lawsuits, 104 Colum. L. Rev. 1042, 1060-62 (2004) (outlining how the vigilance
required of district judges in scrutinizing proposed class settlements creates questions of
judicial conduct, rather than unmet legal standards").
90. See Brakel, supra note 86, at 546-49 (outlining the history and emergence of special masters in litigation); Resnik, Trial as Error, supra note 78, at 988 (describing how the
use of special masters developed through Judicial Conference Committees in the 1950s and
1960s); James S. DeGraw, Note, Rule 53, Inherent Powers, and Institutional Reform: The

Lack of Limits on Special Masters, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 800, 800 (1991) (" [T]he roles played
by judicial adjuncts, and more specifically special masters, have become crucial to the
smooth functioning of courts." (footnotes omitted)).
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overhauling the rule in 2003, the Advisory Committee retained its core
precaution "that appointment of a master must be the exception and not
the rule,"9 1 but allowed special masters to perform an array of duties with
the parties' consent.92 Even if the parties refuse to consent,judges may still
appoint special masters if matters "cannot be effectively and timely
addressed by an available district judge or magistrate judge." 93

)

Despite the rule's precaution, special masters' proponents argue that
complex MDLs regularly need specialized expertise that magistrates lack. 94
Precisely because they are not judges, special masters often have a backstage pass that allows them to go, do, and see things that district and magistrate judges cannot.9 5 An authorizing order licensing them to communicate with the parties ex parte liberates special masters to cinch deals that
might otherwise fail. 96 (Of course, designating a magistrate as a special
master under Rule 53(h) technically gives them the same freedoms.9 7
Special masters' critics, on the other hand, worry about high costs,
ever expanding authority, lack of oversight, and added delay. 98 They suggest that paying judicial appointees by the hour can incentivize them to
91. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's note on 2003 Amendment.
92. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a). As Professor Silberman suggested many years ago, nothing in
Article III prohibits magistrate judges from exercising a district court judge's power so long
as the parties consent. She reasoned that because Rule 53's restrictions "are designed largely
for [parties'] protection, litigants should be able to knowingly waive the protection thus
afforded." Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part II: The American Analogue, 50

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1297, 1354 (1975) (footnote omitted).
93. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a)(1).
94. See, e.g., ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 56 ("Special masters who have specialized expertise in relevant fields can provide a practical resource to courts in cases that would
benefit from subject-matter expertise."); Margaret G. Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy

of Special Masters, 2 Widener L. Symp.

J.

235, 255, 273 (1997) [hereinafter Farrell, The

Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters] (describing the different roles special masters
have played in toxic tort litigation).
95. See Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR, supra note 65, at 885-86, 891-92 (noting that
ex parte communications allow special masters to "obtain information which, if conveyed
to the court, might prejudice any subsequent trial"); Fellows & Haydock, supra note 28, at
1281-82 ("Some level of ex parte communication with the parties is required for the master
to adequately perform mediation or facilitated negotiation roles.").
96. See ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 56 (highlighting the ethical constraints on
judges, which limit their ability to participate in ex parte communications); Feinberg, Creative
Use of ADR, supra note 65, at 891-92 (discussing a special masters' ability to "coordinate and
effectuate settlement discussions" through ex parte communications).
97. When judges appoint magistrates as special masters under Rule 53(h), the provisions

of that rule govern. See Beazer E., Inc. v. Mead Corp., 412 F.3d 429,445 (3d Cir. 2005) (" [T]he
District Court claims that it reviewed both the Magistrate Judge's factual findings and its
legal conclusions de novo. This is inconsistent with Rule 53(e)(2) .... "); Richardson v.

Bedford Place Hous. Phase I Assocs., 855 F. Supp. 366, 368 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (finding that
Rule 53 conferred upon a magistrate judge the power to prepare a special master's report,
not a judicial order).
98. See Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary or

Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 394, 396 (1986); Farrell, The Function and
Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 273-74; Hanks, supra note 19, at 47.

2020 ]

JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MDL

2145

expand proceedings unnecessarily, thereby delaying justice and undermining the efficiency sought." Cost implications led some scholars and
courts to suggest that appointing special masters creates a two-tiered justice system in which parties who can afford them might receive swifter justice than everyone else or, conversely, that slower justice may come at a
steeper price.1 00
Addressing the use of alternative decisionmakers in ManagerialJudges,
Professor Resnik warned, "[o]ne disadvantage of this proposal is that, by
creating some set of 'others' to perform managerial tasks, it causes yet
another transformation of the courts-this time into a 'bureaucratic' judiciary." 101 Delegating, she notes, "provides little assurance that the power
will be exercised more fairly or efficiently than it would be if judges
retained such authority."102 Privatizing judicial duties, in particular, has
prompted wide-ranging debates about partiality, legitimacy, transparency,
and ad hoc procedures. 103
Special masters do not stumble into their court-appointed positions;
they are selected by the parties, or sometimes by the judge, and thus share
certain attributes with arbitrators. 104 Those accepted into this elite cadre,
says Professor and former Director of the American Bar Foundation
Bryant Garth, "must be people acceptable to the parties who are repeat
players." 105 As both attorneys and special masters develop expertise, repeat
players on both sides emerge. Special masters' livelihood depends on their
next assignment, which means they must ensure that whoever is likely to
produce that next job is pleased with their work.106 That, in turn, can
prompt concerns about favoritism, particularly if the master serves in concurrent proceedings with the same attorneys.
99. See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2137, 2150-51 ("The
addition of a special master, who usually charges a normal hourly fee, can be staggering."
(footnotes omitted)).

100. See Adventures in Good Eating v. Best Places to Eat, 131 F.2d 809, 815 (7th Cir. 1942)
("It is a matter of common knowledge that references greatly increase the cost of litigation
and delay and postpone the end of litigation."); Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of
Special Masters, supra note 94, at 273; Fellows & Haydock, supra note 28, at 1271; DeGraw,
supra note 90, at 803 (" [B] road delegation ofjudicial powers to special masters can abrogate
the various safeguards of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Federal Rules of Evidence,
and canons of judicial conduct.").
101. Resnik, ManagerialJudges, supra note 70, at 437.

102. Id.
103. See Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 275

("[T]here are few institutional mechanisms to safeguard the neutrality of special masters
and eliminate possible conflicts of interest."); Hanks, supra note 19, at 49-51 (noting that
"litigants may worry that special masters are not truly neutral" because special masters "tend
to have substantial experience with similar disputes" and may have a prior relationship with
some or all of the parties).
104. See infra section

II.D.

105. Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a

Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 927, 930, 939 (2002).
106. Hanks, supra note 19, at 49.
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Special masters, like magistrates, are subject to the same Code of
Conduct as U.S.judges as well as the disqualification standards in 28 U.S.C.
§ 455.107 Nevertheless, if the parties consent to the master's appointment
despite a conflict, they can waive circumstances that would otherwise
require judicial recusal.108 And unlike merit-selection panels for magistrates (who are appointed for eight-year terms), no standards exist to guide
judges in choosing special masters. 109
As judges outsource authority to special masters in lieu of magistrate
judges, critics lament the demise of trans-substantive rules. Using private
adjuncts, they say, makes adjudication too informal, takes proceedings
away from officers of the court, raises thorny ethical issues about ex parte
communications, and removes key decisionmaking from public scrutiny
and challenge.11 0 Using special masters might thus lead to less process and
insulate decisions from judicial review, triggering concerns about
fairness."
Rule 53, for example, pads special masters' decisions with some judicial deference, stating that judges review procedural matters for abuse of
discretion and factual findings de novo.11 2 But those standards are all subject to one important caveat: Parties can agree otherwise, and everything
might be final depending on the appointment order.113 Magistrate judges,
on the other hand, are subject to the district court's constant controlparties must consent before a magistrate enters a finaljudgment, and their
decisions may be appealed to an Article III court.114 Summarizing these

107. Jenkins v. Sterlacci, 849 F.2d 627, 630-31 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
108. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(a) advisory committee's note on 2003 Amendment.
109. See Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Article I Judges in an Article III World:

The Career Path of Magistrate Judges, 16 Nev. L.J. 823, 830-32 (2016); Silberman, Judicial
Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2133-34. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 631 et seq. (2018)
(detailing the standards for appointing magistrate judges), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 (setting

no parameters on selecting special masters).
110. Brazil, supra note 98, at 421; Feinberg, Creative Use of ADR, supra note 65, at 885
("Increased use of such Special Masters has given rise to provocative ethical questions concerning the relationship of the Master to both the parties and the appointing court.");

Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2136, 2176-77 (" [T]he use ofjudicial adjuncts has pushed formalized procedure into retreat."); DeGraw, supra note 90, at
804. Early critics likewise raised legitimacy questions. Given the proliferation of agencies,
bankruptcy courts, and magistrate judges, however, this legitimacy concern may be less
poignant today than it was in the 1980s and 90s. See, e.g., Farrell, The Function and
Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 286.
111. See Brazil, supra note 98, at 418 (comparing special masters with court appointed
experts and noting that the former lack the procedural safeguards of the latter).

112. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3)-(5).
113. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f) (3) (B).
114. Judges review nondispositive decisions to determine whether they are clearly erroneous and dispositive motions on a de novo basis. Fed. R. Civ. P. 73(a), (b); Wright & Miller,

supra note 77 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 1629, at 8 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4254).
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 72 and 73 spell out magistrates' statutory authority. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72 (discussing pretrial orders); Fed. R. Civ. P. 73 (discussing trial by consent).
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concerns, Professor Silberman explained, "To the extent that cases are
shaped, ad hoc procedures embraced, settlements influenced and even
coerced, and law articulated, special masters may represent an even
greater threat to the integrity of the process because they are private individuals who are not institutionally entrusted with judicial powers."11
II. A TAXONOMY OFJUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MDLS
As judges rely on special masters and magistrates to assist them in traditional civil suits where caseloads have remained relatively steady, how
might the picture change as cases become more complex? Although civil
filings have not risen much since 1995, the number of actions included in
MDLs has slowly but steadily increased.116 Large mass torts, proceedings
with 1,000 or more actions, have likewise grown in recent years.11 7 And
though proceedings with 1,000 or more total actions range in type from
products liability to common disaster, miscellaneous, and sales practices,
92% are products liability.118 Known to be some of the most difficult proceedings to manage,11 9 it is within this world of products liability MDLs that
we gathered data on transferee judges' use ofjudicial adjuncts.

A.

Dataset Description

We built an original dataset by collecting and hand coding data from
all products liability proceedings that the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation (the Panel) centralized between 2004 and 2017 that had ended
by April 15, 2019.120 Those dates allow us to examine an array of ninetytwo proceedings centralized and closed over a substantial period of time.
It likewise enables us to make more accurate apples-to-apples comparisons
about whether appointing a judicial adjunct speeds a proceeding alongor not. 121 Collectively, those ninety-two proceedings involved 79,641
actions.

115. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2137.
116. Margaret S. Williams, The Effect of Multidistrict Litigation on the FederalJudiciary

over the Past 50 Years, 53 Ga. L. Rev. 1245, 1270 (2019).
117. Still, even when they reached a high of nine proceedings in 2011, those large proceedings were never more than 15% of all the proceedings centralized. Id. at 1275.

118. Id.
119. E.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Glass Half Full, Glass Half Empty: The Use of Alternative
Dispute Resolution in Mass Personal Injury Litigation, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 1587, 1602 (1995)
[hereinafter Hensler, Glass Half Full] (describing the challenges that courts face in mass torts).
120. Centralization refers to the date the Panel issued an order to transfer related cases
from across the country to the same judge for coordinated pretrial handling. See, e.g., U.S.
Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig., Calendar Year Statistics (2019), https://www.jpml.uscourts.

gov/sites/jpml/files/JPMLCalendarYearStatistics-2019_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TG3LAV2] (referring to motions for centralization and dates for granting those motions).
121. For a list of those proceedings and a detailed description of our methodology, see

infra Appendix.
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Before delving into our findings, we first explore the variations among
these proceedings by considering the year they were centralized, the outcomes, the length of the proceedings, the number of actions within each,
which federal districts handled the proceedings, and the transferee judge's
prior MDL experience. This exercise demonstrates that our dataset provides a robust sample. Of course, given our emphasis on closed proceedings, more of the proceedings began earlier in our time period than later,
but they nevertheless vary considerably by age. 122 A sample more heavily
weighted toward older proceedings is also consistent with the recent
decline in the Panel's grant rate given that fewer proceedings are now centralized. 123 Some readers may consider proceedings over or resolved once
a settlement program is announced, but courts appoint many of the
adjuncts we examine to help with administering the settlement, which
makes settlement the beginning of their work, not the end. Thus, the date
that the court formally closes the proceeding remains an important milestone in measuring adjuncts' contributions and efficiency. We do, however,
include settlement dates and analyze that data in section III.A.
Variety among centralization dates suggests that our sample proceedings will differ in how long they last, which they do, substantially: Proceedings were open an average of 1,743 days (4.7 years), with a minimum of

202 days (In re ChryslerLLC 2.7 Liter V-6 Engine Oil Sludge Products Liability
124
Litigation,
open for less than one year) and a maximum of 4,964 days (In
re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, open for 13.6 years). 125 Considering
how long a proceeding lasts, on average, by centralization year shows that
a proceeding's length tends to vary, with newer proceedings ending somewhat sooner than those centralized earlier. Again, however, this is likely a
function of our focus on closed proceedings; we note it here for the sake
of comparison outside the bounds of our analysis. Figure 1 simply shows
that a proceeding's average length changes by centralization year.

122. We used the closed date because it is a uniform metric across all of the proceedings
that encompasses the time that it takes to complete all activities to end a proceeding. We
realize that an MDL may have settled long before it officially closes and that a proceeding
may remain open just so that the parties can complete time-consuming tasks like lien resolution. Because those tasks are often outsourced to judicial adjuncts (and plaintiffs will not
receive final payments until they are completed), those delays are important to our study as
well.

123. See Williams, supra note 116, at 1266.
124. 598 F. Supp. 2d 1372 (J.P.M.L. 2009).
125. 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005); see infra Table 18.
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Figure 1: Average Proceeding Duration by Centralization Year
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The number of actions within a proceeding can considerably impact
its longevity. All else being equal, larger proceedings take longer to close
than do smaller ones. The number of actions in a given proceeding differed markedly in our dataset: Our proceedings included an average of
866 actions, with a low of three (In re Saturn L-Series Timing Chain Products

Liability Litigation 126 ) to a high of 11,860 (In re Yasmin & Yaz (Drospirenone)
Marketing, Sales Practices & Products Liability Litigation127 ). Not surprising
given our focus on closed proceedings, those centralized more recently
tend to be smaller than those centralized earlier-smaller proceedings
tend to conclude more quickly than do larger ones. Figure 2 highlights
our sample proceedings' diversity by size.

126. 536 F. Supp. 2d 1367 (J.P.M.L. 2008).
127. 655 F. Supp. 2d 1343 (J.P.M.L. 2009); see U.S. Jud. Panel on Multidistrict Litig.,
Multidistrict Litigation Terminated Through September 30, 2019, https://www.jpml.
uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPMLCumulativeTerminatedLitigations-FY-2019.pdf [https://
perma.cc/3TG3-LAV2] (last visited Sept. 2, 2020). These numbers likely undercount the
actions affected by the MDL for two reasons: (1) Global settlements often include state-court
plaintiffs and unfiled claims as well, and (2) judges have begun to create inactive shadow
dockets and parties institute tolling agreements, such that claims do not actually appear on
the docket. See, e.g., Transcript of Status Conference at 7, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc., Pelvic

Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:12-md-2325 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 1, 2019) ("As of now, we
have approximately 2,000 MDL cases on the inactive docket, and we are aiming to have an
additional 6,000 on the inactive docket by the end of this month, for a total of 8,000 by the
end of the month."). Unfortunately, systematic data is not available to remedy either deficiency.
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Figure 2: Number of Actions in Proceedings
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The Panel centralized these ninety-two proceedings in thirty-five districts across the United States, with a plurality in the District of Minnesota.
Table 1 shows the variety among the number of proceedings in each district, from most to fewest. Although our dataset included only thirty-five
districts, those districts represent ones that the Panel typically selects for
mass torts over time. While the Southern District of New York is considered
to be a frequent transferee district, for example, it does not typically
receive mass torts. 128 Other districts such as the District of NewJersey and
the Northern District of Ohio-found in our data as well-are more common transferee courts for products liability proceedings. 129

128. See Williams, supra note 116, at 1277-78 (noting that the Southern District of New
York typically handles antitrust and securities proceedings).

129. Id.
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Table 1: Transferee Districts by Number of Proceedings, with
Total Actions

Ditrk

Prix e tings

Ac iti~ Disliric

Pru eedin,.

lctime

D. Minn.

8

6887

N.D. Al.

2

3053

D.N.J.

7

551

E.D.N.C.

1

12

N.D. Ohio

6

3086

M.D. Tenn.

1

667

D.S.C.

6

3802

D.R.I.

1

2233

C.D. Cal.

6

130

D. Neb.

1

3

N.D. Cal.

5

2320

W.D. Wash.

1

4

N.D. Ill.

5

109

M.D. Ga.

1

862

E.D. Pa.

5

1001

S.D. Iowa

1

23

S.D.N.Y.

4

3782

W.D. La.

1

5193

E.D. La.

4

15204

W.D. Mo.

1

38

S.D. Ill.

3

14494

E.D. Mich.

1

172

S.D. W. Va.

3

1043

N.D. Tex.

1

25

S.D. Fla.

2

2057

E.D. Ky.

1

279

E.D.NY.

2

2035

E.D. Wis.

1

8

M.D. Fla.

2

8396

S.D. Ohio

1

8

N.D. Ga.

2

429

W.D. Okla.

1

13

D. Kan.

2

65

E.D. Mo.

1

57

W.D. Ky.

2

1580

Within our dataset, the Panel selected transferee judges with a wide
range of previous MDL experience. Of the ninety-two proceedings, for
instance, thirty-five judges (38%) were receiving their first assignment.
Overall, judges within our sample had an average of three assignments,
with a low of one and a high of ten: Thirty-five received their first assignment, twenty-two their second, seventeen their third, eight their fourth,
three their fifth, two their sixth, and one their tenth. Note two caveats
about these numbers: First, where more than one judge presided over a
proceeding, we used the terminating judge's experience because of our
focus on closed proceedings. 130 Second, a number of transferee judges in
130. Seven proceedings saw more than one judge assigned over the life of the proceeding: In re Ford Motor Co. E-350 Van Products Liability Litigation (No. II), In re American
Honda Motor Co., Inc., Oil Filter Products Liability Litigation, In re CertainTeed Corp.

Roofing Shingles Products Liability Litigation, In re Aqua Dots Products Liability Litigation,
In re Whirlpool Corp. Front-Loading Washer Products Liability Litigation, In re Oral Sodium
Phosphate Solution-Based Products Liability Litigation, and In re Kitec Plumbing System

Products Liability Litigation. See infra Table 18.
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our dataset received multiple MDLs in our sample. Consequently, we measured the level of experience as the count of proceedings assigned to the
judge, so the same judge can have increasing levels of experience throughout our data.
Finally, we collected information on how the proceedings concluded. 131 We coded for the following outcomes: class action settlements,
aggregate (nonclass) settlements, 132 individual settlements, defense
wins, 133 bankruptcy, and remand. Our coding focused on how the majority
of actions in the proceeding ended. This means, for example, that if there
were some individual settlements before a defendant's motion for summary judgment terminated the proceeding, we still coded the outcome as
a defense win.
Of the ninety-two proceedings, 32.6% ended in aggregate settlements
(seventeen of which were global settlements (18.4%) and thirteen of which
were inventory settlements (14.1%)), 32.6% concluded as class action settlements, 21.7% ended with defense wins of various sorts, 6.5% concluded
in individual settlements, 4.3% ended in bankruptcy, and 2.1% were
remanded or dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These different results allow us to examine whether appointing judicial adjuncts
affects the outcomes within the dataset.
Overall, we find that our sample proceedings accurately represent the
world of products liability MDL and provide a robust and prototypical sample in which to explore the gamut of court-appointed judicial adjuncts.
The proceedings vary by centralization year, duration, size, judicial experience, and district. Outcomes, while heavily weighted toward settlement-like the rest of MDL-show substantial variety. All of these factors
provide sufficient variation for testing assumptions about the uses and
effects of appointing judicial adjuncts.

B.

A Typology of Adjuncts in MDL

To the extent that judges delegate to address burgeoning caseloads,
one would expect them to do so in products liability proceedings. But what
we found was that transferee courts in our dataset appointed judicial
adjuncts no more often today than they did in years past. As Figure 1 illustrates by organizing MDLs by docket number, which corresponds with its
centralization date, courts' reliance on adjuncts varies substantially. Order-

131. If a proceeding's resolution was not clear from its docket, then we searched news
reports, such as Bloomberg's Class Action Litigation Report and Law360, to find the information.
132. Some of the aggregate settlements were "inventory," or law firm-by-law firm settlements, and some were global deals. See infra Part III.A.3.
133. There may have been some individual settlements within what we coded as a
"defense win." Defense wins included dismissals after the judge denied class certification,
stays followed by dismissals for arbitration, and summary judgement decisions granted in
defendants' favor on Daubert motions, on the merits, or through preemption.

2020 ]

JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MDL

2153

ing the proceedings chronologically reveals no clear trend and the number of adjuncts used does not appear to change over time.

Figure 3: Number ofJudicial Adjuncts Appointed by
MDL Docket Number
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We gathered information on when and how courts used these judicial
adjuncts, including the dates upon which courts appointed a range of
judicial adjuncts, settlement and dispositive decision dates, and the dates
upon which judges closed the centralized proceeding. 13 4 Unlike the existing literature's exclusive focus on magistrate judges and special masters,
we found a host of different judicial appointments. We categorized them
into five groups, each of which are explained in more detail below: (1)
magistrate judges; (2) special masters; (3) mediators; (4) settlement/
accounting, which includes escrow agents, certified public accountants,
claims/fund/settlement administrators, lien-resolution administrators,
auditors, common-benefit fund administrators, and qualified-settlementfund trustees; and (5) other, which includes court-appointed counsel, inspectors, data consultants, medical experts, and external review specialists.
Judges in nineteen proceedings did not use any adjuncts at all. In the
remaining seventy-three, they appointed a total of 233 adjuncts, designating an average of three adjuncts, with a range from one to fourteen. Table
2 shows the most common types ofjudicial adjuncts and the number of
proceedings that appointed each category.

134. Details on our methodology appear in section A of the Appendix.
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Table 2: Number ofJudicial Adjunct Appointments by
Type and Proceeding

Settlement/Accounting

77

33%

37

Special Master

59

25%

31

Magistrate Judges135

59

25%

42

Mediator

29

12%

21

Other

9

4%

8

Total:

233

1. MagistrateJudges and Special Masters. - By looking across the lifecycle of the proceedings, one can determine when courts appoint judicial
adjuncts and who they typically appoint first. Table 3 below shows the
average time to each appointment, the number of proceedings with that
many appointments, and the type of appointment made.

135. In the ninety-two proceedings, seventy-four magistrate judges were referenced on
the docket, but only fifty-three appeared to work on the MDL proceeding-by entering
orders or being assigned specific tasks, for instance. We excluded those magistrate judges
assigned to the proceeding who did not appear to manage any tasks (signing orders, holding

hearings, managing discovery, etc.).
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Table 3: Judicial Adjunct Appointments by Type

First

38

16

6

12

0

72136

308

Second

10

14

10

9

1

44

768

Third

3

4

6

15

2

30

893

Fourth

5

9

3

7

0

24

1183

Fifth

1

4

3

6

3

17

1176

Sixth

1

2

1

8

1

13

1236

Seventh

0

3

0

6

0

9

1293

Eighth

0

3

0

3

1

7

1404

Ninth

0

3

0

2

1

6

1410

Tenth

0

1

0

2

0

3

2073

Eleventh

0

0

0

3

0

3

2076

Twelfth

0

0

0

2

0

2

2223

Thirteenth

1

0

0

1

0

2

2448

Fourteenth

0

0

0

1

0

1

4213

59

59

29

77

9

233

872137

Total:

Table 3 demonstrates that courts overwhelmingly assign magistrate
judges first. Many courts do so shortly after the Panel centralizes the
proceeding in their district, and some transferee judges actively refer MDL
matters to magistrates. 138 Initial appointments occur early in the proceeding's life-on average, less than a year after centralization-a statistic
driven largely by appointing magistrate judges upon arrival. The broad
swath of pretrial powers that judges may designate to magistrates under
§ 636 overlaps neatly with transferee judges' authority under the
Multidistrict Litigation Act, which Congress also passed in 1968: Both stat-

136. The total for this row is lower than the number of proceedings with at least one
adjunct appointed because one appointment did not have a date on the docket.
137. This is a weighted average of the days to appointment. We used the weighted average because so few proceedings had more than a handful of adjuncts appointed.
138. Some districts pair magistrates with district judges such that their appointment is
automatic. See infra section I.B.
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utes afford substantial discretion over pretrial matters but limit trial

authority. 139
When Professor Abbe Gluck interviewed MDL judges, however, some
stated a preference for working with special masters.140 That helps to
explain the substantial number of appointments in the other categories.
While some courts turn to special masters, mediators, and settlement/
accounting adjuncts early on in the proceedings, others often wait until
later to designate special masters and settlement/accounting adjuncts.1 4 1
As the clusters around average days to the appointment depict, judges
frequently employ special masters and settlement/accounting adjuncts
together, in part to assist with administering the settlement, which is discussed further below.
Looking solely at the number of appointments indicates that judges
designated special masters and magistrates at roughly the same rate, with
both special masters and magistrates occupying 25% of the judicial-adjunct
positions. But that distorts the picture a little, for when judges turned to
special masters, they often appointed more than one in the same proceeding. Examining the count as a percentage of the number of proceedings
in our dataset shows that judges in forty-two of the ninety-two proceedings
appointed magistrate judges (45.6%), whereas judges in only thirty-one of
ninety-two proceedings appointed special masters (33.6%). These results
are thus roughly consistent with a previous study, which found that in all
MDLs closed from 2011 to 2012, judges appointed magistrate judges in
54% and special masters in 20%.142 There did not appear to be a substantial
difference in how the proceedings concluded whenjudges used one versus
the other, as Table 4 below demonstrates. Judges do rely heavily on special
masters in aggregate settlements, however.

139. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b), 1407(a) (2018). For an excellent history of the MDL statute, see generally Andrew D. Bradt, "A Radical Proposal": The Multidistrict Litigation Act

of 1968, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 831 (2017) (analyzing the origins of MDL using legislative history); Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and Something More: MDL's Roots as a Class

Action Alternative, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1711 (2017) (exploring MDL's origin story through
two influential elements of the drafting process).
140. See Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict Litigation's
Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1669, 1693-94

(2017); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(f)(3); Philip M. Pro, United States Magistrate Judges:
Present but Unaccounted for, 16 Nev. L.J. 783, 807 (2016) ("Why should magistrate judges
get all the good civil cases?").

141. Supra Table 3.
142. Hanks, supra note 19, at 37.
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Table 4: Magistrates Versus Special Masters by Proceeding Outcome
P'roceedlin Qutcone

Magistrate

Special M[aster

Aggregate Settlement

25

40

Class Settlement

17

12

Defense win

10

5

Individual Settlements

4

1

Bankruptcy

2

1

Remand

1

0

59

59

Total:

Of the fifty-nine proceedings that employed either a special master or
a magistrate, fourteen used both (23.7%). By highlighting magistrate
appointments in light grey and special master appointments in dark grey,
Figure 4 below illustrates which proceedings used magistrates, special mas143
ters, or both, as well as how many of each appeared in the proceeding.
When judges appointed a special master, they sometimes appointed more
than one, thus raising the special master count within the dataset. That
judges in forty-two proceedings appointed magistrate judges and did so
more often than special masters is not surprising given that magistrates are
a readily available resource, have substantial expertise in resolving cases,
and impose no added cost on the parties.

143. Readers may access a larger, interactive version at: https://publictableau.com/
vSM?:la
views/Figure4MagistrateVersusSpecialMastersbyOutcomeandMDLNumber/Mag
nguage=en&:displaycount=y&publish=yes&:origin=viz-sharelink.
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Figure 4: Magistrate Versus Special Masters, by
Outcome and MDL Number
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2. Mediators. - In addition to magistrate judges and special masters,
judges appointed mediators in twenty-one proceedings, and more than
one mediator appeared on the docket in six proceedings. The mediators
within our dataset often come from private dispute-resolution groups such
as JAMS144 and some names were already quite familiar from the specialmaster roster. When parties mediate, they engage in private dispute resolution. Thus, we were able to decipher the least about this group.145
As frequent special master and mediator Ken Feinberg explained, a
mediator's role differs depending upon whether mediation is court-initiated or party-initiated. When the court appoints a mediator, "the mediator
acts as a type of quasi-judicial official and enjoys the benefit of important
leverage associated with such court sponsorship."1 41 "[T] he entire process
has the imprimatur and encouragement of the court," Feinberg notes.1 4 7
This gives mediators more power but may likewise prompt parties to push
back. Party-initiated mediation, on the other hand, is "marginally better
and more likely to succeed than one involving the court," according to
Feinberg. 148 Parties have a "stake in the venture," so mediation often leads
"to a more satisfactory-if not quicker-consensus."14 9 The distinction
between a court-appointed and party-appointed mediator might likewise
affect a mediator's cost since courts sometimes offer free or low-cost mediation services. 150
Because so little information appeared on the dockets and in court
orders about mediation, it was difficult to tell which mediators were courtinitiated versus party-initiated. From the docket entries and what few court
orders we could find, it appeared that parties suggested mediators in nine
proceedings and courts suggested mediators in four proceedings, but we
could not gather enough data on the remaining proceedings to indicate
one or the other. Given that parties must pay for the costs of private mediation, the absence of information about initiation and cost is concerning.

144. JAMS was formerly an acronym for Judicial Arbitration and Mediation Services, Inc.

See The JAMS' Name, JAMS, https://www.jamsadr.com/about-the-jams-name
perma.cc/TC3G-KVCS] (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).

[https://

145. There is, of course, a broad pre-existing literature on the topic. E.g., Francis E.
McGovern, Mediation of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, 42 Idaho L. Rev. 547, 550

(2006) (describing mediation strategy).
146. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Reporting from the Front Line-One Mediator's Experience

with Mass Torts, 31 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 359, 362 (1998) [hereinafter Feinberg, Reporting from
the Front Line].
147. Id. Others caution that if the mediator or master "is effective because of leverage
that comes from behind the scenes contact between the master andjudge, serious questions
of ethics and policy are presented." Silberman, supra note 29, at 2159.
148. Feinberg, Reporting from the Front Line, supra note 146, at 362.

149. Id. at 363.
150. See generally Roselle L. Wissler, Court-Connected Mediation in General Civil Cases:

What We Know from Empirical Research, 17 Ohio St. J. Disp. Resol. 641, 644-45 (2002).
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3. Settlement/Accounting. - The settlement/accounting category comprised the largest segment ofjudicial adjuncts in the dataset. 51 Adjuncts'
identities ranged from banks who held settlement funds, to accountants
who kept track of common-benefit fees for plaintiffs' attorneys who lead
the proceeding, to claims administrators, lien resolution administrators,
and trustees. 152 Each comes from the private sector and appointing one is
thus likely to increase litigation costs. 153 Because their work occurs principally in administering plaintiffs' settlement proceeds and plaintiffs' attorneys common-benefit fees, those costs tend not to be split evenly among
the parties. 15 4 Given the frequency with which courts appoint these
adjuncts, costs are especially important. 155 Table 5 shows this category's
breakdown by type.
Table 5: Settlement/Accounting Adjuncts by Type
dcIl

mw

nt/Accc~dndng1,Adjufil1Niberw (, .App i

tit

Claims Administrator

27

Certified Public Accountants

15

Bank

15

Escrow Agent

11

Lien Resolution Administrator

4

Common Benefit Fund Administrator

2

Auditor

2

Trustee

1

To avoid the ethical conundrums inherent in divvying up settlement
proceeds among their clients, lawyers askjudges to designate adjuncts like
claims/fund administrators, escrow agents, and trustees.156 On one hand, this
avoids importing obvious bias and favoritism into the allocation process. 157
151.
152.
153.
154.

Supra Table 2.
See, e.g., infra Table 16 & Table 17.
See infra Table 16 & Table 17.
See infra Figure 12.

155. See infra section III.B for an exploration of costs.
156. Lynn A. Baker, Mass Tort Remedies and the Puzzle of the Disappearing Defendant,
98 Tex. L. Rev. 1165, 1169-70 (2020). But as Professor Lynn Baker points out, "To the extent
that the third party is retained by plaintiffs' counsel to perform this task on behalf of the
covered clients, plaintiffs' counsel arguably has simply delegated the allocation problem." Id.
157. For example, lawyers might allocate more to their direct clients and less to referred
clients to increase their attorneys' fees. See Huber v. Taylor, 469 F.3d 67, 70-71 (3d Cir.

2006); Paul H. Edelman, Richard A. Nagareda & Charles Silver, The Allocation Problem in
Multiple-Claimant Representations, 14 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 95, 99-100 (2006); see alsoJohn
C. Coffee, Jr., Conflicts, Consent, and Allocation After Amchem Products-Or,Why Attorneys

Still Need Consent to Give Away Their Clients' Money, 84 Va. L. Rev. 1541, 1544-50 (1998)
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On the other, it means that clients must pay-as a separate cost-for a
service that the attorney's contingent fee would otherwise cover and risks
making the judicial adjunct financially beholden to the attorney who
appointed them. 158
When defendants settle personal injury claims, they care little about
these allocation questions, but they do want to ensure that they will not
incur penalties for failing to resolve healthcare liens from private insurance companies or Medicare, for instance.159 Consequently, most settlement agreements require plaintiffs to indemnify defendants for those statutory liens.160 As Lynn Baker and Charles Silver have explained, because
of the complexity and time it takes to resolve liens, "an occupation known
as a Lien Resolution Administrator(LRA) now exists."161
Without such a service, however, the responsibility to handle liens
once again falls to plaintiffs' lawyers. Ethically, attorneys cannot charge clients extra for this service unless: (1) their retainer agreement permits it,
(2) a valid lien against a particular client exists, (3) the total of both the
lien-resolution fee and the client-paid lien amount is less than the original
lien amount (meaning that the client benefits), and (4) the client's charge
is the actual amount the lien-resolution service cost (meaning that the
attorney can't make money off of the cost or charge interest) .162 Paying
these costs out of the gross settlement proceeds violates these requirements because clients who have no liens share in the expense.
Judges tend to appoint certified public accountants (CPAs) and auditors
at one of two points: at the beginning, where they keep track of the money
that plaintiffs' attorneys front for joint litigation costs, or at the end, where
they audit lead attorneys' billable hours and expenses and divvy up common-benefit fees among them. 163 Here's how this process works: Outside
of class actions where judges award class counsel the entirety of their fee,
plaintiffs hire individual lawyers. 164 In nonclass MDLs, judges then select

(arguing that conflicts of interest are worse at the allocation stage than during settlement

negotiations).
158. See infra Part I.C.1.
159. Lynn A. Baker & Charles Silver, Fiduciaries and Fees: Preliminary Thoughts, 79

Fordham L. Rev. 1833, 1864-65 (2011).
160. Id. at 1860-61.
161. Id. at 1861 (emphasis added).
162. Id. at 1862 n.116 (citing a consensus of state ethics opinions).

163. Infra Figure 10.
164. See Mark Fainaru-Wada & Steve Fainaru, Concerns over Lawyer Pay in NFL Deal,

ESPN (Dec. 16, 2013), https://www.espn.com/espn/otl/story/_id/10146287/nfl-settlementawaits-preliminary-approval-concern-arises-attorneys-double-billing-plaintiffs

[https://perma.

cc/2XKJ-D5J4] (describing how many NFL players faced the possibility of paying part of
their settlement awards to their individual counsel). There are exceptions, of course. The NFL
Concussion litigation, for instance, was certified as a class but most players had individual
counsel as well. Id.
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lead attorneys from among that group. 165 Those selected must pay for
expenses like expert witnesses, special masters, travel, and discovery
costs. 166 Sometimes leaders ask the court to appoint a CPA or bank (or
even a special master) early in the proceeding to keep track of their funds,
spot billing outliers early on, ensure compliance with their joint venture
agreement, and invest the money until they spend it. As cases settle, if lead
attorneys' work benefits all plaintiffs as opposed to just their own clients,
judges then award them a common-benefit fee that often comes out of the
plaintiffs' gross settlement award. 167 As one might imagine, skirmishes can
arise among leaders over who gets what, so they hire a special master, CPA,
or auditor to decide.168
Court-appointed banks in our dataset either held common-benefit
funds or settlement money. Their duties ranged from establishing
noninterest-bearing accounts and disbursing funds to holding, managing,
investing, and reinvesting settlement funds. When banks appeared alongside trustees, courts charged them with administering and investing funds
in accordance with the trust agreements.
4. Other. - The "other" category includes a hodgepodge of only nine
adjuncts that did not fit neatly under one of our previous labels: data consultants, medical experts, court appointed counsel, external review specialists, and ethics advisors. Their highly-specialized duties ranged from
providing special masters with data management services to advising the
parties on mass-tort ethics. Relatively few proceedings included these
adjuncts. We note both the presence and the types of adjuncts in this
group to permit scholars to extend our work in the future.
C.

Outsourced Duties

How do the types of adjuncts map onto the duties they handle within
MDL proceedings? Although some of the category titles like settlement/

165. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict

Litigation: The Social Network, 102 Cornell L. Rev. 1445, 1460-61 (2017). Orders differ as
to how exactly this all occurs, but typically in nonclass MDLsjudges deduct common-benefit
fees from the individually retained attorney's contingent fee and costs from the client's portion of a settlement award. See, e.g., Second Amended Case Management Order No. 9
Common Benefit Order at 5, In re Ortho Evra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-cv-40000-DAK

(N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2006) ("One and one-half percent (1 /%)

shall be deemed fees to be

166. E.g., Case Management Order No. 12 on Plaintiffs' Common Benefit Time

&

subtracted from the attorneys' fees portions of individual fee contracts, and one and onehalf percent (1 /%) shall be deemed costs to be subtracted from the client portion of individual fee contracts.").

Expenses Submission at 4-5, In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-MD-1789 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 18, 2007).
167. These percentages tend to range from 4-15%. Burch & Williams, supra note 165,

at 1510 tbl.8.
168. See, e.g., Amanda Bronstad, Plaintiffs Firm Takes Growing Fee Spat in Mesh Cases

to Appeals Court, Law.com (Aug. 12, 2019), https://www.law.com/2019/08/12/plaintiffsfirm-takes-growing-fee-spat-in-mesh-cases-to-appeals-court

(on file with the Columbia Law Review).
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accounting or mediator already hint at the adjunct's job, we downloaded
and examined each appointment order to catalogue adjuncts' duties into
four areas-pretrial, settlement, common-benefit fee, or other. Of course,
these categories are not hermetically sealed. We cataloged adjuncts based
on the order initially appointing them, but oftentimes an adjunct's role
evolved over the proceeding's life.1 6 9 Some magistrates and special masters, for example, initially handled pretrial duties but their roles morphed
into providing settlement functions without a separate appointment order.
When the judge formally appointed the magistrate or special master to a
second role like settlement, we coded it accordingly.17 0 Table 6 below displays the breakdown of duties by type of adjunct, with the percentage of

each row highlighted.
Pretrialduties covered a wide range of responsibilities such as hearing
motions, mediating, handling discovery disputes, deciding motions to
remand to state court, admitting attorneys to the court on a pro hac vice
basis, conducting scheduling conferences and settlement discussions, and
imposing discovery sanctions. Across all judicial adjuncts, 49.3% (115)
handled pretrial matters.
Settlement covered an array of settlement-related tasks such as notifying
class members, collecting opt-out forms, advising lawyers on ethical issues,
administering claims under class or aggregate settlements, retaining and
investing settlement money, administering trust agreements, identifying
and resolving healthcare liens, creating and maintaining settlement websites and hotlines, and presiding over claimants' allocation disputes.
Common-benefit fee duties included managing the common-benefit
fund, allocating common-benefit money among plaintiffs' attorneys, holding funds in escrow, and maintaining and auditing plaintiffs' attorneys'
billable-hour records.
Other contained only two instances: one where the court appointed
counsel to represent plaintiffs whose interest conflicted with their own
attorneys' interests and one in which the court asked the adjunct to assist
the court with administrative, ministerial duties post-settlement.

169. For more information on methodology, see infra Appendix A.
170. Where ajudge initially appointed a magistrate or special master to perform pretrial
duties and later entered a separate order assigning that person to a different task, it was
recorded as two appointments. This rationale is explained more fully in the Appendix's
methodology section. Id.
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Magistrate Judge

53

6

(89.8%)

(10.2%)

29

Mediator

(100%)

-

32

23

4

(54.2%)

(40.0%)

(6.8%)

52

25

-

(67.5%)

(32.5%)

-

Special Master

-

-

Table 6: Judicial Adjunct Duties, Percent

Settlement/Accounting

Other

Total:

1

5

1

2

(11.1%)

(55.6%)

(11.1%)

(22.2%)

115

86

30

2

As Table 6 shows, of the fifty-nine special masters in our dataset, transferee judges initially appointed thirty-two to oversee aspects of pretrial litigation, twenty-three to implement settlements, and four to aid in keeping
and allocating common-benefit fees. When special masters conduct pretrial proceedings (matters that magistratejudges often handle), academics
have worried that because masters bill by the hour, they may "encourage
more elaborate procedures and, in the end, lengthen pre-trial time" 171 or
become dependent on the steady paycheck and prolong the proceeding
unnecessarily.17 2
It is also interesting to note that several magistrate judges administered settlements, sometimes in the same way that a private special master
or claims administrator would. For instance, in litigation over Medtronic's
defibrillators, the magistrate judge presided over the private settlement as
the special master, where he used parties' agreed upon guidelines to set
up and administer a claims program that was subject to review by the district courtjudge. 173 The magistrate judge likewise presided over the private
inventory settlements in Levaquin, where he alone had the final, binding,
171. Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2151.
172. See Margaret G. Farrell, Special Masters, in Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence 614 [hereinafter Farrell, Special Masters] (1st ed. 1994); Hanks, supra note 19, at
48. Special masters have nevertheless created a handbook for judges and lawyers that lists
sixteen types of appointments that they can perform. Acad. of Ct. Appointed Masters,
Appointing Special Masters and Other Judicial Adjuncts: A Benchbook for Judges and

Lawyers 4-7 (2013), https://nys-fjc.ca2.uscourts.gov/programs/11-16-15%20-%20Appointing%
20Special%2OMasters%20and%200ther%20Judicial%2OAdjuncts%20 (January%202013%
20Edition).pdf [https://perma.cc/JF7W-V5KX].
173. Order for Approval of Allocation & Resolution Process at 1, In re Medtronic, Inc.

Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1726 (D. Minn. Jan. 14, 2008).
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and non-appealable authority to craft allocation plans, award settlement
money, and resolve Medicare and Medicaid liens. 174
Other times, magistrates and private adjuncts worked side by side in
settlements. For example, with the help of ophthalmologist Lance Turkish,
whom the transferee judge appointed as an expert under Federal Rule of
Evidence 706, the magistrate judge developed and implemented a
protocol to allocate private settlement funds to claimants suing Franck's
Compounding Lab. 175 And in Fosamax, the magistrate judge worked alongside private special master John Feerick, Fordham Law School's former
dean.1 76 Dean Feerick served as the allocation special master and determined claimants' eligibility and settlement amounts, and the magistrate
judge (as the General Special Master) heard appeals and resolved disputes
arising from Feerick's decisions. 77 Similarly, the transferee judge
appointed the magistrate judge as a special master to work alongside private, assistant special master Patrick Juneau to implement and administer
the Guidant settlement. 178
Although magistrates and special masters routinely appear in the
same proceedings together, the appointment of other adjuncts co-occurs
in noticeable patterns. Table 7 below demonstrates which types of adjuncts
tend to appear together and the correlations among appointment types,
with statistically significant relationships (at the p < 0.05 level or higher)
starred. Assuming the value in the table is starred, the larger the number,
the stronger the correlation between the two types of adjuncts. Said differently, the larger the positive coefficient, the more likely the adjuncts are to
be appointed together in the same MDL. Looking at these relationships

174. Order Appointing Magistrate Judge Boylan as Special Settlement Master at 1-2, In

re Levaquin Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 08-md-01943 JRT) (D. Minn. Jan. 15, 2013) (order
appointing the magistrate judge as special settlement master).
175. Order at 1, In re Franck's Lab, Inc. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:13-md-02454-KDE-KWR
(E.D. La.June 4, 2014). The settlement fund covered Dr. Turkish's charges of $400 per hour,

up to $40,000. Id. at 3.
176. See Master Settlement Agreement

¶60,

In re Fosamax Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-

md-01789-JFK-JCF (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 2014) (initially appointing Dean Feerick as special master); John D. Feerick, Fordham Univ. Sch. of L., https://www.fordham.edu/info/23130/
john_d feerick [https://perma.cc/LGF6-7MX7] (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (stating that Feerick
is a former dean of Fordham Law School).
177. Order Appointing General Special Master; Allocation Special Master; Mass Tort
Settlement Ethics Advisor; Settlement Fund Escrow Agent; & Lien Resolution Administrator,
FosamaxProds. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-md-01789-JFK-JCF; Master Settlement Agreement, supra
note 176, 1 60. Note that the magistrate judge was appointed as the general special master
after the plaintiffs' steering committee filed a consent motion asking for his appointment.
See Plaintiffs' Steering Committee Amended Consent Motion to Appoint: General Special
Master; Allocation Special Master; Mass Tort Settlement Ethics Advisor; Settlement Fund
Escrow Agent; & Lien Resolution Administrator at 1-2, FosamaxProds. Liab. Litig., No. 1:06-

md-01789-JFK-JCF.
178. Order Appointing Special Master Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 & Appointing
Claims Administrator, In re Guidant Corp. Implantable Defibrillators Prods. Liab. Litig.,

No. 05-md-01708-DWF-AJB (D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2007).
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illustrates that one appointment tends to beget another, suggesting that
appointments might be "contagious."" In other words, when appointing
adjuncts becomes the norm, then that behavior can spread, leading the
same judge to make more appointments.

Table 7: Correlations by Type ofJudicial Adjunct
Sj cial
SremUt!,
_Adjuntty}
Mpglismtc
Master
M dialto
_A cuntint,
Magistrate

1.00

Special Master
Mediator
Settlement/
Accounting

Ot

rr

-0.0070

-0.1345

0.0938

0.2593*

1.00

0.0506

0.3064*

0.2697*

1.00

0.2934*

0.0160

1.00

0.3763*

Other

1.00

As this Article discusses in more detail shortly, given their related work
on settlement and claims administration, it is not unusual that special masters and settlement/accounting adjuncts tend to appear in proceedings
together. The relationship between appointing a mediator and a settlement/accounting adjunct, however, is somewhat less clear, though it is possible that mediation leads to settlement. The "other" category ofjudicial
adjuncts correlates with most types, but the small number of technical
appointments explains these relationships. Perhaps the most surprising
finding from this exercise is the absence of any other relationship between
adjuncts. Courts that appoint a magistrate judge, for instance, do not do
so at the exclusion of others.
D.

Adjuncts' Origins

How do all of these actors become court-appointed adjuncts? As
section I.B suggests, like most other professions, much of it is about who
they know-but who they must know seems to have changed over time. In
its study of special masters in 2000, the Federal Judicial Center found that
judges proposed 54% of the special masters. 180 Subsequent anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that the trend has shifted. 181 In 2004, for
instance, at a conference for special masters, Francis McGovern observed,

179. See generally Nicholas A. Christakis &James H. Fowler, Connected: The Surprising

Power of Our Social Networks and How They Shape Our Lives 16, 104 (2009) (explaining
how contagion flows across social network ties and influences behavior).
180. Willging et al., supra note 6, at 27-28; see also Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy
of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 275 ("Most often, the initial suggestion regarding the
need for a special master comes from the judge, and not the parties.").
181. Hanks, supra note 19, at 70.
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"When I started out, it was judges who found you. We are now seeing much
more in terms of attorney-initiated appointments."18 2 Similarly, in interviewing judges about using special masters, one study reported that the
parties "were often directly involved in making suggestions for potential
masters."183 Of course, given that many of these discussions may take place
behind the scenes, it is not always easy to pinpoint whether the judge proposed appointing an adjunct and the parties simply provided names or
whether the parties suggested using an adjunct in the first place.
Bearing that caveat in mind, our findings are consistent with this more
recent trend-that parties typically suggest using an adjunct or, as may
sometimes have been the case, using a particular adjunct. Overall, parties
suggested 50.2% of the adjuncts (primarily the settlement/accounting
adjuncts and special masters) and the court selected 33% (primarily by
assigning a magistrate judge). We were unable to identify the origin of the
adjunct's nomination in 16.7% of the appointments, principally in the special master and mediator categories.
Table 8 below shows that judges cited seven sources of appointment
authority, with party consent as the primary rationale across all appointments. Where the judge cited no authority but the parties proposed the
appointment, we coded the basis as the parties' consent. And where no
order appointing a magistrate judge appeared on the docket, but the magistrate was nevertheless active in the proceeding, we coded the authority
as 28 U.S.C. § 636.184 Few orders appointing mediators specified any
authority for doing so, and many appointments simply appeared as docket
notations without an accompanying order. District courts have, however,
each adopted local rules governing alternative dispute resolution. 185 Consequently, where judges did not list any authority to appoint a mediator or
cited to a local rule, we coded the authority as "Mediation Rules."
Consistent with the Federal Judicial Center's prior study of special
masters, none of the orders that were found discussed the court's legal
authority to appoint the adjunct at any length. 186 Rather, courts frequently
assumed they had the authority when parties suggested (and consented
to) the adjunct and, if the judge cited any authority at all, it was in passing.
182. 2004 Special Masters Conference: Transcript of Proceedings, 31 Wm. Mitchell L.
Rev. 1193, 1255 (2005) (transcribing remarks by Francis McGovern on the future ofjudicial

masters).
183. Hanks, supra note 19, at 70; see also Baker, supra note 156, at 1181 ("When an
allocation Special Master is involved in a private, aggregate settlement, she will sometimes
be appointed by a court to serve in that capacity. Importantly, however, such an appointment is sought by the parties; it does not originate with the court.").

184. Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(a)-(b) (2018) permits judges to designate magistrate judges
to conduct pretrial activities and other judicial functions.

185. See DOJ, ADR in the Federal District Courts: District-by-District Summaries (Mar.
2016), https://wwwjustice.gov/olp/file/827536/download [https://perma.cc/TX3X-2VA3].
186. See Willging et al., supra note 6, at 32-33 ("It is worth noting, however, that none
of these orders of appointment contained extended discussion of legal authority. Most, if
not all, simply cited an authority in passing.").
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Courts cite positive authority-28 U.S.C. § 636 (magistrate judges) and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 (special masters)-most frequently at
the pretrial stage, and rely more heavily on parties' consent at the settlement stage and to assist with plaintiffs' attorneys common-benefit fees. It
is worth noting, however, that Rule 53(a) (1) (A) likewise allows the court
to appoint a special master to "perform duties consented to by the parties,"
so party consent likely plays a more substantial role than the numbers
indicate. Of course, district judges may also refuse to refer a matter to a
special master despite the parties' consent. 187
Table 8: Authorities Cited in Orders or Motions to Appoint
Judicial Adjuncts

A tohrih

Appoainmnts

App

inmen s

Parties' Consent

71

30%

28 U.S.C. § 636

59

25%

Fed. R. Civ. P. 53

37

15%

Mediation Rules

22

9%

Treasury Regulation § 1.468B

10

4%

Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 & Inherent Authority

8

3%

Consent & Inherent Authority

1

0.4%

Fed. R. Evid. 706

1

0.4%

Unspecified

24

10%

Figure 5 illustrates who suggested adjuncts to perform various
duties. 188 Courts assigned most magistrate judges and special masters to
perform pretrial duties, whereas parties proposed more special master and
settlement/accounting adjuncts at the settlement stage. Not surprisingly,
lead plaintiffs' attorneys were the primary drivers behind designating
banks, certified public accountants, and escrow agents (all ensconced
within the settlement/accounting category) to preside over, administer,
and allocate common-benefit fees.

187. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 53 advisory committee's notes on 2003 Amendment; Bartlett-

Collins Co. v. Surinam Navigation Co., 381 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1967) (" [T]hough the
parties agreed to reference to a Master, we are constrained to suggest that there was no
justification for such action.").
188. Readers may access a larger, in color interactive version at: https://public.tableau.
com/views/JudicialAdunctsinMuiltidistrictLitigationFigure5/Adjunctproposedbyappt
authority?:language=en&:displaycount=y&publish=yes&:origin=vizshare_link.
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Figure 5: Adjunct Suggested by Whom, for Which Duties
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One thing in particular stands out about Figure 5: The parties exercise extraordinary control at the settlement stage in both suggesting the
adjunct and consenting to their subsequent appointment. This is an
important point to keep in mind when considering compensation, as this
Article does later, for it is the parties who must bear potentially significant
costs associated with non-magistrate, "private" adjuncts. 189
Note too that "party" control and consent can mean different things
across the proceedings. In class action settlements, class counsel has formal authority under Rule 23 to bind absent class members and consent on
their behalf 19 0 Yet concerns about whether class counsel's self-interest will
trump their ability to faithfully serve absent class members have prompted
courts to act as fiduciaries to the class.191 Thus, it stands to reason that

189. See infra section III.B.

190. Fed R. Civ P. 23; see also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 899-901 (2008) (explaining that a class member who has been adequately represented can be precluded from bring-

ing a later suit).
191. See Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat'l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279-80 (7th Cir. 2002);
Brummer, supra note 89, at 1060-61 (2004).
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judges presiding over certified classes and settlements have an independent obligation to assess the propriety of appointing a private adjunct.1 9 2
In aggregate settlements, on the other hand, judges appoint lead lawyers as an organizational tool to streamline the proceedings. 193 But unlike
class settlements, judges have no formal monitoring authority nor do they
typically appoint lead lawyers based on adequate representation. 194 Plaintiffs themselves have no say in which leaders the court selects. 195 And as the
Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor v. Sturgell made plain: There is no such
thing as virtual representation. 196 There are thus significant questions
about whether leadership's "consent" on plaintiffs' behalf (particularly in
global settlements) can bind nonclients even whenjudicial orders purport
to give them that authority.197
With ample money invested in a proceeding, lead plaintiffs' lawyers
may feel substantial pressure to settle. 198 Plaintiffs, too, might find settlement desirable. But if leaders think that appointing an adjunct furthers
settlement, they may be inclined to do so regardless of cost, knowing that
costs will be passed on to the plaintiffs. Moreover, when adjuncts review
claims and allocate attorneys' fees, they shoulder some of the work that
lawyers would otherwise have to bear. So, one cannot assume that leaders'
self-interest overlaps with plaintiffs' self-interest when employing a special
master to preside over aggregate settlements.
Finally, out of the 233 appointments, we found only five objections.
The lack of objections was unsurprising given that: (1) parties often overtly
consent to appointing an adjunct, (2) when appointed, the adjunct may
take on an adjudicative role in the proceedings, and (3) if the person is
likely to be appointed over the objection, it may be difficult for a party to
192. As Professor Resnik recognized over thirty years ago, however, judges may have
disincentives to perform this role rigorously. "If the parties can agree to something, then
that decision can at least be rationalized as in service of the parties' interest," she writes. She
thus concludes that "[j]udges and lawyers may become willing to ignore or downplay the
problems of self-interest (of attorneys, representatives, special masters, or others) in the
eagerness to centralize authority and dispose of the mega-cases that they have created."
Judith Resnik, From "Cases" to "Litigation", 54 Law & Contemp. Probs. 5, 60 (1991)
[hereinafter Resnik, From Cases to Litigation].
193. See, e.g., David M. Jaros & Adam S. Zimmerman, Judging Aggregate Settlement,

94 Wash. U. L. Rev. 545, 576 (2017) (explaining that judges can appoint "lead lawyers" in
aggregate settlements for coordination purposes).
194. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Mass Tort Deals: Backroom Bargaining in Multidistrict
Litigation 94-96 (2019) [hereinafter Burch, Mass Tort Deals] ("Some judges ... take measures
to ensure that leaders will properly represent potentially warring factions.").

195. Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 71,
88 (2015) [hereinafter Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation].
196. See 553 U.S. 880, 901 (2008).
197. In instances where the aggregate settlement was an inventory settlement, where
the defendant bargained with each law firm to settle all of its clients' cases, and the judicial
adjunct was categorized as settlement/accounting, then the plaintiff's lawyer would likely
play a more direct role in consenting on the plaintiff's behalf.
198. See Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 96-98.
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say no.199 As one magistrate judge we interviewed noted, "[L] awyers are in
a tough position; they can't object meaningfully to special masters." 200
Granted, it is also possible that informal opposition occurred in a pretrial
conference or proceeding and would therefore not appear on the docket
sheet.
III. AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION INTOJUDICIAL ADJUNCTS'
IMPACT ON MDL

Now that we have a better idea of who judges designate to perform
what tasks, we can do more than just scratch the surface. Section III.A
explores the following questions: First, what drives courts to entrust their
power to others? Is it the sheer size and complexity of the multidistrict
proceeding, or are cultural practices at work? As it turns out, both factors
play a role, with some surprising results. Second, does the way that a proceeding ends affect how courts use adjuncts? Yes. More adjuncts appear
when proceedings conclude with aggregate settlements, suggesting (at
least on this metric) that it may cost more to put money into plaintiffs'
hands than class members' hands. Third, and perhaps most critically, how
does appointing an adjunct affect efficiency? Are special masters' advocates correct in asserting that they reduce delay? The analysis in section
III.A suggests not.
If litigation costs in terms of time are high, what about the actual
dollars adjuncts charge? Section III.B attempts to round out this costbenefit calculus by identifying those monetary costs. Yet, outside of magistrates' public salaries, judges and parties disclosed precious little information on private adjuncts' compensation. The total payments found
sometimes ranged in the millions for a single adjunct. 201 And across all
private appointments, plaintiffs alone bore the costs for 54% of those
adjuncts, raising questions about how private adjunct appointments affect
plaintiffs' bottom line. 202
A.

Statistically Assessing the Why, When, and Effect of Outsourcing

1. Proceeding Size and District Culture. - The literature suggests that
the larger the proceeding, the more likely judges are to need help managing it. 20 3 Considering the relationship between the number of actions filed
in the proceeding and the number and type of adjunct appointments
199. See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2159 ("[T]he danger
is that the 'consent' is not always so voluntarily forthcoming.").
200. Interviews, supra note 48.

201. See infra Table 16.
202. See infra Figure 12.
203. In considering a proceeding's size, there is an important caveat: In products liabilities with personal injuries, reported actions likely undercount the true number of actions
affected by the MDL. See supra note 127. Unfortunately, systematic data is not available to
fill those knowledge gaps.
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shows that this is true: Overall, the correlation between total actions and
total adjuncts is 0.6148, and is statistically significant at the p < 0.001 level.
Put simply, as the number of actions increases, so too does the likelihood
that judges will appoint a judicial adjunct.
If courts rely more on judicial adjuncts in proceedings with more
actions, which adjuncts do they use? Larger proceedings are associated
with more appointments of all types, particularly special masters and settlement/accounting adjuncts like claims administrators. But the number
of actions is not associated with whether the court appoints a magistrate
or mediator in the proceeding. Table 9 shows the correlations between
actions and the number of appointments of each type. For the statistically
significant relationships in the second column (shown by the asterisk), the
higher the value, the more likely the adjunct is to be appointed as the
number of actions rise. Relatedly, the third column shows the relationship
between the number of actions and the number of adjuncts of each type,
with higher numbers of actions associated with higher numbers of
adjuncts, especially special masters.
Table 9: Correlations Between Number of Actions and Appointment of

Judicial Adjuncts
\yu
\<lAjunct

T

pp\}ninnt

Nimli

of

\pjeinmuts

Magistrate

0.1208

0.0652

Special Master

0.3734*

0.7540*

Mediator

-0.0256

-0.0557

Settlement/Accounting

0.2872*

0.4736*

Other

0.2385*

0.3579*

Howjudges use adjuncts may differ as a matter of court culture as well
as by the size of the proceeding. Prior studies suggested that districts'
culture and norms varied significantly: Those with standing orders that
routinely refer pretrial matters to magistrate judges were, not surprisingly,
more likely to use magistrate judges to handle MDLs than districts without
standing orders. 204 Likewise, districts using a "team approach to case management" where magistrates and district judges worked side by side were
also more likely to prefer magistrate judges over special masters. 205 Both
approaches would affect the number of adjunct appointments in those
districts.
As Table 1 shows, the Panel tends to select certain districts to handle
mass-tort proceedings with greater frequency than others. If these courts
204. Hanks, supra note 19, at 68; Pro, supra note 140, at 807-09.
205. Hanks, supra note 19, at 68.
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have standing orders for referral, we may see more adjuncts appointed. We
examined the number ofjudicial adjuncts appointed across the districts,
as Figure 6 illustrates, beginning with the district appointing the most
judicial adjuncts and ending with those appointing the least.
Figure 6: Number of Judicial Adjuncts Appointed by District
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As expected, some districts appointjudicial adjuncts more frequently
than others. Districts with more proceedings have more opportunity to
appoint adjuncts, and some, such as NewJersey and the Eastern District of
Louisiana, rely heavily on magistrate judges. Of course, districts with larger
proceedings may have more need for adjuncts, so that is taken into consideration as well.
To see whether the MDL caseload affected a district's adjunct use,
adjuncts and actions are plotted in the same figure, still sorted by districts
with the most adjunct appointments. Because the scales for the two variables are so different, however, the appointment of adjuncts and actions are
examined as a percentage of the total. Figure 7 shows the surprising lack
of a relationship (at least in some districts) between a district's percentage
of adjunct appointments and its percentage of the MDL caseload in our
data.
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Figure 7: Percentage ofJudicial Adjuncts and MDL Actions, by District
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The districts with the heaviest MDL caseloads (the percentage of
actions is shown in darker grey) are not necessarily those that appoint the
most judicial adjuncts. Several districts, including the Northern District of
Ohio, the District of New Jersey, the Southern District of Florida, the
District of Kansas, the Central District of California, and the Northern
District of Illinois appoint a greater share of judicial adjuncts than their
share of the MDL caseload. Not only are some districts appointing more
adjuncts than would be expected based on MDL caseloads, others, like the
Middle District of Florida, do not appoint nearly as many as their caseload
might merit. This suggests that the number of adjuncts and MDL actions
are not perfectly related, or, said differently, appointing judicial adjuncts
is related to district practices in ways that are not explained by the district's
MDL caseload.20 6
2. Proceedings'Complexity. - As a proceeding becomes more complex,
courts may increasingly turn to judicial adjuncts. Some complexity is not
easily reduced to categorization. For instance, the difficulty of proving causation is typically contested within the proceeding itself and may be entangled with thorny issues of scientific proof. Nevertheless, we classify complexity along six intertwined dimensions.
First, as noted above, we included the number of reported actions in
a proceeding, assuming more actions means increased complexity. Second, using court dockets and examining the complaints within the pro-

206. It is also possible that a district's overall civil and criminal caseload would affect
whether a court can devote a magistrate judge to an MDL matter.
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ceedings,2 07 we determined whether a proceeding involved a single event
or multiple events and found that all but one of our proceedings (In re
Cessna 208 Series Aircraft Products Liability Litigation) involved multiple
events. 208 Third and fourth, we documented whether the complaints
included allegations against a single defendant (32.6%), multiple related
defendants (23.9%), or multiple unrelated defendants (43.4%),209 as well
as whether the litigation included a single product (71.7%) or multiple
products (28.2%).210 Again, one might guess that complexity would
increase with additional products and defendants who are not part of the
same parent corporation. Fifth, we distinguished between those proceedings that included personal injury claims (55.4%) and those that did not
(44.5%). Proceedings seeking recovery for personal injuries are likely to
last longer because the lien-resolution process can be particularly time
consuming. 21 1 Yet the line between personal injury and nonpersonal injury
was not absolute. Complaints' facts sometimes included statements about
bodily harm, but, to facilitate class certification, the counts focused only
on economic claims like breach of warranty and consumer laws. Thus, we
categorized those as nonpersonal injuries.
These first five measures of complexity are likely to be related to several factors that we consider in more detail including the appointment of
an adjunct and the duration of the proceeding. When we looked at the
correlations among these factors, however, not all of our expectations
played out. The presence of personal injury claims was unrelated to the
appointment of any adjunct and to the number of adjuncts. Personal
injury claims were, however, related to the number of actions in a proceeding in two ways: (1) Proceedings with personal injury claims averaged more
actions than those without such claims (the difference was significant),
and (2) proceedings with personal injury claims took longer to close,
averaging 2,215 days, while those without averaged 1,155 days.

207. In proceedings where no complaint was included on the MDL docket, we pulled
complaints from several member cases. Where master, consolidated, or class complaints
existed, we used those rather than complaints filed in member cases.
208. Judge Jack B. Weinstein, for instance, classifies mass torts into four categories based
on somewhat similar factors to those we use here. However, he distinguishes between "clear
cause" and "unclear cause," which is typically a heavily contested question in the proceedings we examined. Jack B. Weinstein, IndividualJustice in Mass Tort Litigation 16-19 (1995).
209. Multiple unrelated defendants might, for instance, span a supply chain as in Aqua
Dots, which included not just the manufacturer but retailers such as Target and Toys "R"
Us. See Consolidated Amended Class Action, In re Aqua Dots Prods. Liab. Litig., 1:08-cv-

02364 (N.D. Ill. May 30, 2008), 2008 WL 2913049. We classified defendants based upon the
complaints filed on the MDL docket, which were often class or master/consolidated complaints. Note that sometimes docket sheets listed multiple defendants that were not
included in these complaints. See infra Table 18.
210. Figure 8 below includes more detail on these findings. See infra Figure 8. Where a
single component product, such as a defective engine or heart valve, was incorporated into
multiple product lines, we still coded it as a single product.
211. Interviews, supra note 48.
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The relationship among defendants, however, was unrelated to any of
the other measures we included thus far, including the number of actions
in a proceeding. This is somewhat surprising as one would imagine that
bringing other parties into the litigation adds to the number of issues, discovery time, and the potential for side disputes to prolong the proceeding.
Nevertheless, our consideration of this factor showed mixed results.
Finally, as we explore in detail below, we coded for the proceeding's
outcome. Class actions allow for a unified resolution and those without
personal injuries may have lower claims-filing rates, meaning that one
might expect a quicker resolution compared with aggregate settlements. 212
As Figure 8 illustrates, most personal injury claims that settled did so as
aggregate, nonclass settlements. 213 We further classified those aggregate
settlements into global settlements (sometimes referred to as "master
settlement agreements") and inventory settlements, which settle all or
most of a single law firm's clients. Most plaintiffs in proceedings ending in
aggregate settlement have their own attorneys, meaning that claims
processing may take longer, both because plaintiffs with counsel are more
likely to file a claim than an absent class member and because resolving
medical liens for personal injury claims can take time. 214 Figure 8 depicts
this in days from centralization to closure, with personal injuries
highlighted in dark grey and non-personal injury proceedings in light grey.
We did not find a significant difference between inventory and global
settlements, either in the average number of adjuncts appointed or the
length of time it took to conclude the proceeding. Yet, as Figure 11 shows,
global settlements with multiple unrelated defendants took slightly longer
to resolve, on average, than inventory settlements with the same features.

212. See generally FTC, Consumers and Class Actions: A Retrospective and Analysis of
Settlement Campaigns 1, 11 (2019) (analyzing claims rates from 149 consumer class actionsincluding product malfunctions-and finding that the overall claims rate was less than 10%).
213. Readers may access a larger, interactive version at: https://public.tableau.com/
views/JudicialAdjunctsinMultidistrictLitigationFigure8/Dashboard2? :language=en&:displa
y_count=y&publish=yes&:origin=vizsharelink.
214. See Baker & Silver, supra note 159, at 1861.
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Figure 8: Complexity Measures, Adjuncts, and Average Time to Closure
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3. Adjunct Appointments and Outcomes. - As noted, the ninety-two proceedings in our data resulted in six different categories of outcomes: class
settlement, aggregate settlement (subclassified into inventory and global
deals), defense win, individual settlements, bankruptcy, and remand.
While most proceedings concluded in some type of settlement, courts may
rely on more judicial adjuncts to administer aggregate settlements. 21 5
Reaching a settlement does not immediately result in plaintiffs receiving
cash awards. Unlike most class settlements, which may have a few overall
claims categories demanding differing levels of proof, claimants in aggregate settlements must typically provide detailed medical and pharmacy
records that connect their claim to the defendant's product. 216 Accordingly, administering aggregate settlements may entail more work and thus
more judicial adjuncts than class settlements.

215. Figure 8 illustrates little difference, on average, between the number of adjuncts
or the time to closure in global versus inventory settlements. See supra Figure 8.
216. See, e.g., Master Settlement Agreement, at Article IV Claims Valuation, In re Actos

(Pioglitazone), No. 6:11-md-02299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015).
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Table 10: Use of judicial Adjuncts by Outcome, with Percentage of Row

Class Settlement

Aggregate Settlement

Defense Win

24

6

(33%)

(32%)

28

Bankruptcy

Remand
Total:

2

(38%)

(11%)

30

11

9
(47%)

20

(15%)

Individual Settlements

30

(

5

(

1

(7%)
4

(5%)

(5%)

(0%)

1
(U%)

1
(5%)

73

19

6

0

2
_________

92

As Table 10 illustrates, across our outcome categories, there is little
difference in appointing a judicial adjunct (regardless of type). Adjuncts
appear less frequently in proceedings when the defense wins, likely
because the proceeding ended during the pretrial stage. Any settlement
outcome often results in designating ajudicial adjunct, though there were
a few aggregate settlements without a judicial adjunct appointed. One
would expect adjuncts to frequently appear in settlements of all types
because administering a settlement is part of why transferee judges turn to
judicial adjuncts in the first place. Table 11 considers whether the number
of adjuncts varies across outcome category, which it does.
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Total:

As Table 11 shows, judges tend to appoint far more judicial adjuncts
when the proceeding ends in an aggregate settlement than when it ends
in any other way. One aggregate inventory settlement designated thirteen
adjuncts and one global settlement used fourteen. So, while courts often
appoint at least one adjunct before a proceeding concludes via a class settlement, they are more likely to appoint multiple adjuncts (again, up to
fourteen) when a proceeding ends in an aggregate settlement.
What kind of adjuncts do they appoint? As Figure 9 depicts, courts
rely heavily on magistrate judges and mediators in class and individual settlements.217 Aggregate settlements, on the other hand, include far more
special masters and settlement/accounting adjuncts-all of which
increase costs, unlike magistrate judges. Thus, one can infer that the cost
of adjuncts in proceedings that end in aggregate settlement is likely to be

217. Readers may access a larger, interactive version at: https://public.tableau.com/
views/JudicialAdjunctsinMultidistrictLitigationFigure9/Mag vSM?:language=en&:display
_count=y&publish=yes&:origin=vizsharelink.
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greater (perhaps substantially so) than proceedings that end any other
way.
Figure 9: Number and Type of Adjuncts Appointed by Outcome
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Figure 10: Timeline of MDL Events and Adjunct Appointments
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4. Proceedings with Adjuncts Last Longer. - Given that most judges
appoint more adjuncts when proceedings settle, we would expect those
appointments to relate to how long a proceeding lasts as well. All proceedings ending in settlement take longer to close than those resulting in
defense wins. So, to the extent courts use more adjuncts in settlements, we
should also see a greater number of appointments in proceedings that last
longer, which we do. The relationship between use ofjudicial adjuncts and
the proceeding's duration is a strong, positive linear one: The correlation
between adjuncts and duration is 0.48 and is statistically significant at the
p < 0.001 level. Of course, a bivariate correlation doesn't tell us what we'd
really like to know-whether the judge's appointment of an adjunct
caused the proceeding to last longer or if a proceeding's anticipated
length and complexity prompted the court to appoint the adjunct in the
first place. Nevertheless, this relationship between a proceeding's duration
and number of adjuncts is important moving forward.
How appointing an adjunct relates to a proceeding's length may
depend on the particular types of adjuncts courts appoint. After all, we
now know that judges use special masters and settlement/accounting
adjuncts more often in aggregate settlements and that those proceedings
tend to last longer. We also know that, of the seventy-three proceedings
that included at least one judicial adjunct, judges appointed an average of
three adjuncts per proceeding." 0 To figure out whether the proceeding's
duration relates to the type of adjunct appointed, we examine whether
designating an adjunct of any type relates to duration, as well as whether
the number of adjuncts of each type relate to duration. Table 12 shows the
correlations and indicates those that are statistically significant at the
p < 0.05 level or higher with an asterisk.
Table 12: Correlations Between Duration and Appointment of
Judicial Adjuncts

Adu

kpc~y

Any Appintni at

Nutmb rofAppoiatmr it

0.1066

0.2304*

0.3258*

0.4702*

Mediator

0.1009

0.0703

Settlement/Accounting

0.1985

0.3406*

Other

0.1705

0.2501*

Magistrate
Special Master

Table 12 demonstrates that appointing a specific type of adjunct does
not relate to duration except for special masters, which are correlated with
longer proceedings. Likewise, as proceedings last longer, we are more
likely to see more than one special master appointed (the same is true for

220. See supra Table 2 and accompanying text.

JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MDL

2020 ]

2183

the numbers of magistrates, settlement/accounting adjuncts, and other
adjuncts). The question is how much longer are proceedings taking with
the appointment of each type of adjunct. Table 13 shows the difference in
a proceeding's average duration for each type of adjunct and for proceedings with and without any adjunct appointed. Put simply, more adjuncts
means longer proceedings.

.

Table 13: Relationships Between

Special Master*

Magistrate Judge

Mediator

Settlement/Accounting

Other

Any Adjunct*

ointments and Duration

2,201

1,510

(32)

(60)

1,859

1,644

(42)

(50)

1,929

1,688

(21)

(71)

1,985

1,579

(37)

(55)

2296

1690

(8)

(84)

1,879

1,218

(73)

(19)

As Table 13 shows, while the difference in average proceeding time
between those with and without any judicial adjunct is statistically significant (denoted by asterisks), most of the individual types of adjuncts didn't
rise to the level of statistical significance. 221 (Settlement/accounting
adjuncts fell just outside the bounds of statistical significance.) One relationship did stand out, however: Proceedings with special masters last
about 66% longer than those without such appointments, and the difference is statistically significant at conventional levels. Our findings are thus
consistent with a prior study's observation that, when comparing proceedings with only special masters to those with only magistrates, "cases that
used only a special master took longer to resolve than cases using only a

magistrate judge." 222

221. For information on the conventional level of significance, see Damodar N. Gujarati,

Basic Econometrics 134 (4th ed. 2003).
222. Hanks, supra note 19, at 62.

2184

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:2129

Proponents of special masters' use in MDLs suggest that masters can
speed a proceeding along "much more efficiently, effectively, and economically," but tend to offer few comparisons and no cost assessments. 223 The
ABA's recent call for judges to use special masters routinely in MDLs
asserted that they "reduce costs" by heading issues off at the pass and "by
swiftly and efficiently disposing of disputes that do arise." 224 It likewise
warned that failing to appoint a special master at the outset of the proceeding, "[r] egardless of the reason," "may disserve the goal of securing
225
'ajust, speedy, and inexpensive determination."'
Our findings thus far suggest otherwise. In practice, appointing special masters "at the outset of the litigation" 226 would mean adding special
masters alongside magistrate judges to preside over pretrial duties that
magistrates typically handle without additional cost to the litigants. As
Table 3 shows, the first appointment is almost always a magistrate. But like
having too many cooks in the kitchen, any appointments beyond that first
one slow down the proceeding even more. And even though special masters are not always the first appointment a court makes, they are often the
first or second. So, the ABA's position that routinely appointing a special
master will speed proceedings up seems dubious in light of our finding
that proceedings with special masters last 66% longer on average. We thus
share a concern voiced by past researchers: that private adjuncts may prolong the litigation to stay employed. 227
Regardless of motive, our finding that proceedings with special masters last 66% longer warrants closer scrutiny. A proceeding's duration is
affected both by appointing adjuncts and the number of actions it contains, but what happens when you look at duration while controlling for
both complexity and adjuncts simultaneously? To come closer to answering this question, we estimated a duration model. Duration models are a
form of regression analysis, allowing researchers to consider the time to a
particular event (here, from the adjunct's appointment to closing the proceeding), while also controlling for a number of other factors (number of
actions, type of termination, etc.) and allowing us to determine the impact

of each. 228
When we look at the duration of proceedings and control for factors
that make proceedings more complex-whether the proceeding ended in
223. Fellows & Haydock, supra note 28, at 1271, 1280.
224. ABA Resolutions, supra note 8, at 57.

225. Id. at 7 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1).
226. Id. at 51.
227. Farrell, Special Masters, supra note 172 at 614; Hanks, supra note 19, at 48.
228. We estimated a Cox proportional hazard model with dichotomous variables for
settlement (individual or aggregate) and any adjunct, plus the number of actions. We also
included a continuous measure of the number of adjuncts appointed. Because the proceedings were all closed, there was no censoring of outcomes in the model. See, e.g., Janet M.
Box-Steffensmeier & Bradford S. Jones, Event History Modeling: A Guide for Social
Scientists 48 (2004) (describing the Cox proportional hazards model).
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any kind of settlement (relative to other outcomes), the number of actions
involved, personal injury claims, multiple unrelated defendants, and the
use of any judicial adjunct-we find a significant effect for the use ofjudicial adjuncts." How a proceeding ends (the outcome) does not significantly relate to the proceeding duration once we control for other factors,
but the number of actions and the use ofjudicial adjuncts are both associated with longer proceeding times. These results are statistically significant
at conventional levels. Figure 11 illustrates proceeding times for those with
and withoutjudicial adjuncts, controlling for the number of actions in the
proceeding, personal injury claims, multiple unrelated defendants, and
the proceeding's outcome.
Figure 11: Probability of Proceeding Survival by Adjunct Appointment,
Measured in Days
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factors, appointing
ajudicial adjunct makes proceedings last longer than they otherwise would, all
else being equal. Although one additional action in a proceeding has
almost no effect on how long it lasts, designating any judicial adjunct
means the proceeding is 43% less likely to close. In fact, as the number of
adjuncts goes up, there is a 12% decrease in the probability of a proceeding closing. While the effects for type of adjunct and the frequency of the

229. Because there are so many districts and so few proceedings in our data, we are
unable to test the effect of district practice.
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type of adjunct are not significant, there is some preliminary evidence that
proceedings with lots ofjudicial adjuncts tend to last longer.
As section L.A notes, efficiency is but one reason that judges employ
adjuncts. Nevertheless, judges should bear in mind that appointing an
adjunct does not just affect a proceeding's length; unless the chosen
adjunct is a magistrate judge, that decision will affect parties' costs as well.
Having considered costs in terms of time, we now turn to actual dollars
and who pays.
B.

The Missing Cost in Cost-Benefit Analysis: JudicialAdjuncts' Compensation

Rule 1 makes it plain that courts should construe all Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure-including Rule 53 on special masters-"to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding."230 Federal magistrate judges are salaried court employees and make
around $185,000 annually.231 Public servants' compensation comes from
taxpayers and is fixed by statute even when magistrate judges serve as special masters under Rule 53.232 Like district court judges, magistrates are
ensconced in the federal courthouse, 233 which means they have staff, law
librarians, and law clerks at their fingertips as well as immediate access to
court records and transcripts. Parties pay for costs associated with all other
adjuncts.
Many years ago, the Supreme Court recognized that special masters'
"compensation should be liberal, but not exorbitant." 23 4 "The rights of
those who ultimately pay must be carefully protected," and though judicial
salaries "are valuable guides," higher compensation rates may be necessary.235 Given this general latitude, appellate courts rarely disturb fees. But
the Supreme Court did find that awarding a special master fifteen times
the amount of a district judge's salary (currently around $210,900 annually) and eight times the Justices' own salary (currently around $258,900)
for a year's work abused the court's discretion. 236

230. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.
231. The Federal Judicial Center notes that as of October 1, 1988, magistrates can
receive up to 92% of the salary of a district judge. In 2019, district judge salaries were
$210,900, meaning that a magistrate could earn up to $185,748.Judicial Compensation, U.S.

Cts., https://www.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation [https://perma.cc/
3K9T-7FCD]; Judicial Salaries: U.S. Magistrate Judges, Fed. Jud. Ctr., https://www.fjc.gov/
history/judges/judicial-salaries-u.s.-magistrate-judges

[https://perma.cc/JX6T-8UH8].

232. 28 U.S.C. § 634 (2018).
233. See Hanks, supra note 19, at 47.

234. Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (1922).
235. See id.; see also Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra
note 94, at 274 (suggesting that judges have looked to the usual hourly rate for private practitioners in the area where they practice).

236. Newton, 259 U.S. at 106.
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Rule 53 requires courts to "fix the special master's compensation"
either in the appointment order or after judgment.2 37 But if the court sets
that compensation later, it must notify the parties and give them an opportunity to be heard.23 No comparable rules govern appointing settlement/accounting adjuncts, which judges typically install at the parties'
request, but which also increase parties' cost.
1. Compensation Lacks Transparency. - Outside of magistrates' public
salaries, we found relatively little information aboutjudicial adjuncts' compensation. Rule 53's advisory committee notes direct judges to state the
"basis and terms for fixing compensation" "in the order of appointment." 239 Yet, of the 174 non-magistrate (or "private") appointments,
judges disclosed no payment information for 60%, full information for
25%, partial information (such as hourly rates or payment ceilings) for
11.5%, and affirmatively sealed information for 2.8%. Table 14 shows disclosures by type of adjunct. Courts provided the least compensation information for mediators, followed by settlement/accounting adjuncts and
special masters.
Table 14: Compensation Disclosures for Non-Magistrate Judicial

Adjuncts, Percentage of Row

Special Master

Settlement/Accounting

Other

27

1

1

(93.1%)

(3.4%)

(3.4%)

-

Mediator

ln
M'di l(osc Di±4 ,s TV
dsr sr( e

20

22

14

3

(33.9%)

(37.3%)

(23.7%)

(5%)

53

17

5

2

(68.8%)

(22%)

(6.4%)

(2.6%)

5

4

(55.5%)

(44.4%)

-

-

AdljunctlI pe

As Justice Louis Brandeis famously quipped, "Sunlight is said to be
the best of disinfectants .... "24 Any attempt at balancing the costs and
benefits of appointing judicial adjuncts necessarily falls short without
being able to assess what those costs are. The absence of publicly available
compensation data in 62.8% of adjunct appointments is a noteworthy red
flag, especially considering the emphasis the ABA places on special masters' ability to reduce cost and delay in complex litigation and circuit
237. Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 3 (g) (1).
238. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53.
239. Fed. R. Civ. P. 53(h) advisory committee's note on 2003 Amendment.

240. Louis D. Brandeis, What Publicity Can Do, Harper's Wkly., Dec. 20, 1913, at 10.
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courts' heightened attention to transparency in proceedings that impact
public health and safety.241
How much must parties pay private adjuncts to perform judicial
duties orjudicially condoned activities? Framed this way, the question purposely differentiates the sought-after information from alternative dispute
resolution like private arbitration, for these judicial adjuncts exist not outside the federal courts but within them. Moreover, the missing information
that we seek involves neither secret settlements nor company data typically
divulged in now-vanishing trials-the two traditional areas in which scholars have traced a decline in transparency. 42 Instead, it concerns something
much more fundamental: the price of court adjudication.

241. See, e.g., In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., 927 F.3d 919, 934, 939 (6th Cir.
2019) (noting that transparency is important to allow the public to assessjudicial decisions);

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178-79, 1181
(6th Cir. 1983) ("[P]ublic access provides a check on courts. Judges know that they will
continue to be held responsible by the public for their rulings. Without access to the proceedings, the public cannot analyze and critique the reasoning of the court."). Compensation seems to have rarely been disclosed even in the 1990s. Farrell, The Function and
Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 275 (" [I]t is difficult to determine the total
cost of many masterships .... ").
242. See, e.g., Nicholas Pace, Introduction to Confidentiality, Transparency, and the
U.S. CivilJustice System, at xvii-xviii (Joseph W. Doherty, Robert T. Reville & Laura Zakaras
eds., 2012) (discussing how the rising use of private judges and of secret settlements contribute to the lack of transparency in civil litigation); Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by
Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 Notre Dame
L. Rev. 283, 371-401 (1999) (discussing how courts can seal confidential filings and settlement agreements); Nicholas M. Pace & William B. Rubenstein, How Transparent Are Class
Action Outcomes? Empirical Research on the Availability of Class Action Claims Data 2

(RAND Inst. for Civ. Just. Working Paper No. WR-599-ICJ, 2008), https://www.rand.org/pubs/
working papers/WR599.html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (" [L] ittle information
is available to the public about how many class members actually received compensation
and to what degree.").
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Table 15: Compensation Disclosures for Private Adjuncts by Resolution

No Disclosure (105 total)

Aggregate Settlement

61

Class Settlement

27

Individual Settlement

11

Bankruptcy

3

Defense Win

3

Sealed (5 total)

Aggregate Settlement

5

Disclosed (42 total)

Aggregate Settlement

30

Class Settlement

9

Bankruptcy

2

Individual Settlements

1

Partial Disclosure

Aggregate Settlements

12

(22 total)

Class Settlement

5

Defense Win

5

Total Private Adjuncts:

174

As Table 15 illustrates by extracting the fifty-nine magistrates and
focusing on the 174 remaining private adjuncts, transparency is lacking
across all outcomes. It is, however, particularly pronounced in aggregate
and class action settlements.
Class and aggregate settlements are the primary areas in which principal-agent problems between attorneys and their clients (or class members) are most acute and thus where sunshine on lawyers' spending would
be most important. Because all plaintiff-side tort lawyers work on a contingent-fee basis, they get paid only upon winning a judgment or negotiating
a settlement, with the latter being far more statistically likely.243
In the class context, Rule 23(e) requires judges to ensure that deals
are fair, reasonable, and adequate, and class counsel's ethical obligations
run to class members as a whole. 2 4 Moreover, judges award class counsel
the entirety of their fee under Rule 23(h).245 But judges have no formal
role in reviewing the terms of aggregate settlements; they award only a
portion of attorneys' fees via leadership's common-benefit fees, and lead

243. Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 20, 224.

244. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
245. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h).
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plaintiffs' lawyers' ethical duties to nonclients are less defined. 26 Unlike
class settlements where members are bound unless they affirmatively opt
out, lawyers in aggregate settlements must convince plaintiffs to dismiss
their claims and enter into a settlement program without knowing what
exactly they will receive.24
Because aggregate settlements are private deals, parties could simply
hire special masters and claims administrators on their own without judicial approval. 248 But scholars speculate that having the imprimatur of the
courts may help convince plaintiffs to agree to a settlement they might
otherwise reject-a result that would jeopardize the deal given the
required participation thresholds that many contain. 24 9 Even though Rule
23(e) has no place here, nonlegally sophisticated plaintiffs may not realize
this. In their eyes, judicially appointing an adjunct may (falsely) legitimize
the deal. 25 0
Moreover, when judges award leaders attorneys' fees based on a percentage of the gross settlement fund and that fund includes administrative
costs, those attorneys will receive more. Leaders in neither class nor aggregate settlements have a self-interested reason to keep costs low if settle-

246. See Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 54-62, 96-99, 130-33 ("This status
quo is worth emphasizing: absent affirmative consent, judges have no authority to coerce or

police private settlements.").
247. Id. at 40-54; Resnik, From Cases to Litigation, supra note 192, at 49 ("Further,
when using MDL in mass torts, its inability to reach unfiled, potential claims becomes a
limitation. When seeking to settle mass torts, judges and lawyers have learned that, absent
'global peace' (preclusion of all future claims), settlements are hard to achieve.").
248. See Baker, supra note 156, at 1173 (outlining "three general scenarios under
a special master assists with allocating a lump-sum mass tort settlement"). In a global
ment, the plaintiffs' steering committee might not be able to charge a mediator or
ment master as a common-benefit fee without judicial approval, but the committee

which
settlesettlecould

always require participating plaintiffs to consent to the costs of administering the program
as part of the price of admission (e.g., consent to settle, consent to the administration fees
that settlement entails). See Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 62 (discussing how
the steering committee includes their common benefit fees in a global settlement's terms).
249. See Burch & Williams, supra note 165, at 1496-516 (finding overall claimant participation requirements between 85 and 100%); Raymond L. Mariani, The Mass Disaster
Mediator: Can One Person Really Serve Two Masters?, 18 Disp. Resol. Mag. 8, 9 (2011)
(noting plaintiffs' confusion over neutrality); Byron G. Stier, The Gulf Coast Claims Facility
as Quasi-Public Fund: Transparency and Independence in Claim Administrator
Compensation, 30 Miss. C.L. Rev. 255, 256-57 (2011) (noting that claimants may be confused about "whether a quasi-public claims fund is like a private fund"). But see Baker, supra
note 156, at 1181 (contending that the benefits of having a court-appointed special master
include claimants seeing it "as more 'legitimate' and more 'fair' than an allocation determined by plaintiffs' counsel," and that "in turn can be expected to result in a higher rate of
claimant participation in the settlement and increased claimant satisfaction").
250. See Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 116-19. As communication theorist
Marshall McLuhan explained, "The medium is the message," meaning that the person
delivering the message-the judges themselves-have special significance for legitimacy in
plaintiffs' eyes. Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man 1 (1964).
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ment is inevitable. 21 If their retainer agreements allow them to charge
plaintiffs interest on those costs-and some charge 12% annually-then
private adjuncts may actually become a source of profit for plaintiffs' attorneys. 252 The longer the proceedings last, the more some attorneys stand to
gain from those interest rates. Of course, at some point, attorneys' desire
to recoup fees will conflict with the desire to profit from costs, but the
incentive structure does little to inspire confidence in an opaque system.
2. Disclosed Private Adjuncts' Fees. - Although relatively little overall
information about private adjuncts' fees appeared within the dockets, the
information that we could obtain showed quite a range: Some adjuncts
charged by the hour, while others took a lump sum, often for settlement
administration. As Table 16 reveals by proceeding, judicial adjuncts can
cost a good bit, but seemingly the costs have not increased over time. In
the 2004 Zyprexa litigation, for instance, the four special settlement masters (Ken Feinberg and Michael Rozen, of what was then Feinberg Rozen
and Cathy Yanni and John Trotter of JAMS) charged a total of

$9,403,293.00 to administer a fund of $690,000,000.253 As Table 16 shows,
although there are several adjuncts who cost millions of dollars, others cost
far less.

251. See, e.g., In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640 (E.D. La. 2010) (awarding $315,250,000 in common benefit expenses to attorneys); Pretrial Order

51A

at 1, In re

Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-1657 (E.D. La. Sept. 11, 2013) (awarding additional
reimbursement for common benefit expenses to attorneys); Nora Freeman Engstrom,
Lawyer Lending: Costs and Consequences, 63 DePaul L. Rev. 377, 425 (2014) (noting that
the gross, client deduction approach makes the client wholly responsible for expenses and
"insulates the lawyer from the effects of exorbitant spending").

&

252. See, e.g., Transvaginal Mesh Litigation: Attorneys Contingent Fee & Cost Employment
Agreement between clients and Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, P.L.L.C. and Ennis
Ennis, P.A. ¶3 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("All costs advanced on our behalf,
whether individually and/or common benefit, shall bear interest at the rate of one percent
(1%) per month (12% per year) until such time as the costs are paid by us.").
253. This suggests a fairly substantial increase from the early Agent Orange litigation in
which Ken Feinberg and his firm reportedly received more than $3 million in fees and
expenses. SilbermanJudicial Adjuncts Revisited, supra note 29, at 2150 n.105.
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Table 16: Disclosed Judicial Adjunct Fees254

Special
Settlement
Masters

Feinberg, Ken
Rozen, Michael
Trotter, John K
Yanni, Cathy

$9,403,293.00
(total)

Zyp rexa

1596

Special
Master

Niss, James

$615,637.79

Ephedra

1598

CPA

Page, Janice

$102,164.23

Ephedra

1598

Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

$91,917.65

High Sulfur
Content

1632

Claims
Administrator

BrownGreer, PLC

$1,552,595.62

Vioxx

1657

Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

$334,788.07

Vioxx

1657

Special

Rice, Paul

$175,000.00

Vioxx

1657

Special
Counsel

Barriere,
Brent B.

$111,470.68

Vioxx

1657

Court
Appointed
Counsel

Tulane Civil
Litigation Clinic

$10,000.00

Vioxx

1657

CPA

Garrett,
Philip A.

$1,371.00

Vioxx

1657

Special

Carroll,John

$17,838.00

American

1737

Master

Master

Honda

CPA

Mahler,
Andrew H.
Gilmore, Kevin

$21,511.38

OrthoEvra

1742

Special
Master

Holstein,
James R.

$9,968.75

Stand 'N Seal

1804

Claims/
Notice
Administrator

BMC Group

$1,369,695.42

CertainTeed

1817

254. As we note in the text, parties involved in these proceedings told us that the
amounts disclosed in the dockets were far less than the amounts actually charged. See supra
section III.B.
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Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

$100,000.00

Kugel Mesh

1842

Disbursing
Agent

Postlethwaite
& Netterville

$3,076,195.08

FEMA Trailer

1873

Special
Master

Balhoff,
DanielJ.

$318,308.07

FEMA Trailer

1873

Mediator

Yanni, Catherine

$138,574.19

Gadolinium

1909

Common
Benefit
Accountant

Dantio, Greggory

$46,062.44

Gadolinium

1909

Escrow Agent

National City
Bank, now a part
of PNC

$2,500.00

Gadolinium

1909

Claims
Administrator

Class Action
Settlement
Services LLC
Miller, Eric J.

$1,200,000.00
(total)

Vytorin/Zetia

1938

and Class
Notice
Consultant

Kinsella,
Katherine

Special
Master

Chuck Smith

$2,000,000.00

Digitek

1968

Special
Master

Gentle, III,
Edgar C.

$178,005.33

Total Body
Formula

1985

Mediator

Max, Rodney A.

$11,464.54

Total Body
Formula

1985

Special
Master

Cohen, David R.

$374,188.98

Whirlpool
Front-Loading

2001

Washer
Special
Settlement
Master

Buchanan,
Jerry A.

$7,705.00

Mentor Corp.
ObTape

2004

Claims
Administrator

Soloranzo,
Tricia M.

$5,000,000.00

Kitec
Plumbing
System

2098

Special
Master

Russo, GaryJ.

$4,790,405.99

Actos

2299

2194

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:2129

Deputy
Special
Master

DeJean,
Kenneth W.

$1,353,199.85

Actos

2299

Accountant

Arsement, Redd,
and
Morella, LLC

$4,837.97

Actos

2299

Special
Discovery
Master

Andrew Chirls

$324,561.37

Zoloft

2342

Special
Master

Jonathan
Lebedoff

$2,100.00

Hardieplank

2359

Medical

Turkis, Lance

$41,000.00

Franck's Lab,

2454

Expert

Inc.

CPA

Demonte &
Falgoust,
CPAs, LLC

$3,475.06

Franck's Lab,
Inc.

2454

Claims
Administrator

BMC Group Class
Action Services

$1,469,796.31

Guidant

1708

Assistant
Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

$252,000.54

Guidant

1708

Escrow Agent

Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A.

$252,000.54

Guidant

1708

Settlement
Administrator

Epiq Systems
Class Action and
Claims Solutions

$1,000,000.00

Caterpillar;

2540

Common
Benefit Fund
Administrator

Ellison, Larry
Liggett, Brooke

$1,565.00

Inc., C13 and
C15 Engine
Power
Morcellator

2652

Hourly rates varied by adjunct, ranging from $250-$600 per hour for
special-master services (and averaging $395.40/hour), to $165 per hour
for an escrow agent,25 5 as Table 17 below illustrates. These rates have
increased significantly from those reported in earlier studies where special

255. Anecdotally, we were told that these numbers seem quite low. Indeed, given how
few numbers were available on the record, they may well be at the low end of the spectrum.
But without more transparency, we have no reliable way of indicating true costs and averages.
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masters typically charged $200 per hour and the rates ranged from $150250.256
Table 17: Disclosed Hourly Rates for ludicial Adiuncts

Page, Janice

Plaintiff
cost

5260.00

Ephedra

1598

Special
Master

Niss, James

Defendant

$250.00

Ephedra

1598

Special
Master

Rice, Paul

Split
equally

$600.00

Vioxx

1657

Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

Plaintifffund

$400.00

Vioxx

1657

Special
Counsel

Barriere,
Brent B.

Split
equally

$300.00

Vioxx

1657

Special
Master

Johnston,
Robert M.

Plaintifffund

$250.00

Vioxx

1657

Special
Master

Smith, Fern

Split
equally

$600.00

Bextra and
Celebrex

1699

Special
Master

Juneau,
Patrick A.

Plaintifffund

$350.00

Guidant

1708

Special
Master

Borg,
John W.

Split unknown

$395.00

Viagra

1724

Escrow
Agent

Mahler,
Andrew H.

Plaintiffcost

$215.00

OrthoEvra

1742

Special
Master

Capra,
Daniel

Split
equally

$500.00

Bausch &
Lomb Inc.

1785

Certified
Public
Accountant

Beauston,
John

Plaintifffund

$225.00

Bausch &

1785

Special
Master

Little, Jr., F.A.

Plaintiffcost

$350.00

FEMA
Trailer

1873

Special
Master

Balhoff,
DanielJ.

Plaintifffund

$275.00

FEMA
Trailer

1873

Special

Ellis, Randi

Plaintiff-

$250.00

FEMA

1873

Master

-

Certified
Public
Accountant

fund

256. Willging et al., supra note 6, at 7.

Lomb Inc.

Trailer
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Urbatsch,
Kevin

Plaintiff
fund

$400.00

Gadolinium

1909

Auditor

FSM Capital
Management

Plaintiffcost

$275.00

Gadolinium

1909

Escrow
Agent

Dantio,
Greggory

Plaintiffcost

$165.00

Gadolinium

1909

Special
Master

Borg,
John W.

Split
equally

$395.00

Trasylol

1928

Accountant

Winikur,
Alan B.

Plaintifffund

$300.00

Trasylol

1928

Special
Master

Gentle, III,
Edgar C.

Plaintifffund

$250.00

Total Body
Formula

1985

Special
Master

Cohen, David
Rosenblum

Split
equally

$450.00

Whirlpool
Corp.

2001

-

Claims
Administrator

Washer
Special
Master

Cohen, David

Split
equally

$345.00

Oral Sodium

2066

Special
Master

Stack, Dan

Split
equally

$400.00

Yasmin
and Yaz

2100

Special
Master

Donovan,
James

Split
equally

$400.00

Yasmin

2100

Certified
Public
Accountant

Fitzgerald,
Michael E.

Plaintiffcost

$350.00

Yasmin
and Yaz

2100

Special
Master

DeJean,
Kenneth W.

Plaintiffcost

$400.00

Actos

2299

Special
Master

Rodriguez,
Carmen M.

Split
equally

$400.00

Actos

2299

Special
Master

Russo,
GaryJ.

Split
equally

$400.00

Actos

2299

Special
Master

Capra,
Daniel

Split
equally

$500.00

MI Windows
&Doors

2333

Special
Master

Chirls,
Andrew

Split
equally

$525.00

Zoloft

2342

Special
Master

Lebedoff,
Jonathan

Split unknown

$400.00

HardiePlank

2359

and Yaz
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Special
Master

Stack, Dan

Split
equally

$400.00

Pradaxa

2385

Special
Master

Donovan,
James

Split
equally

$400.00

Pradaxa

2385

Medical
Expert

Turkis, Lance

Split
unequally

$400.00

Franck'sLab,
Inc.

2454

Some of the attorneys we interviewed suggested that the information
gleaned from the dockets underestimated adjunct costs. One reported
paying special masters "between $50,000-$60,000 a month" and noted
some information found on the docket was "so skewed to the downside as
to not be relevant." 25 7 Yet this is the information publicly available on costs,
and some of the costs are surprisingly high. Concerns over whether these
data paint the full picture on costs only highlight the need for more public
disclosure. Thus, the numbers in Table 16 may be just the tip of the
iceberg.

3. Plaintifs Bear the Costs of Most Private Adjuncts. - We were able to
discern more information about which party paid for the private adjunct's
services. Settlement agreements, for example, often specified that administrative costs would be taken out of the settlement fund.258 And the norm
when a certified public accountant oversees plaintiffs' attorneys' commonbenefit fees (or when a special master divvies up fees among plaintiffs'
leaders) is that it counts as a cost attributed to plaintiffs. 25 9 Using those
norms and data collected from judicial orders, parties' motions, and settlement agreements, we coded who paid for each non-magistrate adjunct.
After removing the fifty-nine magistrate judges, we found that plaintiffs alone pay for 54% of the remaining 174 private adjuncts. That percentage includes instances when the costs of administering the settlement
came out of the fund as well as when plaintiffs paid for an adjunct's services
as a litigation cost. In settlement funds, one might argue that because
defendants pay settlement money, those costs should be attributed to
them. 2 0 But when claims administration fees come out of the fund, that
257. Interviews, supra note 48.
258. See e.g., Brief in Support of Plaintiffs' Unopposed Motion for Certification of
Settlement Class, Preliminary Approval of Settlement, & Approval of Class Notice at 25, In

re Caterpillar, Inc., C13 & C15 Engine Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 14-cv-03722 (JBS)

JS)

(D.N.J.

Apr. 11, 2016) ("The cost of notice will be paid out of the Settlement Fund.").
259. E.g., Case Management Order: Special Master Dejean's Fees & Costs at 1, In re

Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-md-2299 (W.D. La. Nov. 16, 2012).
260. One might argue that this suggests that costs paid directly by the defendant should
also be attributed to the plaintiffs under this logic (for it is money that could have gone
toward the settlement), but defendants are often willing to expend substantial amounts of
money paying lawyers and litigation costs that they are unwilling to put toward settlement.
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depletes the money available to plaintiffs. Accordingly, we categorize those
costs as costs incurred to plaintiffs.
Of the remaining appointments, parties shared costs 20% of the time,
though they did not always do so equally. One court, for instance, ordered
the defendant to bear 90% of the pretrial special master's cost.261 Defendants bore sole responsibility for only 6.9% of the appointments (again, in
contrast with plaintiffs bearing sole responsibility for 54%), and we were
unable to discern information on who paid for the adjunct in 18% of
appointments. Figure 12 breaks down which side paid for the adjunct by
type of appointment. 262

The early tobacco lawsuits are but one example. E.g., Haines v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 814 F.
Supp. 414, 421 (D.N.J. 1993) ("[T]he aggressive posture we have taken... continues to
make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs' lawyers . . . . To paraphrase General Patton, the way we won these cases was not by spending all of [Reynolds']
money, but by making that other son of a bitch spend all of his.") (alteration in original)
(quoting Memorandum from J. Michael Jordan, Att'y., R.J. Reynolds, to unspecified

Smoking and Health Attorneys (Apr. 29, 1988)).
261. Order at 3, In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB (M.D.
Fla. Nov. 16, 2007).
262. Readers may access a larger, interactve version at: https://public.tableau.com/

views/JudicialAdjunctsinMultidistrictLitigationFigurel12/WhoPaysbyTypeofAdjunct?:langu
age=en&:displaycount=y&publish=yes&:origin=vizsharelink.
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Figure 12: Who Pays for Judicial Adjuncts, by Type of Adjunct
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IV. A QUALITATIVE LOOK INTO MDL'S DELEGATION PUZZLE
Our findings thus far on delay and dollars add significantly to the cost
side of the cost-benefit ledger And yet, as our data also demonstrate, parties request and judges appoint adjuncts regularly in MDLs. Why? Maybe
they need help managing thousands of personal injury plaintiffs, lengthy
privilege logs, complex scientific and epidemiological data, and lawyers
with personality to spare. Or, as the literature on special masters suggests,
maybe it is adjuncts' specialized expertise, ability to operate behind the
scenes, nip disputes in the bud, and work collaboratively with the litigants
in ways that would otherwise endanger ajudge's neutrality.2 63 Maybe it's all

of these things or none of them.
Rather than speculate, we conducted twenty-two semi-structured
interviews with randomly selected plaintiff and defense lawyers, special
masters, claims administrators, magistrate judges, and district court
judges. 264 The purpose of these interviews is to better understand our
263. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Litigating Together: Social, Moral, and Legal
Obligations, 91 B.U. L. Rev. 87,113-114 (2011); Kenneth R. Feinberg, Democratization of
Mass Litigation: Empowering the Beneficiaries, 45 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 481, 494
(2012); Fellows & Haydock, supra note 28, at 1271, 1280-85.
264. We explain our methodology in more detail in the Appendix. See infra Appendix.
Our interviews include fourteen lawyers, six adjuncts, and two transferee judges. We had
more interviews planned but were forced to cancel them as courts, lawyers, and judicial
adjuncts scrambled to address the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, even with more
interviews, we are likely to gain little additional information. The patterns established in the
quantitative data are clear, these interviews support those findings, and additional anec-

2200

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:2129

quantitative (and statistically significant) findings regarding the use of
judicial adjuncts in these proceedings. By themselves, the interviews do
not offer (nor are they intended to offer) statistical significance. The
actors we selected have a range of experience-some are in the midst of
their first products liability MDL, whereas others have decades of MDL
experience dating back to the 1960s. They participated in at least twentyseven of the proceedings within our dataset that concluded in a range of
outcomes and collectively they appear to have worked in over one hundred
different MDLs. Although our principal aim is to supplement our quantitative findings with qualitative evidence, we have no reason to doubt that
this group represents the gamut of perspectives.
Our discussions yielded two broad narratives. One perspective suggested that all is well in this corner of the MDL world:Judges appropriately
delegate when proceedings demand too much of the court's time or where
specialized expertise would serve both the court and the parties. Judges
then carefully select and supervise those adjuncts. The other account is
darker. Rather than improvingjustice, adjuncts cajole parties through nonreviewable, ex parte discussions; repeat players on all sides thrive through
preferential treatment; and plaintiffs are left playing the lawyer lottery,
where their outcomes may depend more on selecting the "right" lawyer
and less on their suit's merits. 265 Of course, both accounts can be right:
Perspectives may vary and adjuncts can be both ideal and abused. The one
thing that everyone agreed on was that who the adjunct is matters
enormously.

A.

The Benefits of Delegation

MDL judges delegate for many of the same reasons that courts outsource more generally: It can save courts' time, protect parties, and tap
into adjuncts' specialized expertise. Commenting first on time, one attorney put it simply: "The system asks a lot of judges."266 "Contrary to the
original rules [of civil procedure], everything has gotten front loaded.
Everything gets tried on motions to dismiss, motions to strike, and motions
to certify." 26 7 Those issues are "magnified when there are complex caseswe're in the capillaries from day one."268 Said another, we're "asking

dotes, though interesting, are unlikely to change the findings. Judicial adjuncts as an industry may number in the thousands, but in our data we found just over two hundred appointments (fewer total people). We generalize to our data, as we should, and hint about what
we may find outside our data given that we have a representative sample of proceedings and

spoke to a representative sample of participants in those proceedings.
265. To be sure, litigants' chances always depend on the quality of their attorney, but
what we mean here is that even highly qualified lawyers may not get top dollar for their
meritorious clients if they do not know the right people, are not appointed to a proceeding's
leadership, or are on the outs with the leaders in a particular proceeding.
266. Interviews, supra note 48.
267. Id. (same interviewee).
268. Id. (same interviewee).
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[judges] to be generalists, so if you can have smart, qualified, incentivized
people who will work hard under the oversight of the judge, then that's
probably a good thing." 26 9 Judges, too, reiterated this theme. One noted
that appointing a special master who could timely address the defendant's
lengthy privilege log became necessary, for it would otherwise occupy all
of the magistrate's time and energy. 270
Second, ifjudges themselves come into close contact with the lawyers
and engage in what one MDL judge described as "off the record, roll-up
sleeves work," 27 1 it can affect their impartiality when later ruling on the
facts and law. Adjuncts act as a buffer, filtering through select information
while keeping the court at arm's length. "My [special master] can do a lot
of things behind the scenes that I can't do in terms of getting parties to
talk about the case," explained one district judge. 272
Third, outsourcing allows judges to tap into adjuncts' specialized
expertise. "My special master has a long history with [complex proceedings] . . . . He's been around . ... He knows all the settlement administrators all over the country," noted a district judge. 273 Interviewees identified
expertise as especially important for settlement administration and
broadly concurred on the benefit of appointing claims and lien resolution
administrators (LRA): "We don't really do [settlement administration]
much," said one magistrate. 274 Attorneys likewise noted that LRAs are
"necessities from an administrative standpoint." 275 But, from a pricing
perspective, they "can be problematic," one observed. 276 "We don't have
empirical data on what percentage of reductions we actually obtained
from the LRA," despite getting bids from different companies. 277 Part of
the difficulty, the same lawyer explained, is that four of the major providers
(Providio, Archer, Garretson Group, and Epiq) have now merged into two:

Archer Systems, LLC and Epiq. 278
Settlement administrators underscored the difficulty and tediousness
of their work:
Technology is hard to come by in the lien space, Medicare
doesn't have a great process. Sometimes you get blurry PDFs as
to what a lien amount is and you have to manually scratch out the
codes. It's a complicated process and so much of it has to be done

by hand.279

269. Id. (different interviewee).
270. Id. (same interviewee).
271. Gluck, supra note 140, at 1700-01 (internal quotation marks omitted).

272. Interviews, supra note 48.
273. Id. (same interviewee).
274. Id. (different interviewee).
275. Id. (different interviewee).
276. Id. (same interviewee).

277. Id. (same interviewee).
278. Id. (same interviewee).
279. Id. (different interviewee).
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As for payment, "we often do a flat bid, but then the workload turns out to
far exceed the administrative fund." 280
Despite these upsides, some interviewees voiced general concerns
about delegating: When the judge proposes using a special master, "sometimes it feels like a threat, not as a need to get more help," one attorney
said. 28 1 "It's an abdication of power," said another.282 A third noted that
whenjudges appoint adjuncts to assist with settlement committees as soon
as MDLs begin, it can be "hard to tell whether parties really do want to
settle the case [at that point] ."283 But you "have two tracks going on at the
same time, running up costs" when what you really need to do "is go
through discovery first." 284 "Sometimes there are just too many special
masters appointed," conceded a special master.285 "A green MDL judge
might think you need multiple people," but instead they "should be doing
a cost-benefit analysis." 286
B.

Special Masters Versus Magistratesin MDLs

District courts' local practices and culture played a central role when
opting for magistrates or special masters, sometimes seeming to overshadow a reflective cost-benefit analysis. 287 Unlike special masters, who may
be party-selected or judicially chosen, magistrates are always appointed by
the court. 288 Magistrate judges explained that districts vary in how they
assign them cases: Some randomly pair district and magistrate judges for
each case, others assign magistrates to a district judge, and still others typically use random pairings but make exceptions for MDLs to allow magistrates to develop expertise. 289
Culture matters, too. One district judge reported "not really using
magistrates" because the "magistrate may not have any unique ability or
280. Id. (same interviewee). To adjust, some adjuncts bid for projects with an initial feeper-claim, but considered changing that charge after processing a certain percentage of
those claims. Id. (same interviewee).
281. Id. (different interviewee).
282. Id. (different interviewee).
283. Id. (different interviewee).
284. Id. (same interviewee).
285. Id. (different interviewee).
286. Id. (same interviewee).
287. Past studies demonstrate wide disparities among districts in preferences for magistrates or special masters. See Tracey George, Christina L. Boyd & Albert Yoon, From Wall Street
to Main Street: A Multidimensional Map of the Impact of Magistrate Judges on Federal

Courts 15, 50-51 (Vanderbilt Univ. L. Sch. Working Paper No. 18-57, 2018), http://ssrn.
com/abstract=3262302 (on file with the Columbia Law Review) ("Just as district judges differ
from one another in their reliance upon law clerks, so too do they vary in their delegation
to magistrate judges. In some instances, the delegation is infrequent; for others, it is standard protocol.").

288. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (2018).
289. This became apparent through conversations with multiple interviewees. Interviews,
supra note 48.
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acumen," 290 whereas a magistrate judge noted the opposite: "In my district,
it's not the culture to use special masters." 291 Continuing, the magistrate
judge said, "In other parts of the country, [district judges] look down on
magistrates. You have to understand the culture .... We handle a ton [of
the MDL work], but we aren't even invited to the transferee judges' conference." 292 Recalling one such conference that took place years ago, one
district judge mentioned using magistrates to manage MDL cases: "The
other judges at my table were appalled that they were using magistrates in
any manner for MDLs. The Panel selects district judges to handle these
cases, not magistrates." 293 "Even those who were on the Panel weren't
happy [with my use of magistrates] back then." 294 "But," the judge concluded, "in my district we use magistrates for all pretrial nondispositive
work. And I think the culture might be changing." 295
Attorneys' comments often reflected longstanding themes that we
pinpoint in Part I: Expertise, efficiency, cost, settlement pressure, and ex
parte communication all played a role in whether they preferred using a
magistrate judge or special master. On expertise, when parties proposed
using a special master, sometimes they did so to "get away from the district
judge," and other times because they worried that the district judge was
too busy or inexperienced. 296
As for efficiency, an adjunct's available time factored into parties' preferences in different ways. Most of the special masters in our dataset seemed
to work full-time as masters, meaning that they did not need to juggle a
law practice on top of their appointment and could instead commit fully
to addressing parties' issues. They ranged from specialists employed by
JAMS like Cathy Yanni, to retired judges (who often work for JAMS) such
as John Trotter, Dan Stack, and Marina Corodemus, to lawyers who serve
only as special masters and mediators like Patrick Juneau, Ken Feinberg,

Randi Ellis, and David Cohen. 297

In contrast with some judges' sentiments, some lawyers saw special
masters' ability to devote their full attention to a matter as a drawback,
particularly when it came to costs. Attorneys reported that the high costs
of special masters trouble them, but that they are reluctant to object to a
master's appointment or fee given the master's authority over their cases.
"Lawyers who are connected who don't have a thriving practice or retired
judges tend to get the [special master] work and they have an incentive to
290. Id.
291. Id. (different interviewee).
292. Id. (same interviewee); see also Pro, supra note 140, at 806-07 (noting that the
change from "magistrate" to "magistrate judge" in 1991 was designed to ease some of the
hierarchical stratification, but that there was a lag in changed thinking).
293. Interviews, supra note 48.
294. Id. (same interviewee).
295. Id. (same interviewee).
296. Id. (multiple interviewees).
297. For more examples, see supra Table 16 & Table 17.
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draw out the proceedings, not to conclude them quickly," one said.298 "The
ABA's statement [on reducing delay] is so not true, but nobody wants that
to be public. Special masters don't reduce cost or delay." 299 And, reflecting
on costs, another attorney noted that "in some cases, I've had special masters sitting in the room for long depositions literally trimming their

nails."300
One defense attorney further explained, "I have somebody who's willing to pay versus a plaintiff's lawyer who's paying out of pocket. Special
masters tend to take their appointments as an annuity."301 They tend to
come in two forms: (1) a "lawyer who's well connected but not overly busy,
who sees it as a financial opportunity," and (2) a "lawyer who's well connected but very busy and doesn't have time to dedicate to it. Which one it
is will drive how you manage the special master-both are problems of a
different sort." 302 A special master who falls into the first category "is
motivated to keep the case going."303 Magistrates, on the other hand, "are
motivated to end the case and keep it off the court's docket. But they can
be rougher on and more threatening to lawyers because they're connected

with the judge." 304
As to this settlement pressure, attorneys also observed "a leverage
component that magistrates can exert that special masters can't."305 Said
one: "Magistrates try to use that influence to coerce you into settling or
penalize you for not settling."306 This is problematic-whoever spearheads
settlement discussions shouldn't "have decisionmaking power over the
case because they can threaten you or carry out penalties for refusing to
settle . . . . It's payback." 307 Of course, that criticism isn't unique to magistrates or even district judges-it illustrates the broader need to have someone handle discovery who isn't facilitating settlement negotiations. 30
In his earlier study, Judge George C. Hanks, Jr. noted that one judge
he interviewed "reported being particularly aware of the risk that a special
master might take on the mantle of the courts' authority and act as a 'de

298. Interviews, supra note 48.
299. Id. (same interviewee).
300. Id. (different interviewee).
301. Id. (different interviewee).
302. Id. (same interviewee).
303. Id. (same interviewee).
304. Id. (same interviewee).
305. Id. (same interviewee).
306. Id. (same interviewee).
307. Id. (same interviewee).
308. See Brazil, supra note 98, at 405-06 (noting that special master Francis McGovern
"believes that facilitating communication and promoting agreements is largely incompatible with wielding actual or apparent power to decide important disputes"); Ellen E. Deason,

Beyond "ManagerialJudges": Appropriate Roles in Settlement, 78 Ohio St. L.J. 73, 127-44
(2017) (arguing for reforms that would separate those presiding over pretrial and trial from
those conducting settlement conferences or mediation).
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facto' federaljudge."3 09 We heard similar reservations over deputizing special masters to broker deals, essentially giving them free reign and the
imprimatur of the court. "[The special master] wants to control every
aspect of the case ... [and] does things that if [the judge] knew, he would
cut his head off," declared a lawyer.310
Nevertheless, some attorneys indicated that informality and the ability
to have ex parte communications with special masters was often key: "You
feel like you can let your guard down a little more," and "it's nice for the
parties to be able to reach out to someone other than the judge or magistrate to be able to resolve issues," one reported. 311 Additionally, there are
things "you don't want to bother the judge with; they don't want to hear
whining." 312 But because "special masters are being paid to hear all of
these issues, you feel free to use them." 313 This was especially true, said
another attorney, of common-benefit fees. Submitting time and expenses
to a special master as the proceeding unfolded is "such a great idea, so
that at the end of the case, it's not some complex mess of arguing about
who did what." 314
Others disagreed, with one attorney noting that a special master in
one proceeding "was changed to a settlement specialist to shield him from
the laws that applied as a special master . . .. I feel like the special master
deliberately overlooked self-dealing [on fees] ."315 Said another, "The special master was a friend of the plaintiffs' steering committee, it didn't matter what the nonleaders time was, it got discounted. I didn't feel like it was
fair. Had it been ajudge, I would have had a greater feeling of fairness." 316
Another lawyer agreed, citing a better experience with magistrate judges
overseeing common-benefit funds: "[The magistrate judge] gave us a lot
of requirements as a common-benefit committee. We had to share everything with everybody and everyone got to object." 317
C.

Privatization Concerns Revisited

Apart from magistrates wearing dual hats as settlement mediators and
pretrialjudges, attorneys' concerns fell principally on special masters. The
positives and negatives largely mirrored those articulated in traditional
civil suits. 318 But one unique theme emerged: Specialty in the bar and
among private adjuncts of all kinds, from special masters to settlement spe-

309. Hanks, supra note 19, at 61.
310. Interviews, supra note 48 (different interviewee).
311. Id. (different interviewee).
312. Id. (same interviewee).
313. Id. (same interviewee).
314. Id. (different interviewee).
315. Id. (different interviewee).
316. Id. (different interviewee).
317. Id. (different interviewee).
318. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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cialists, created unique opportunities for mischief. Concerns about special
masters spilled over into the entire settlement industry: Private adjuncts
may be partial to the people who appoint them; as repeat players, their
interests may conflict with one-shot plaintiffs' best interests; and, as disputes shift from Article III courts into claims administration, adjuncts can
create ad hoc procedures insulated from judicial and appellate review that
may affect plaintiffs' substantive outcomes.
1. Capture and Cronyism. - In law, the word "capture" brings to mind
agencies unduly influenced by members of the industries that they regulate: The agency is the marionette, the industry the puppeteer. That traditional Stiglerian account is not what we have in mind here, however. 319
Rather, the word is a heuristic for interviewees' softer concerns about entry
barriers and subtle scenarios in which incentives and self-interest align to
favor insiders over outsiders. 320
The revolving door described in regulatory capture bears a passing
resemblance to concerns raised in our interviews. But instead of FDA
employees seekingjobs in the pharmaceutical industry, for instance, MDLs
present a situation in which repeat-player attorneys have opportunities to
hire repeat-player special masters and claims administrators. 321 Special
masters may then have opportunities to suggest those same plaintiffs'
attorneys for lucrative leadership positions and to award them commonbenefit fees thereafter. 322 Claims administrators, too, could be in a position
323
to provide preferential treatment for plaintiffs with the right lawyers.
As early as 1994, when writing about special masters, the Federal
Judicial Center observed that "a small group of 'repeat players' has devel-

319. See generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BellJ. Econ.

& Mgmt. Sci. 3, 3 (1971) (explaining the regulatory capture hypothesis).
320. See Daniel Carpenter, Susan I. Moffitt, Colin D. Moore, Ryan T. Rynbrandt, Michael
M. Ting, Ian Yohai & Evan James Zucker, Early Entrant Protection in Approval Regulation:

Theory and Evidence from FDA Drug Review, 26J.L. Econ. & Org. 515, 516 (2009) ("As
interpreted by capture theory, early entrant protection would provide market incumbents
with added and prolonged shelter from competition (e.g., regulatory delay in approving
later entrants) .... ").
321. In some cases, claims administrators hire employees from law firms, which is a side
subject in an attorney malpractice suit over the pelvic mesh settlements. Pamela Johnson's

First Amended Complaint

¶103, Alvarado v.

Clark, Love & Hutson, G.P., No. 4:19-CV-02148

(S.D. Tex. filed Nov. 15, 2019) ("As it turns out, employees from [Clark, Love & Hutson]
and [Lee Murphy] have found their way to Archer Systems, including employees who may
have knowledge of the blown statute of limitations issue and subsequent efforts to conceal
the same.").
322. See, e.g., In re Syngenta Mass Tort Actions, No. 3:16-cv-00255-NJR, No. 3:15-cv-

01221-NJR, 2019 WL 3887515, at *2-3, *10 (S.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2019) (citing Special Master
Dan Stack as conducting both an objective and a subjective analysis to divvy up commonbenefit fees among law firms and reducing one award to a single law firm from 79% of the
Illinois common-benefit fund down to 49%).
323. See Farrell, The Function and Legitimacy of Special Masters, supra note 94, at 277
("The neutrality of masters is not assured by life tenure, fixed salaries, or even special codes
of professional ethics.").
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oped-masters who have served in many cases and are invested in their
reputations as successful settlement masters."324 One study warned that
"special master appointments have become a lucrative 'cottage industry'
for the bar." 325 One of the judges interviewed "was particularly surprised
by the several phone calls received from special masters 'offering their services' once an MDL case had been announced." 326
Lawyers also specialize. As Special Master (and Professor) Francis
McGovern observed of the bar back in 2005, "[W] e are seeing the same
faces over and over and over again. ... "327 Our prior empirical work
demonstrated the truth of McGovern's intuition about MDLs: A small
cadre of repeat players (on both the plaintiff and defense sides) consistently occupies the most powerful leadership positions. 328
Putting two and two together, with insider attorneys selecting special
masters and special masters suggesting which attorneys should spearhead
the proceeding, these dynamics could produce an insular world in which
slights in one proceeding have repercussions in another. Our attorney
interviews highlighted these concerns. "You have the same frequent flyers
in all of these cases," said one. 329 "[Special masters] are in bed with the
plaintiffs' leadership," and "the economic interest of these people is so
self-aligned." 330 When special masters are involved in choosing the plaintiffs' lawyers who will lead the MDL, "they're always going to be deferential
to people they've worked with in the past and they're always looking for
their next gig," said another. 331 "When you look at the roster in [proceeding name], you see way too many friends and family. It's clearly [the special
master's] posse." 332 Concluded a third: "There may be exceptions where
special masters are objective and fair, but they are the exception rather
than the rule. They shouldn't be allowed to be in multiple MDLs at the
same time with the same leadership." 333
Yet, when the Advisory Committee amended class settlement rules in
2018, it entrusted adjuncts with a role in safeguarding the integrity of settlement negotiations. Rule 23(e) requires judges to consider, among other
things, whether "the proposal was negotiated at arm's length," 334 and the

324. Farrell, Special Masters, supra note 172, at 604 (footnote omitted) (citing Jack B.

Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469, 558 (1994)).
325. Hanks, supra note 19, at 72.

326. Id.
327. 2004 Special Masters Conference, supra note 182, at 1253 (remarks by Francis
McGovern on the Future ofJudicial Masters).
328. Burch & Williams, supra note 165, at 1495 (discussing findings on the influence of
a small number of well-connected repeat players).
329. Interviews, supra note 48.
330. Id. (same interviewee).
331. Id. (same interviewee).
332. Id. (different interviewee).
333. Id. (different interviewee).

334. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (2) (B).
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Advisory Committee's notes suggest that "the involvement of a neutral or
court-affiliated mediator or facilitator in those [settlement] negotiations
may bear on whether they were conducted in a manner that would protect
and further the class interests."335 Some courts have even gone so far as to
reason that subclassing and separate class representatives are less necessary
ifjudicial adjuncts facilitated the deals. 336
But if cronyism concerns are to be credited, then they suggest that
private adjuncts may not be as ideally suited to play this prophylactic role
as the Advisory Committee hoped. Still, the point would not be that the
negotiating parties want a special master biased to one side or the other;
rather, it is that they would prefer one who will not upset the status quo. 337
So, if a settlement includes features that harm class members but benefit
class counsel and defendants (spurious injunctive relief, coupons, burdensome claims procedures, and monetary reversions back to corporate
defendants), expand class counsel's franchise and promote closure for
corporate defendants (broad class definitions and releases), or discourage
class objectors (bonuses to class representatives and clear-sailing agreements for attorneys' fees) ,331 the issue is whether a private adjunct would
be willing to wave a red flag if doing so jeopardized future work. After all,
class members do not hire adjuncts; class counsel and defense attorneys
do.
2. Self-Dealing and Bias. - Attorney interviews raised somewhat similar
concerns with claims administrators. One defense attorney speculated, "I
think there's some financial arrangement between those companies and
plaintiffs' lawyers-they're getting a referral fee or kickback of some sort
from the claims administrators. They're such advocates for a particular
administrator. "339 A plaintiffs' attorney conceded, "[T] here's probably
something worth looking into there." 34 0 Another said, "[Claims administrators] gave out ski trips and World Series tickets to lawyers all the
time." 341 Claims administrators, on the other hand, noted that their business was "very competitive; we get hired based on relationships." 34 2 Yet,
335. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note on 2018 Amendment.

336. See In re NFL Players' Concussion Inj. Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351, 377 (E.D. Pa. 2015)
("Moreover, the presence of Mediator Judge Phillips and Special Master Golkin helped
guarantee that the Parties did not compromise some Class Members' claims in order to
benefit other Class members."). As the Second Circuit recognized, however, private adjuncts
are a poor substitute for separate representation: "Only the creation of subclasses, and the
advocacy of an attorney representing each subclass, can ensure that the interests of that
particular subgroup are in fact adequately represented." In re Literary Works in Elec.

Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 252 (2d Cir. 2011).
337. Garth, supra note 105, at 941.
338. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment: Red Flags in Class Action

Settlements, 92 Notre Dame L. Rev. 859, 864-65 (2016).
339. Interviews, supra note 48.
340. Id. (different interviewee).
341. Id. (different interviewee).
342. Id. (different interviewee).
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one observed that a particular proceeding seemed "all sewn up-we didn't
get any of it and I can't understand why."343
Unlike magistrate judges and special masters, no disqualification
standards or ethics rules exist to guide claims administrators. Parties, principally plaintiffs' lawyers, hire them and ask the judge to formally appoint
them. But in past writings, most administrators acknowledge that their
obligations lie with the claimants. In administering the Sulzer Inter-Op Hip
Prothesis settlement, a former state court judge noted, "Basically I'm in a
situation while where people's claims are pending, that I owe my fiduciary
relationship to those people who are adverse to me. And that's sort of a
funny situation to be in. But it goes on on a daily basis."344 Claims administrator Orran Brown likewise noted that whoever pays his bills, "his firm
is in the neutral role of being a trustee or a fiduciary who has to safeguard
plaintiffs' money," meaning that the "ultimate duty is owed to the beneficiaries of the claims program."345
All settlement designers (plaintiff and defense attorneys) must typically agree on the person or entity selected. Special masters and claims
administrators who favor one side outright are unlikely to be retained
again. The conventional thought then is that with repeat players on both
sides, it's a wash-no need for concern. 346 Nevertheless, when judgment
calls pit insiders against one-shot plaintiffs (or one-shot attorneys), once
again, there could be a tendency to err on the side of keeping one's future
employers happy.347
As prior research has shown, what's good for defendants and plaintiffs' lead lawyers isn't always good for the plaintiffs themselves or their
individual counsel. 34 For instance, when a plaintiffs' law firm requested a
second claims administrator and bank to deliver settlement money to its
clients, the MDL judge refused. "The court's concern is the plaintiffs," he
wrote. 349 "This is just another step in receiving the money they are entitled
to. Furthermore, there is no indication each of the 450 clients has agreed

343. Id. (same interviewee).
344. Symposium, A Novel Approach to Mass Tort Class Actions: The Billion Dollar
Settlement in the Sulzer Artificial Hip and Knee Litigation: A Symposium, 16J.L. & Health

169, 196 (2002).
345. Amaris Elliott-Engel, Mass Money in Claims Administration Raises Questions, Legal
Intelligencer (Nov. 27, 2012), https://www.law.com/thelegalintelligencer/almID/

1202579410212/?hubtype=main

page&id=1202579410212 (on file with the Columbia Law

Review).

346. Garth, supra note 105, at 930, 934.
347. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on
the Limits of Legal Change, 9 Law & Soc'y Rev. 95 (1974) (theorizing that repeat players
who encounter the legal system time and again will have different goals than one shotters).
348. Burch, supra note 194, at 63-71.

349. Order at 2, In re Benicar (Olmesartan) Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 1:15-md-02606-RBKJS (D.NJ. Nov. 22, 2019), 2019 WL 6271285.
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to this proposal, particularly in light of the proposed requirement they
indemnify the proposed Fund Administrator for certain claims."350
Claims administrators do far more than run numbers and cut
checks-they can, for example, determine the sequencing and priority of
payouts as well as award money from extraordinary injury funds. 351 That
discretion fosters opportunities for preferential treatment. In litigation
over BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill, for instance, allegations surfaced
that special master Patrick Juneau's claims team favored the repeat players
who appointed them by expediting steering committee members' clients
over earlier filed claims. 352 More generally, one claims administrator noted
that in one settlement, "[Well-known plaintiffs' attorney's] claims didn't
get paid as much as he wanted them to. If you do what [that attorney]
wants you to, then he'll hire you again; if not, he won't."353
Certain court-appointed banks, which also perform adjunct functions, may be susceptible to claims of self-dealing and conflicts of interest
as well. Esquire Bank, for instance, is founded and run by repeat-player
plaintiffs' lawyers in the mass-tort bar, who likewise hold shares in its publicly traded parent company, Esquire Financial. 354 The bank loans money
to plaintiffs while they await their settlement checks from claims administrators; it also holds attorneys' fee funds and settlement money, like the
Vioxx Consumer Settlement Funds. 355 Interests can quickly intertwine. In
the Chinese Drywall litigation, for instance, three of Esquire Bank's founders and board members sat on the attorney's fee allocation committee and
the Bank held those funds. 356 Other attorneys accused committee members of waylaying fee payments as a means to preserve the bank's ability to
loan money to retired NFL players awaiting their payouts in the concurrent NFL Concussion litigation; one of the bank's former board members

350. Id.
351. E.g., Actos Master Settlement Agreement § 7.02(G), In re Actos (Pioglitazone) Prods.

Liab. Litig., No. 6:11-MD-2299 (W.D. La. Apr. 28, 2015) (explaining the extraordinary injury
fund process and stating that the "Special Master's resolution of all appeals relating to El
Payments shall be final, binding and Non-Appealable").
352. Independent External Investigation of the Deepwater Horizon Court Supervised
Settlement Program: Report of Special Master Louis J. Freeh at 8-9, 74, In re Oil Spill by

the Oil Rig "Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2:10-md-02179CJB-SS (E.D. La. Sept. 6, 2013); Jason Brad Berry, DHECC-Proof Positive of Claims Being
Expedited by the PSC, Am. Zombie (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.theamericanzombie.com/

2014/03/dhecc-proof-positive-of-claims-being.html

[https://perma.cc/ZY9N-QLAA].

353. Interviews, supra note 48.
354. See Declaration of Arnold Levin

¶6,

In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods.

Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-md-2047-EEF-JCW (E.D. La. June 27, 2018) ("I personally purchased
8,000 shares of Esquire Financial Holdings, Inc. for $100,000.00 on November 30, 2012, and
continue to hold this investment.").

355. Order at 2, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 05-md-01657 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2013)
(appointing Esquire Bank as the financial institution for the Consumer Settlement Fund).
356. Order and Reasons, In re Chinese-Manufactured Drywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2047,

2018 WL 5251849 (E.D. La. Oct. 22, 2018); Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 154-55.
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also served as the NFL's class counsel.357 These questions over conflicts
prompted the transferee judge to transfer Chinese Drywall's fee fund out of
Esquire Bank and into the court registry. 358 Reflecting on Esquire Bank,
one of our interviewees said that "it is actually conflicted, it is unsavory, it
is unpleasant, it doesn't feel right." 359
3. Bureaucratization, Ad Hoc Procedure, and Transparency. - Judicial
outsourcing in MDL has become a given: That's one theme that emerged
implicitly from our attorney interviews. Although many interviewees raised
process-related questions about adjunct selection, debated whether special
masters or magistrates were better equipped for particular tasks, and disputed the wisdom of hiring particular special masters, no one suggested
that judges should shoulder the burden alone. As hierarchies become
ingrained, however, they layer in new decisionmakers and demand coordination between them. Each proceeding that employs adjuncts and particularly those with many adjuncts (again, up to fourteen) forms a minibureaucracy.
Professor Owen Fiss's work, The Bureaucratizationof theJudiciary, suggests that delegating decisionmaking itself as opposed to hiring an expert
to aid judicial understanding "insulates the judge from the presentation
of the facts and the law on that particular issue."360 Splintered decisionmaking may lead judges to defer too heavily to adjuncts' decisions,
review those decisions with only a partial understanding of the full picture,
and rob them of the "human experience that is otherwise endemic to
adjudication and the idea of a case." 361 The dangers of what Fiss labels
"bureaucratic insularity" include diluted responsibility and endangered
legitimacy.3 2 "The larger the bureaucracy," he warns, "the greater the diffusion of responsibility." 36 3 He thus urged judges to hire special masters
only as a last resort (even in structural-reform cases) and curtail the use of

magistrates.364
Since Fiss's writing in 1983, outsourcing has become so interwoven
into the judicial fabric that it is rarely scrutinized. Yet attorney interviews
reflected some of the pathologies that Fiss identified. Fractured deci357. Yance Law Firm's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Immediately Transfer
Attorney Fee Qualified Settlement Fund to a Different Depository Bank or Back into the

Court Registry, Chinese-ManufacturedDrywallProds. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-md-02047-EEF-JCW;
Letter to The Honorable Anita Brody from Craig Mitnick, In re NFL Players' Concussion

Inj. Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (No. 2:12-md-02323-AB); Burch, Mass Tort Deals,
supra note 194, at 149-55.

358. Order, Chinese ManufacturedDrywall Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2:09-md-2047.
359. Interviews, supra note 48.
360. Fiss, Bureaucratization, supra note 14, at 1455.

361. Id. at 1454-55.
362. Id. at 1455-57 ("Ajudge who exercises power without fully engaging in the dialogue
that is the source of his authority ...
is like a biologist who reports an opinion he has not
tested by the scientific method .... [T] here is no reason for us to believe that he is right.").

363. Id. at 1465.
364. Id. at 1463.

2212

COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 120:2129

sionmaking persists. One attorney remarked, "[Transferee judge] wanted
to wrap up the MDL before he retired but he doesn't want to walk away
until then. But he wants it to be done. [Transferee judge] trusts [special
master] and doesn't want to get into the middle of it."365 Accountability
too may wane. As Professor Abbe Gluck's interviews with fifteen federal
and five state MDL judges revealed, some judges prefer working with special masters precisely because any appeal from magistrate judges requires
written opinions and thus undermines their focus on efficiency.366 But
open reasoning is important both to adjudicators' decisionmaking process
and to litigants' feelings of fairness. 36 7
Claims administrators, in particular, bring Fiss's concerns over diffused decisionmaking and accountability into sharper focus. Unlike magistrate judges and special masters, whose decisions are subject to judicial
review through statutory and rule-based mechanisms, claims administrators who run settlement programs (as well as the special masters who sometimes preside over them) often sit as judge, jury, and final arbiter.36 They
seldom explain their decisions, and although judges appoint them, they
rarely review their decisions. 369 As one claims administrator explained:
If the dollar value is of any magnitude, there will be some opportunity to appeal the claims administrator's award. Sometimes you
have to pay an appeal fee. Normally, we decide an initial outcome, then [the settlement] allows a request for reconsideration
to us and that's the way it ought to be done. It lets us fix mistakes
and most people are happy with that. Programs vary in terms of
how you appeal beyond that. It used to go back to the court, but
judges didn't want those. Sometimes it's a committee of plaintiff
and defense lawyers. People don't trust that, so you have a neutral
put into place as an appeal. A special master or something. That's
the going trend now. Very often now those people have been the
365. Interviews, supra note 48.
366. Gluck, supra note 140, at 1693-94. Some magistrate judges that we interviewed
noted that they sat on the bench with the district judge during hearings and co-signed
orders. Interviews, supra note 48. District judges review magistrate judges' nondispositive
orders on a clear error standard, and dispositive orders on a de novo basis. Fed. R. Civ. P.

72; see also Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 98 (3d
Cir. 2017) ("Unlike a nondispostive motion (such as a discovery motion), a motion is dispositive
if a decision on the motion would effectively determine a claim or defense of a party.").
367. See Michael D. Bayles, ProceduralJustice: Allocating to Individuals 41 (1990) (noting the importance of reasoned opinions to litigants' perception of fairness); Richard A.
Posner, Reflections on Judging 240 (2013) (observing that "the process of writing, which
means searching for words, for sentences, in which to express meaning, is a process of discovery rather than just of expressing preformed ideas"). For history on devising global settlements, see Hensler, Glass Half Full, supra note 119, at 1612-18.
368. See supra note 351 (describing the Actos Settlement). As Professor Teddy Rave argues,
that's the point of settling-achieving dispute resolution in a lower-cost, alternative form.
See D. Theodore Rave, Settlement, ADR, and Class Action Superiority, 5J. Tort L. 91, 98 (2012).
369. The Vioxx settlement is a notable exception; the transferee judge sat as the chief
administrator. Settlement Agreement, art. 6, § 1.1, In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 478 F.

Supp. 2d 897 (E.D. La. filed Nov. 9, 2007) (No. 2:05-md-01657).
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settlement master or mediator appointed by the judge that
brought the case to the settlement and they stay involved ....
Some programs have a standard of review-de novo, abuse of discretion. There are ways to control things like that.3 70
While Fiss's concerns about judicial engagement and diffused decisionmaking haven't aged, they now raise second-generation issues: As
transferee judges' organizational needs grow amidst a backdrop of fragmented responsibility and piecemeal decisionmaking, ad hoc procedures
can flourish and transparency may decline. Of course, a busy transferee
judge might be quick to question both whether feasible alternatives exist
and, on balance, whether broadscale settlement administration isn't a net
good. After all, tailoring justice to a claimant's unique circumstances is
part of what special masters and claims administrators do best. Private
adjuncts' allure and the appeal of ADR more broadly is that rules of procedure and evidence operate not as a mandate, but as a menu of options
where substitutions are welcome and anything can be cooked to parties'
preference. 371 Moreover, ad hoc procedures are prevalent in MDL: From
plaintiff fact sheets to Lone Pine orders, judges regularly invent and imple372
ment procedures outside of the Federal Rules.
But whether multiple decisionmakers and procedural customization
are flexible, commendable responses to new challenges-or are abdications of power and process susceptible to insider influence and abuse-is
hotly contested. 373 By design, settlement programs will compensate some
at greater amounts than others. Some interviewees noted that claims are
treated "more uniformly in a global deal [than a law-firm-by-law-firm
inventory settlement] ."374 Others disagreed: "It all depends on who's in
the lead. If the firm isn't a big player in the proceeding, it doesn't have all
the facts, depositions, and information. The firm is left trying to find out
what the defendant has paid to other, bigger players." 375 So, a global settle370. Interviews, supra note 48.
371. See Hensler, Alternative Courts, supra note 27, at 1432-34 (describing twelve decision points that claims facility designers face).
372. See Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Nudges and Norms in Multidistrict Litigation: A
Response to Engstrom, 129 Yale L.J. Forum 64, 68-70 (2019) (concluding from a dataset of
products liability MDLs that 47% ofjudges issued Lone Pine orders and showing that plaintiff
fact sheets were used in thirty-three out of thirty-four products liability MDLs); Nora Freeman
Engstrom, The Lessons of Lone Pine, 129 Yale L.J. 2, 17 (2019) (observing that while it is
difficult to precisely quantify their prevalence, state and federal courts have issued at least
ninety-seven Lone Pine orders); Gluck, supra note 140, at 1677-81; David L. Noll, MDL as

Public Administration, 118 Mich. L. Rev. 403, 411-21 (2019); Margaret S. Williams &Jason
A. Cantone, An Empirical Evaluation of Proposed Civil Rules for Multidistrict Litigation, 54
Ga. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
373. Compare Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing

Complex Litigation, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 440, 491 (1986) (discussing the benefits of judges
using flexible procedures), with Brazil, supra note 98, at 417-20 ("The achievements of special masters in the areas of case management ...
[are] at best partial.").
374. Interviews, supra note 48.
375. Id. (different interviewee).
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ment's winners and losers might be based less on the merits of individual
claims (particularly when those merits remain uncertain at the time of settlement) than on whose attorneys sit around the negotiation table. 376
Informality and nonreviewable decisions can invite improper influences
and imprecision, and off-the-record discussions could lead to favoritism or

cajoling.

77

When it came to inventory settlements, attorneys differed as to
whether private adjuncts were even necessary. "Yes, it can create a bit of an
ethical dilemma," said one, "and some people believe the solution is to
appoint a special master, but I don't like doing that. It's not fool proof. I'd
rather the defendant actually make offers, but it doesn't work that way all
the time." 378 Few independent checks exist on this otherwise opaque process. Without transparency as to who gets what and why, litigants may fairly
question whether horizontal equity exists.
Similar transparency issues plagued adjuncts' fees. At times even the
lead plaintiffs' lawyers who weren't on fee committees were not privy to
special master or mediator costs. The "expense was paid out of the common benefit fund . .. but the plaintiffs' lawyers don't know." 379 "[The special master] ran sham mediation sessions, and I bet that [special master]
made more than a million," said one attorney.380 Another said simply,
381
"[T]he court doesn't want [costs] on the record."
V. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OFJUDICIAL ADJUNCTS

Collectively, our findings reveal a somewhat startling conclusion:
Seventy-six of ninety-two proceedings included a special master, settlement/accounting adjunct, or another private adjunct-not counting private mediators. In other words, in 82.6% of the proceedings, courts delegatedjudicial authority to private actors. This fits snugly into a larger trend
toward privatization through alternative dispute resolution (ADR) except
that it occurs within the auspices of the federal courthouse. 38 2 Yet both
private judicial adjuncts and ADR raise a similar, elemental question: What
are courts for?

376. Others have also expressed these concerns. Hensler, Alternative Courts, supra note

27, at 1434; Mark D. Plevin, Robert T. Ebert & Leslie A. Epley, Pre-Packaged Asbestos
Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. Tex. L. Rev. 883, 907-08 (2003).
377. Brazil, supra note 98, at 420-22.
378. Interviews, supra note 48; see Baker, supra note 156, at 1171 ("Rule 1.8(g) does not
state that the attorney can or should resolve her concurrent conflict of interests under Rule
1.7 by handing off to a third party the making of the aggregate settlement or the allocation
of any attendant lump-sum settlement fund.").
379. Interviews, supra note 48.
380. Id. (same interviewee).
381. Id. (different interviewee).
382. See Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 134-37.
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Responses vary, but they tend to divide over whether courts should
aim to provide justice and articulate legal standards or resolve disputes.3 83
Pushed to their extremes, however, both may sometimes lead to unsatisfactory results. For instance, if courts' chief goal is to resolve disputes, then
secret settlements, like those that once threatened to conceal ignitionswitch defects in GM cars, must trump public safety concerns. 3 4 Conversely, prodding litigants to fully adjudicate their disputes' merits-to dig
to the heart of doingjustice-might prove so cost prohibitive for even meritorious disputes that it would chill attorneys from bringing them at all.
The aim of this Article is not to proclaim what courts are for or to
replicate the tomes dedicated to the debate. 3 5 Rather, it is to inform the
discussion by situating some of what takes place under the auspices of
Article III courts within the larger literature on privatization. For example,
when private settlement programs divert MDL claims out of court, they
often mirror arbitration: The special master (or sometimes the claims
administrator) sits as a final, binding arbitrator.386 When this occurs in
arbitration, there is no surprise. But what about when the district judge
appoints a special master to preside over that private settlement? Are there
new issues scholars should grapple with as ADR occurs not parallel to court
adjudication but under its umbrella?
This Part adds data to this debate by illustrating how privatization
costs within the federal courts tend to fall more harshly on the plaintiffsthose who may be least able to afford it. In so doing, we tie our empirical
results back into our theoretical foundation to raise philosophical questions about who should pay for the system: its users or the public? Grappling with this question, particularly in the area of mass torts, which historically impacts public health and safety, leads us to propose that judges turn
to magistrate judges first. When caseloads or lengthy settlement oversight
383. See generally, e.g., Amy J. Cohen, Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections

on Dispute Resolution and Public Values, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1143, 1145 (2009); Owen M.
Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 Yale L.J. 1073 (1984) (arguing that settlement should not be
preferable to judgment); Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 1273
(2009) (arguing that settlements are characterized "by the pursuit of self-interest, imbalances of material resources, inequalities of information, and strategic behavior").

384. Alexandra Lahav, In Praise of Litigation 48-49 (2017); see also Bill Vlasic, G.M.
Settles Switch Suit, Avoiding Depositions, N.Y. Times (Mar. 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.
com/2015/03/14/business/general-motors-ignition-flaw-victim-settlement.html (on file with
the Columbia Law Review).
385. On the question, see generally Miller, supra note 69. On the costs and benefits of
ADR, see J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 Yale

L.J. 3052, 3059-64 (2015); Sally Engle Merry & Susan S. Silbey, What Do Plaintiffs Want?
Reexamining the Concept of Dispute, 9 Just. Sys. J. 151, 151-55 (1984); Judith Resnik,
Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the

Erasure of Rights, 124 Yale L.J. 2804, 2838-40 (2015); Jack B. Weinstein, Some Benefits and
Risks of Privatization ofJustice Through ADR, 11 Ohio St.J. on Disp. Resol. 241, 256-63 (1996).
386. Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 135-37. Professor Hensler pointed out
some early parallels between claims facilities, special masters, and ADR as early as 1995. See
Hensler, Glass Half Full, supra note 119, at 1622-23.
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prompt the need for private adjuncts, courts should play a supervisory role
by considering multiple candidates and seeking budgets, bids, or other
assurances that the appointee will be a faithful steward not only of the
judicial office, but of the parties' money.
A.

Privatizing Justice Comes with a Price-Principally for Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs' attorneys ultimately bill adjunct charges as "costs" on top of
attorneys' fees, which means that those expenses do not typically affect
lawyers' take-home pay unless there is no settlement or the settlement is
too low. When Special Master David Cohen told an attorney he "felt
slightly guilty about the parties having to pay my fees," the lawyer
"laughed." 387 "[C]ompared to expert witness fees, deposition travel
expenses, and paying platoons of brief-writing attorneys, his client's halfshare of my cost was 'a rounding error,"' Cohen explained. 388 But what's a
mere rounding error to the attorney is serious money to injured plaintiffs.
As plaintiffs alone bear the full brunt of 54% of private adjuncts'
fees, 38 9 evidence from our interviews drove home the true toll of that statistic. One claims administrator, for instance, recounted a situation in
which the judge appointed a special master to preside over the inventory
settlement of around one hundred plaintiffs with diverse settlement
awards. The special master charged around $250,000 on a per capita basis,
meaning that each client paid the same amount for administrative costs.
After the attorney's one-third contingent fee, "the client was netting less
than 50% of her award. The lawyer didn't want or hire the special master.
What do you do in those situations? ... I do the math and tell every law
firm when they don't pass the 50% test before liens," the administrator
concluded. 390 Similarly, one attorney said: "When you have all those [settlement] categories based on the severity of the injury, the least compensated category gets totally devoured by the fees. With [lien resolution
administrators], special master, common benefit fees, etc., if someone gets

a $10,000 payout, they end up getting maybe $1,500."391
Costs can impact plaintiffs disproportionately in other ways too,
including their right to access the justice system. Despite later employing
a team of four special masters to administer the Zyprexa settlement, one
transferee judge questioned whether litigant-paid adjuncts might raise
constitutional problems for violating the Appropriations Clause:
The practice is analogous to the National Park Service
deciding that, if it does not have enough money to run a
park, it will charge a new user fee without specific statutory
387. Cohen, Special Masters Versus Magistrate Judges, supra note 4, at 75.

388. Id.
389. See supra Figure 12.
390. Interviews, supra note 48. The 50% test determines whether a plaintiff nets less
than 50% of their settlement award.
391. Id. (different interviewee).
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authorization. Taken to the extreme, the constitutional
argument might mean that a court must deny plaintiffs
access if they cannot pay certain expenses. 392
Adjuncts increase costs in two ways: time to resolution and actual dollars. Plaintiffs feel the impact of both. And as monetary costs mount, lawyers may be less inclined to pursue those cases at all. One magistrate judge
noted, "[U] nless special masters are used only in select instances, it could
end up being a constitutional bar to a person's right of access to the
court." 393 Making "money off that gateway to the court has a significant
impact on the community." 394 Likewise, one defense attorney said, "[S] pecial masters are like renting a new judge, it's not fair. Filing fees should
entitle you to a public adjudication." 395 "Who's going to pay for all the privatization if defendants win? [Settlement] becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy to make sure all of these parties get paid." 396 Although judges appoint
fewer adjuncts in proceedings where defendants win, that outcome is certainly not a foregone conclusion when courts make those initial decisions.
B.

Judges Should Prioritize Public Resources

Instead of turning reflexively to private adjuncts, judges should first
consider appointing a magistratejudge in MDLs. The overall caseload statistics presented in Part I illustrate that federal courts' civil burden has not
increased much at all since 1995, and state courts' civil caseload has
decreased. 397 The one increase that we observed was in MDL filings. That
doesn't suggest a crisis in the courts; rather, it reflects a predictable shift:
As companies globalize their products and new forms of social media and
interactivity lend themselves to expansive advertisement opportunities, it
would be expected that if a faulty product hits the market, it would produce widespread harm. That intuition is reflected in the increased number
of products liability MDLs from 2007 to 2017.398 Instead of showing cause
for alarm, these statistics simply illustrate a need to deploy resources

accordingly. 399
Magistrate judges, whose salaries come from the general tax revenue,
are a preferable first-best solution for several reasons. First, as salaried,
public employees, magistrates are better insulated from the capture, bias,
and self-dealing concerns that plague party-selected, party-compensated
392. Jack B. Weinstein, Ethical Dilemmas in Mass Tort Litigation, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 469,
501 (1994).
393. Interviews, supra note 48.
394. Id. (same interviewee).
395. Id. (different interviewee).
396. Id. (same interviewee).
397. Supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (providing caseload statistics).

398. Williams, supra note 116, at 1267-68.
399. See Pro, supra note 140, at 809 (noting that magistrate judge use is driven by a
variety of factors, including the district's caseload and the magistrate's experience level and
skill set).
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private adjuncts. 400 They can (and have) performed the same work as special masters, and sometimes even claims administrators, for far less
expense. As one attorney we interviewed noted, "[T] he magistrate is free;
that's always a preference among litigants to have no cost." 401 Because they
are not paid by the hour, magistrates' incentives better align with judges'
aim to move the proceedings along. When appointed as a special master
under Rule 53, they have the same freedom to operate behind the scenes
as does any private special master, but magistrates' decisions need not be
colored by a desire for future business.
Second, magistrates are already ensconced within the federal courthouse. They possess the legitimacy of federal office, know the court's
culture, and have staff and law clerks that do not add to parties' expenses.
Plus, they are accustomed to the ways in which judges review their decisions, and clear paths exist forjudicial review and error correction. So long
as the same magistrate does not issue pretrial rulings and conduct settlement discussions, using magistrates may reduce behind-the-scenes coercion that some attorneys reported, while judicial review sheds light on ad
hoc procedures.
One attorney mentioned that magistrates who work regularly with the
same district judges "may have developed practices over time that they
believe provide efficiency, plus the magistrate may have insight into what
the judge thinks about the case." 402 Studies interviewing magistrates bear
this out: In some districts at least, expectations between district and magistrate judges "were understood even when unspoken." 403 Conversely, said
the lawyer, if the special master "is outside of the courthouse and doesn't
have experience with the federaljudge (maybe expertise in the subject but
not experience in pretrial proceedings or with this judge), then there may
be more efficiency with the magistrate." 404
Third, our interviews suggested that magistrate judges wanted opportunities to take on MDLs, and previous work indicates that they are capable
of becoming experts themselves. 405 As one magistrate noted, "I haven't had
a case I didn't think I could handle." 406 Said another of the work,
"[M] agistrates would welcome it-MDL work is great and interesting. "407
Judge Hanks's interviews with magistrate judges likewise indicated that
even though MDL proceedings "did consume a large amount of time,
400. See supra section I.B.
401. Interviews, supra note 48.
402. Id. (same interviewee).

403. Pro, supra note 140, at 805.
404. Interviews, supra note 48.
405. Hanks, supra note 19, at 68, 79; see also Jack B. Weinstein & Jonathan B. Wiener,
Of Sailing Ships and Seeking Facts: Brief Reflections on Magistrates and the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure, 62 St. John's L. Rev. 429, 439 (1988) ("Magistrates who are given full
power to manage discovery can do so exceptionally well.").
406. Interviews, supra note 48.
407. Id. (different interviewee).
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their dockets did not become unmanageable."4 08 Moreover, despite a heavier workload, magistrate judges who handled MDLs "reported they
enjoyed the challenges" and "appreciated their role,"409 a similar sentiment to that expressed by the transferee judges that Professor Abbe Gluck
interviewed. 41 0
One district judge we spoke with noted that magistrates are particularly well equipped to handle smaller MDLs and that it was only in a larger,
more contentious proceeding with a substantial privilege log that the magistrate felt overwhelmed, leading the judge to appoint a special master.
"The magistrate was very appreciative. She felt burdened and felt badly
that she couldn't do it all. But that wasn't at the outset of the case, it was
on down the line." 41 1
Litigants might worry that magistrates, as salaried employees, would
be less willing to spend nights and weekends working on their case. The
data collected could not address this concern, for courts often appointed
both magistrates and special masters-making it impossible to untangle
their effects. Nevertheless, the magistrate judges with whom we spoke, as
well as previous studies, belie such criticisms of public servants, and parties
appeal both magistrate and special master decisions at similar rates with
similar outcomes.4 12
Fourth and finally, successful mass-tort proceedings benefit the public, notjust the plaintiffs. Why should litigation costs fall disproportionality
on the latter? We are, after all, each better off for not having our cars turn
off while we drive them. Everyone can lead better lives when pharmaceutical companies adequately warn doctors about risky side effects and when
lawsuits force medical-device companies to pull faulty products off the
market. In short, products liability MDLs play a policing role that impacts
public health. Using the general tax base to compensate the public servants who help resolve these disputes makes sense. Appointing private judicial adjuncts, on the other hand, taxes those who use the system but not
everyone who benefits from it.
C.

Judges as Supervisors

To be sure, the justice system isn't free: Plaintiffs pay filing fees, contingent fees, and litigation expenses. But private-adjunct expenses indicate
that there can be additional costs, too. That does not mean that judges
must tackle MDLs alone, but it does suggest a need for closer attention to

408. Hanks, supra note 19, at 69.
409. Id. This also suggests that magistrate judges may be able to handle MDL work in
addition to (rather than in lieu of) their work on habeas and social security cases, which one
of our interviewees noted can be "time consuming, rote, and mind numbing." Interviews,
supra note 48.

410. See Gluck, supra note 140, at 1693-94.
411. Interviews, supra note 48.
412. See Hanks, supra note 19, at 59.
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the cost-benefit calculus. Of course, there may be times when judicial
vacancies or the court's overall caseload make the volume overwhelming,
or even when a proceeding truly does require specialized expertise that a
magistrate lacks. For these instances, this Article offers a few guidelines.
Unless magistrate resources are scarce, special masters should be used
sparingly for overseeing pretrial activities-an area in which magistrates
are particularly experienced and adept. Special masters are best used in
long-term projects like medical-monitoring programs that demand continuity and in "nation-building" type projects where they have to gain the
trust of neighbors or those incarcerated to implement a court's decree. 413
Likewise, in toxic torts or geographically centric accidents where plaintiffs
can come together to discuss their desires and settlement options, special
masters and mediators may play a useful role.
Special masters and accountants may also be advantageous in overseeing plaintiffs' attorneys' common-benefit fees and in administering settlements, but only with appropriate checks in place. Lawyers raised concerns
about their fees being undervalued by special masters who are beholden
to the same attorneys in other concurrent proceedings, suggesting that
judges should seek input on conflicts from non-lead attorneys and be willing to review special masters' decisions de novo. Others worried about the
same special master moving from, for instance, leadership selection and
common-benefit fees to a role overseeing settlement negotiations. Conflicts are nearly unavoidable when the same person moves from a trusted
plaintiffs-side confidante to a settlement facilitator for both sides.
When selecting a private adjunct, attorney interviews proposed that
judges "should have buy-in from both sides.""4 "Everyone should get to
put three people in a hat, like when you're picking a mediator. There
should be more choice."" This strikes at the heart of anxieties over both
pricing structures and repeat play; diverse options may allow parties to discuss costs and benefits more openly.
Disclosing adjunct candidates' budgets on the record likewise fosters
transparency and frugality. "Costs and the number of special masters are
legitimate concerns," acknowledged one district judge; these appointments are "not an opportunity for you to take care of your buddy who owns
a document management company .... The district court must have some
oversight."" 6 Special Master Ed Gentle issued a "Pepsi challenge": "If the
413. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 85, at 710 (describing the special master's role in
integrating a school and revitalizing the area of Coney Island); Brakel, supra note 86, at 543
(discussing the special master's role in implementing decrees reforming prisons and mental
hospitals); Edgar C. Gentle, III, Administration of the 2003 Tolbert PCB Settlement in
Anniston, Alabama: An Attempted Collaborative and Holistic Remedy, 60 Ala. L. Rev. 1249,
1258 (2009) (discussing the special master's role in remedying the long-term, communitywide impacts of a toxic tort).
414. Interviews, supra note 48.
415. Id. (same interviewee).
416. Id. (different interviewee).
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special master takes on a task, she should come up with a budget and try
to stick with it; as services are rendered she should then report progress
against task milestones for each invoice (a speaking bill) so the parties can
evaluate the costs and benefits."417
With the power to appoint comes the power-and obligation-to
monitor.418 Some judges, however, seemed hesitant to intervene when all
parties agreed. One said, "Some special masters charge exorbitant hourly
rates," but "that comes into play [for me] only if there was a dispute as to
who the special master should be based on the rates . ... Otherwise,
there's no reason for me to get involved." 41 Another judge disagreed:
"Rule 1: Just, speedy, and inexpensive-that's the hook for judges to get
involved for holding down costs. Runaway costs don't help anyone." 420
Instead, the "number one thing is transparency. The special master has to
keep everyone informed about his role and what he's doing." 421
Scholarship about the potential for class counsel to abuse their power
at class members' expense has existed for decades. 422 And recent amendments to Rule 23(e) suggest thatjudges should approve a class settlement
only after considering whether the relief offered is adequate, including
"the method of processing class-member claims." 423 Ifjudges ever doubted
their power to demand information on settlement administration or to
ensure cost effectiveness, this change should allay those fears. Granted,
some judges exhibited an exemplary fly's eye for detail even before that
amendment: In presiding over the Ephedra litigation, for example, the
transferee judge had the special master file every proposed bill on the
docket and gave parties an opportunity "to object to or otherwise com424
ment" on it to him, ex parte.
Similar fiduciary concerns arise in nonclass MDLs, where judges call
upon substantially more adjuncts to help administer aggregate settlements. Not only are those costs likely to be greater, meaning that it is likely
to be more expensive to put money in plaintiffs' hands in those settlements
than in class action deals, 425 but lead lawyers' fiduciary obligations toward

417. Id. (different interviewee).
418. For proposed standards for approving claims administrators and their programs,
see Francis E. McGovern, The What and Why of Claims Resolution Facilities, 57 Stan. L.

Rev. 1361, 1386-89 (2005).
419. Interviews, supra note 48.
420. Id. (different interviewee).
421. Id. (same interviewee).
422. See, e.g., Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem

Products, Inc., 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1045, 1057, 1090-92 (1995).
423. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (2).
424. Notice of Opportunity to Object to Special Master's Bill Dated 8/2/04 at 1, In re

Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1598 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 2, 2004); see also Order at 1, In
re Ephedra Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 04-MD-1598 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2004).
425. Of course, claims rates in both class actions and aggregate settlements are difficult
to find, so we were unable to consider anything approaching a cost per claimant. We explain
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nonclient plaintiffs are muddled at best. 426 Most judges do not appoint
lead lawyers based on adequate-representation principles. Yet, they allow
those attorneys to "consent" to adjunct appointments on behalf of the
plaintiffs.427 The worry then is that those leaders may lack a strong incentive toward frugality. Some lawyers' retainer agreements, for example,
allow them to charge clients interest on costs-up to 12% annually. 428
Those attorneys stand to profit both from private adjuncts' appointment
and the delay they create.
The method that some judges use to award common-benefit fees and
class counsel's fees may likewise give plaintiffs' lawyers an incentive to
increase costs.4 In Vioxx, for example, the transferee judge capped the
total amount of attorneys' fees at 32% of the gross recovery (an amount
that included administrative costs) and awarded leaders 6.5% of that gross

further possibilities for these discrepancies, including a lower claims rate, supra section

III.A.2.
426. See Memorandum & Order at 12-13, Casey v. Denton, No. 3:17-cv-00521 (S.D. Ill.
Sept. 4, 2018) (discussing whether leaders owe duties to nonclients); Opinion & Order at

14, In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-md-2543 (S.D.N.Y. Apr 12, 2016)
(same); Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation § 1.04 reporter's notes on cmt. a (Am.
L. Inst. 2010) (same); Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note 194, at 96-98 (same); Charles
Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict Litigations, 79

Fordham L. Rev. 1985, 1989-90 (2011) (same). As one academic has argued, fiduciary obligations are what separate lawyers from car dealers and construction workers, which spills
over into billing arrangements: When clients are oversold in those situations, "there is social
harm, to be sure, but there is no disloyalty or betrayal, because these service providers deal
at arm's length with everyone and do not (seriously) profess otherwise." W. William Hodes,
Cheating Clients with the Percentage-of-the-Gross Contingent Fee Scam, 30 Hofstra L. Rev.

767, 782 (2002).
427. See Hensler, Alternative Courts, supra note 27, at 1434 (resolving claims "depends
on who is at the negotiating table," as claimants "represented by lawyers who have a good
deal at stake in the outcomes of the claims resolution design process . . . are likely to do
better than categories of claimants who are unrepresented or whose lawyers are edged out
of the process by legal maneuvering").

&

428. Transvaginal Mesh Litigation: Attorneys Contingent Fee & Cost Employment
Agreement between clients and Aylstock, Witkin, Kreis & Overholtz, P.L.L.C. and Ennis
Ennis, P.A., supra note 252, ¶ 3 ("All costs advanced on our behalf, whether individually
and/or common benefit, shall bear interest at the rate of one percent (1%) per month (12%
per year) until such time as the costs are paid by us."); see also First Amended Complaint,

ExhibitA at 1, Plummer v. McSweeney, No. 4:18-cv-00063-JM (E.D. Ark. Aug. 27, 2018), 2018
WL 1789882 (exhibiting a contingency fee retainer agreement allowing law firms to recover
"reasonable interest on all expenses that are advanced (not to exceed the 'prime' rate published in the Wall Street Journal)"); Complaint, Exhibit 1 at 2, Morrison v. Blasingame,

Burch, Garrard & Ashley, P.C., No. 2:17-cv-04133 (S.D. W. Va.June 14, 2017) ("All costs and
expenses associated with the litigation which are advanced or paid by the Firms shall accrue
interest at the maximum rate of interest authorized by applicable law, but not to exceed

seven percent (7%) per annum .... ").
429. Engstrom, Lawyer Lending, supra note 251, at 425 ("The problematic scenario is
thus chiefly confined to the gross, client deduction approach, as it alone makes the client
wholly responsible for expenses and thereby insulates the lawyer from the effects of exorbi-

tant spending.").
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recovery in common-benefit fees. 430 He subtracted costs thereafter. 431
Including costs and expenses in plaintiffs' gross recovery and awarding
attorneys' percentage fees out of that lump sum does little to encourage
frugality. So long as settlement is likely, this method may encourage lead
lawyers or class counsel to spend freely, for it permits them to receive a
portion of that fund as fees in addition to being reimbursed for clients'
costs. Moreover, Vioxx is not an outlier. Given that it is in their best financial interests to do so, it is no surprise that where ethics rules permit attorneys to deduct their fees from the gross settlement award and then deduct
expenses thereafter (as most ethics rules do), that seems to be precisely
what most choose. 432
Rule 23(h) gives judges clear authority over class counsel's fees, and a
similar restitution theory supports judicial oversight in awarding commonbenefit fees in nonclass aggregate settlements. 433 Consequently, in addition to requesting budgets, pricing structures, and costs from private
adjuncts (and disclosing them on the record), one straightforward proposal to encourage fiscal responsibility would be to first subtract and reimburse common-fund costs and expenses from plaintiffs' gross settlement
amount, then award leaders a percentage of plaintiffs' net recovery. 434 At
430. See In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 760 F. Supp. 2d 640, 646, 661 (E.D. La. 2010);
see also Pretrial Order
431. Pretrial Order

51A, supra note 251, at 2-3.
51A, supra note 251, at 1.

432. See, e.g., Stephen D. Annand & Roberta F. Green, Legislative andJudicial Controls
of Contingency Fees in Tort Cases, 99 W. Va. L. Rev. 81, 95 (1996) ("Almost without exception, plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are calculated from the total amount of the settlement or
verdict before costs are taken into consideration."); Lester Brickman, ABA Regulation of

Contingency Fees: Money Talks, Ethics Walks, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 247, 248 (1996) (observing that standard contingency fees are "usually thirty-three percent to forty percent of gross
recoveries"). On ethics, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct permit attorneys to deduct
fees from either the gross award or the net award so long as the agreement notifies the client
of the method. Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 1.5(c) (2020); see also Engstrom, Lawyer
Lending, supra note 251, at 425 ("Some states ...
demand that expenses be deducted
before the contingency fee is calculated. The bad news, though, is that the gross, client
deduction approach is permissible in most states. Where it is permissible it appears to be
utilized by the majority or vast majority of contingency fee practitioners.").
433. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h) ("In a certified class action, the court may award reasonable
attorney's fees .... "); see also Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 195, at
102-03 (noting that judges may apply the common-fund doctrine even after denying class
certification); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 Vand.
L. Rev. 67, 146-48 (2017) ("Judges and lead lawyers routinely invoke the common-fund
doctrine tojustify awarding leadership's fees."). Judges might reach the same result by using
a reasonableness test, which acknowledges that reasonableness must reflect what's rational
and appropriate in light of the settlement amounts. See Hodes, supra note 426, at 773-75,
782 (suggesting that attorneys and ethics rules focus on "value added" by the lawyer and arguing
that "the percentage-of-the-gross contingent fee should be deemed per se unreasonable").
434. For a detailed proposal along these lines, see Burch, Mass Tort Deals, supra note
194, at 190-200; see also Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the

Contingent Fee, 63 Cornell L. Rev. 529, 592 n.216 (1978) (explaining how clients' net
recovery is likely to increase overall using a similar approach); Jay Tidmarsh, Cy Pres and

the Optimal Class Action, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 767, 788 (2014) (proposing that judges
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the least, it means that lead plaintiffs' attorneys do not stand to profit from
the expenses they incur on plaintiffs' behalf.
CONCLUSION

What does justice cost and who should deliver it? What started as a
simple idea to assess the costs and benefits of appointing judicial adjuncts
quickly morphed into that much larger question. Looking under the hood
of MDLs opened our eyes to an entire industry that thrives upon mass-tort
settlements. These deals plainly compensate far more people than just the
plaintiffs. Although we could not obtain substantive payouts for the plaintiffs or class members within our proceedings, our interviews with those
involved raised concerns over how private actors' appointments affect
plaintiffs' payouts. As one magistrate lamented, "[G]nce you get that [special master] gig, it's like a gold mine, it's like a golden ticket."435
If that golden ticket becomes self-perpetuating, with attorneys
appointing private adjuncts, and private adjuncts repaying those appointments with leadership positions, common-benefit fee allocations, preferential expedited claims processing, greater awards in extraordinary injury
funds, or lighter scrutiny of class settlements, then the effects on our
nation's largest cases are significant. By pulling back the curtain onjudicial
adjunct appointments in MDLs, we aim both to shed light on the subject
and to situate it within the broader currents of privatization. When privatization moves from outside the courthouse into its chambers, it raises
access-to-justice and oversight issues. As private actors begin to reshape the
American judiciary, Article III judges have a tremendous opportunity:
They can reclaim adjudication for themselves or for magistrate judges, or
they can use the power to appoint (or not) as a crowbar into the black box
of private settlements, thereby illuminating and, perhaps improving, what

they find within.
APPENDIX

A.

Methodology

Section II.A explains how we created our dataset and selected the
ninety-two proceedings within it. We pulled each proceeding's docket on
Bloomberg Law and ran several searches to identify whether the court
appointed ajudicial adjunct: "appoint," "master," "magistrate," "mediat" (for
mediator), "administ" (for administer and administrator), and "settle" (for
settlement master). As part of our search for complexity measures in
section III.A.2, outcomes in sections III.A.2 through III.A.3, and adjunct
fees in section III.B, we also downloaded and scoured complaints, orders
should "use the net recovery to the class, rather than the gross recovery" when awarding
class counsel's fee).
435. Interviews, supra note 48.

2020 ]

JUDICIAL ADJUNCTS IN MDL

2225

approving settlements, and orders awarding fees. This exercise sometimes
revealed additional adjunct appointments that did not appear in our initial docket search.
We considered the adjunct to be appointed (or assigned as it sometimes pertained to magistrates) if there was a docket entry, order to
appoint, or judicial order to pay the judicial adjuncts. Where multiple
orders existed appointing the same person or entity to perform different
jobs in the same proceeding, we recorded these as separate appointments. 436 We deemed magistrates as part of a proceeding only if a referral
was made or the magistrate judge was appointed in a specific capacity (discovery master, etc.) and there was evidence on the docket of the magistrate
carrying out that duty. We initially relied on student coders to search many
of the dockets, but we subsequently doubled back, verified, and added to
their findings in each proceeding, increasing our confidence in the
results.
Using the same ninety-two proceedings, we also collected information
on adjuncts' fees, including amount and, for private adjuncts, which party
paid. Within each Bloomberg Law docket report, we ran several searches
to identify documents that might contain fee-related information:
"disburse," "distribut" (for distribute or distribution), "fees," "cost," "award,"
and "expenses." Because judicial adjunct fees are sometimes included with
motions to disburse common-benefit attorneys' fees, we downloaded and
analyzed those documents as well. When adjuncts were paid as the proceeding progressed, we created an Excel spreadsheet tracking payouts per
adjunct. Again, we initially relied on student coders to search many of the
dockets, but we subsequently doubled back, added to, and verified their
coding in each proceeding, increasing our confidence in the results.
Our first goal in this Article is to provide quantitative evidence of how
judicial adjuncts are used within products liability MDLs. Second, we add
narrative to those findings with our interviews, aiming to provide greater
insight into the costs and benefits of those appointments. Thus, to supplement our empirical data, we conducted semi-structured interviews with
twenty-two people involved in products liability MDLs (including twentyseven of the proceedings in our dataset and over a hundred proceedings

436. Each time ajudge appoints an adjunct, they are outsourcing their power to someone else or authorizing someone to do something. Each appointment is thus a decision
point at which judicial power could stay with the judge, go to a magistrate, or go to a private
adjunct. Accordingly, when ajudge initially appointed a magistrate or special master to perform pretrial duties and later entered a separate order assigning that person to a different
task, we recorded it as two appointments. As noted in the text, there is some creep between
these categories. A magistrate or master appointed to handle pretrial proceedings could
also wind up handling settlement. But without a separate order of appointment, we coded
that situation as only one appointment.
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overall): special masters, 437 magistrates, 43 district judges, 439 claims administrators,44 0 and plaintiff and defense attorneys.4 4 i Each conversation lasted
about an hour. We interviewed fourteen lawyers (from both the plaintiff
and defense sides), six adjuncts, and two transferee judges.
Though the interviews themselves are not a comprehensive review of
all the participants in our proceedings, they are not meant to be. Random
selection of interviewees allows us to control for experience, adjunct roles,
and a host of other factors.442 Moreover, the purpose of these interviews is
to better understand the quantitative (and statistically significant) findings
regarding the use ofjudicial adjuncts in these proceedings. By themselves,
the interviews do not offer (nor are they intended to offer) statistical significance. Instead, the interviews provide more richly detailed information
about how adjuncts were used within these MDL proceedings, why they
were used, and what issues arose in their use. Assuring interview participants of confidentiality allows them to speak freely about their experiences
without fear of consequence, allowing them to be candid in answering our
questions. 443 Thus, the surveys provide additional detail, support our
quantitative analysis, and reflect a representative and (to the best of our

437. We asked whether special masters knew if their appointment stemmed from the
judge or the parties; whether a magistrate was assigned to proceedings that they worked on
as well and, if so, how responsibilities were allocated among them; and whether questions
of cost typically get negotiated and whether those costs appear on the record.
438. We asked magistrates how they were appointed; whether a special master appeared
in proceedings alongside them and, if so, how responsibilities were allocated among them;
whether they wanted to take on MDL cases and, if so, whether barriers existed to them doing

so; what advantages or disadvantages might exist as to appointing a special master or magistrate; and if they had any sense as to how appointing a magistrate or special master might
affect cost or delay.
439. We asked district judges how magistrates are appointed in their district; whether
they have a preference for working with special masters or magistrates; whether they have
cost concerns when it comes to one or the other; whether the parties suggested that cost
was an issue for them with special masters; and whether parties kept them informed about
the total special master costs.
440. We asked claims administrators whether there were any particular issues that we
should be thinking about and addressing in this Article; how parties typically select them;
whether a special master was assigned in the MDL cases that they worked on and, if so, how
settlement responsibilities were allocated.
441. We asked attorneys if there were any particular issues that we should be thinking
about and addressing in this Article; whether they had a preference for special masters or
magistrates; how mediators are selected and compensated; who tends to suggest the use of
a special master; whether the judge oversees the special masters' bills; whether cost was a
concern; and how claims and lien-resolution administrators are selected and compensated.

442. See generally Gary King, Robert

O.

Keohane & Sidney Verba, Designing Social

Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research (1994) (explaining methods to control
variables and avoid selection bias in qualitative research).

443. See The SAGE Handbook of Applied Social Research Methods 20 (Leonard
Bickman & Debra J. Rog eds., 2d ed. 2009) ("Making the data collection anonymous may
improve the accuracy of [self-reported] data, especially about sensitive topics.").
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knowledge) honest accounting of the use of adjuncts in these MDL
proceedings.
Although we had additional interviews planned, the advent of the
novel coronavirus precluded us from conducting them. We might add,
however, that little additional information is likely to be gained from further interviews. The patterns established in the quantitative data are clear,
these interviews support those findings, and additional anecdotes, though
interesting, are unlikely to change the findings. Judicial adjuncts as an
industry may number in the thousands, but in our data we found just over
two hundred appointments (fewer total people). We generalize from our
data, as we should, and hint about what we may find outside our data given
that we have a representative sample of proceedings and spoke to a representative sample of participants in those proceedings.
B.

Included Proceedings

Table 18: List of Included Proceedings in the Dataset, by MDL Number
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